1st (UK) Armoured Division: http://www.pymes75.plus.com/military/1ukdiv.htm
3rd (UK) Mechanised Division: http://www.pymes75.plus.com/military/3ukdiv.htm
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pymes75 |
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Posts: 1241 ( 2-Jul-2009 19:02:47) |
Ooops! Forgot to include links to:
1st (UK) Armoured Division: http://www.pymes75.plus.com/military/1ukdiv.htm 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division: http://www.pymes75.plus.com/military/3ukdiv.htm |
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Trouble |
the slight problem with 4 & 4 | ||
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Posts: 274 ( 2-Jul-2009 19:24:09) |
is that the British Army runs on a rotation of 5 as per FORM
formations are rotated through 6 month blocks, the intention being a bod in a unit gets 24 months away from deployment. in theory. 1- recovery from deployment, low level training 2- indvidiual/unit training 3- unit/collective training 4- "high readiness", or pre-deployment training (i.e. forgetting everything from (3) to re-role for current ops) 5- deployment hence why CGS hoping for 10 Bdes, 5 heavy/medium, 5 light, which with 1 RM Bde would require 9 Army (3x Div HQ). somehow I think thats unlikely to happen, although recruiting could support it (the bottleneck being training people in the right skills, not a shortage people interested). thats how 1, 4, 7, 12 & 20 Bdes work. 3, 16 & 19 have been augmented by 52 & 11 to provide 2x simulataneous Bdes deployed Iraq/Afghan. I expect 52 to return to a non deployable HQ (if not already) and 11 to disband after its tour (as stated it will). The Army was expecting to up Afghan to a 2nd Bde HQ thus 52/11 would have been kept deployable (but they lack anything other than Inf, everything else is robbed from the other Bdes, not as bad as it sounds since Bdes dont deploy with everything anyway). from wiki, RAC, 10 Cav/RTR units, plus the HCR and HCMR provide 5 CR2 (1/4/7/12/20 Bdes) and 5 CVRT (19 Bde, 1 Div, 3 Div and 2 in Theatre Troops including HCR) plus the cerimonial and CBRN. not sure about the CVRT allocation and that may have been someones guess, but 5 would be insufficient for all the 6 Bdes to be so supported, hence my question. If CGS wants 8-10 Bdes with CR2 & CVRT then that would imply forming new RAC Regts... you also had the locations of 12 & 19 Bde the wrong way round, 19 now in N.Ireland/Scotland and 4 Bde ex Germany in Catterick. I think some of the units you've allcoated as Div (e.g. MLRS) are actually in Theatre Troops 1 Arty Bde alongside the ISTAR Regts that would support them, and Air Def are in 7? Arty Bde. |
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Anthony58 |
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Posts: 2638 ( 2-Jul-2009 19:42:56) |
Report: MoD faces a decade of cutsThursday, July 02, 2009The MoD could have to make cuts as deep as £6bn from its budget in the next six years if the country does not recover from the economic recession or if the MoD is not exempt from the looming cuts, a new report has found. Professor Malcom Chalmers' Future Defence Review working paper from RUSI, paints a dark picture of the coming years at the MoD. If defence spending is kept in line with the cuts expected across the government, defence spending will drop in real terms by 6.8 per cent by 2014 and 11 per cent by 2016. Even if the MoD can win an exemption in the budget cuts battle, it may still face deep and painful cuts in the coming years. Whichever government is in power from next year will have to maintain spending commitments to the NHS and education, resulting most likely in their massive budgets being frozen instead of cut. Factoring that in with the growing demand on the unemployment pay and state pension system, and the MoD and other departments may have to face cuts in order to pay for all of this. Chalmers predicts that the MoD could face a budget cut of 14 per cent if these variables all fall into place. Then there is the issue of the economy. The Treasury predicts a return of growth by late next year. But these figures are arbitrary at best and are rapidly changing in this uncertain economic climate. As a result, if growth is less than predicted so will tax revenues, meaning even deeper cuts will be required for the MoD. The government has also emphasised that many of the pending cuts will come from the capital budget. In the MoD, capital investment is among the highest in Whitehall, totalling around £9bn. "If the new chancellor persists in focusing cuts disproportionately on the capital budget, therefore, the MoD could be one of the hardest-hit departments," Chalmers wrote. When the MoD's lower standing in the cabinet is factored in, the department could face a cut of 10-15 per cent in real terms over the course of the next decade, Chalmers argues. To make savings , the MoD will have to make some tough choices. Chalmers recommends reductions in operations, the number of MoD and Armed Forces personnel, or the most likely option: Huge cuts to the procurement programme. If Chalmers is correct in his predictions, the next decade could be one to forget for the MoD. http://www.defencemanagem...m/news_story.asp?id=9972 Defense Spending in Britain Facing Cuts Up to 15%
By Andrew Chuter
Published: 2 Jul 2009 08:24 Defense spending in Britain is facing a 10 percent to 15 percent cut in real terms over the next six years as the government puts in place austerity measures to tackle massive public debt, a top British military think tank said in a report released July 2. The Royal United Services Institute says the 2010-2016 period could see between 4 billion pounds and 6 billion pounds wiped off the defense budget as a consequence of Britain's fiscal crisis. But it warns that even if the government increases taxes, bigger defense spending reductions are in the cards if the administration opted for a modest level of real terms growth to health and education or if the economy fails to recover its previous rate of growth by next year. The RUSI report, called Preparing for the Lean Years, is authored by Malcolm Chalmers, the Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy at Kings College of London. It is the latest contribution to a growing debate here about what sort of armed forces can Britain afford in the medium to long-term Three days ago, a report by the Institute for Public Policy Research urged the government to consider restructuring the military to focus on specialist capabilities as part of a deepening European defense integration and the wider NATO alliance. The IPPR report said Britain should also reconsider how it could provide a minimum nuclear deterrent when the existing Trident missile submarines go out of service and look again at whether major projects like the CVF aircraft carrier , Joint Strike Fighter and the Astute nuclear attack submarine are relevant to projected defense requirements. A general election here is scheduled for no later than June 2010. With both the leading political parties planning a strategic defense review immediately after the election, academics and others are already scrambling to influence thinking. The RUSI report, though, is probably the first to sketch out just what the financial picture might be during the period a strategic defense review is likely to cover. The core defense budgets out to 2010 and 2011 have already been set and are unlikely to be substantially altered. But RUSI said the immediate aftermath of the next election will see a "comprehensive review of government commitments leading to a prolonged period of austerity in public spending starting with the fiscal year 2011/12. The total British defense budget for 2010/11 is currently set at almost 37 billion pounds. That's not enough though to meet even current program requirements as the MoD has sought to balance its books in the face of a potentially huge overspend. Among the key findings, RUSI says: * Reduction of the MoD current and capital budgets in line with those for the whole government would see total defense spending dip by an estimated 6.8 percent in real terms from 2010 to 2011 and 2013 to 2014. The estimated reduction over six years from 2016 to 2017 would be 11 percent in real terms. If the MoD succeeds in obtaining an exemption from the full impact of planned capital cuts, it could face pressure from another source. If health and education are given special treatment and their budgets are frozen at 2010 levels in real terms, and the rate of growth of social security spending is reduced to 1 percent, this would leave the rest of government, including the MoD facing a budget cut of 14 percent over the period 2010 to 2016. The report says procurement, pay, operations in Afghanistan and capabilities could all be potential victims of a budget cut. Postponement of the replacement for the Trident-armed Vanguard nuclear submarine program "could be particularly tempting given it is due to be the MoD's largest procurement project from 2016-17," according to the report. http://defensenews.com/st...8461&c=EUR&s=TOP |
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Phil Gollin |
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Registered Member
Posts: 3737 ( 3-Jul-2009 00:00:53) Banned User |
I think they should form a new regiment in the "territorials" - the City of London bankers, who would use their superior skills to locate and destroy
IEDs in Afghanistan equipped with the latest in high-end sports cars.
Tours of duty should be arranged by order of bonus payments. . |
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 4421 ( 3-Jul-2009 01:42:31) |
If the report was honest, it would say that to justify reductions and the end of the Deterrent we must reduce our international involvement, which includes our military commitments, but also our distinctive British effort in others areas of diplomacy as well. Reduce our exposure, our involvement and there is a corresponding reduction in potential risks of threat from other states. But if one holds a distinctive line within the EU, and maintains 'red line' competances (not handing them to EU) such as a vet on defence and dimplomatic treaties of varying sorts, then we retain all the risks associated with being involved, without the benefit of a Deterrent to counter those risks. Handing those powers to the EU, means accepting the EU may choose to sacrifce our interests to the greater EU interest which is the sum of its member states's. Consequences of a reduced British influence will effect how permissive the enviroment is for us to prosper. But arguing we should do more effort to nip potential wars in the bud, requires speedy action (not something the EU is noted for) and the willingness to back up diplomatic and civilian efforts with military force. By going out there and getting more involved we may indeed stop many a small war and prevent many a conflict, but the price is increasing our exposure to the risks of being attacked by those we have thwarted in their aims, which will have been contrary to the 'peace' we have kept. The proactive we are, even if it is to prevent wars, the more we increase the cost benefit ratio of an enemy choosing to wipe us out to our detriment. That is it is either more costly to them not to attack us, or more beneficial for them to attack us or some combination of the two. |
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benjaminw1 |
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Posts: 60 ( 3-Jul-2009 12:57:59) |
Phil Gollin wrote:They have, I was in it, and they are currently on active service.... http://www.hac.org.uk/ Ben |
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used to be remf |
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Posts: 532 ( 3-Jul-2009 13:39:35) |
Phil Gollin wrote:it is the lack of those bankers drawing in tax income for the treasury that is causing a large measure of the deficit in public spending, and thus knackering the MOD. |
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pymes75 |
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Posts: 1243 ( 3-Jul-2009 14:30:13) |
hence why CGS hoping for 10 Bdes, 5 heavy/medium, 5 light,Personally, I think the CGS is dreaming. If it did happen, then my plan could simply be increased by 1x Armed/Mechanised Briage and 1x Light Role Brigade. However, I would still stick with 2x Air Assault brigades because I still believe in their potential utility in top end warfighting ops. The alternative approach is for the British Army to be organised in a similar way to the USMC - i.e. Infantry battalions operate as all round foot soldiers based around Regiments, whilst motor transport and support helicopters, etc are operated by seperate dedicated units. In this way, the army would have to form 2-4 battalions to operate the Warriors/Bulldogs/FRES used by the infantry battalions as required. Actually, I quite like the MAGTF approach for maximising flexibility........ |
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Phil Gollin |
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Posts: 3740 ( 3-Jul-2009 16:48:13) Banned User |
used to be remf wrote:Absolute rubbish. Bankers pay, however ridiculous is a pitance. If you mean the banks' activities - it is that house of cards whose collapse has caused both the huge public debt and the economic recession which means the country will earn less in tax and spend more in benefits At present the banks are trying to retrieve the situation by increasing the difference between savings and borrowings rates thus meaning that it is compamies and individuals who are actually contributing to what income the banks are making. Real growth, in general, is in the future - but the mess the banks made is here and now and government spending (debt) and the defence budgets are its visible side. |
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hulahoop7 |
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Posts: 1436 ( 3-Jul-2009 17:01:36) |
I think the government are trying to play a risky hand. They know that the only way out of the current mess is growth. An emasculated city won't bring in
the dosh for the treasury. My bet is Darling / Brown think, lets slap them on the hand and tell them to reduce exposure and enhance risk assessments /
governance, but lets essentially leave them alone again. NY etal bring in stinging regulation, London picks up all the work.
It's a dangerous hand, but perhaps the only one the UK has at the moment. |
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 4425 ( 3-Jul-2009 23:44:03) |
It's a dangerous hand, but perhaps the only one the UK has at the moment.I don't think its the only hand, but it cannot be anything but a short term solution if it is. UK must rebalance the economy away from the dominance of the financial sector. We need expansions of other areas, whether it be quality farm produce or manufacturing or electricity supply (exported to the continent and a counter to Russian gas). Fortunately Pharmaciticals cluster around the sugar daddy of the NHS, so this is one area to look at. We must'nt sit on laurels over the education sector. The further the Pound falls the more attractive UK goods and services look, but the more those goods and services are dependant on imports the less beneficial any increases will be. Now is not the time for a greater reliance on imports. Certainly Europe is not looking healthy for future growth. |
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Colin Mc |
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Posts: 772 ( 4-Jul-2009 03:55:23) |
Just to drag the thread back to an earlier theme, there was a letter in the Times today from the Editor of Battlespace (whatever that is, but I may be showing
my ignorance). In it he put forward the notion of building more Astutes but completely fitted out with TLAM. The idea is that the accuracy and destructive
power of conventional missiles has improved so far beyond WWII that they constitute an effective deterrent. Has it got legs? It is an attractive idea. Clearly
you do not deter major nuclear nations but for small nuclear nations, rogue or not it could well be an effective conventional deterrent. And do we now have to
be in the business of deterring a Russia or a China besotted with prosperity? Whaddy think? It's an armchair admirals dream - wet or dry, take your pick.
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StewartG |
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Posts: 622 ( 4-Jul-2009 09:15:29) |
"The idea is that the accuracy and destructive power of conventional missiles has improved so far beyond WWII that they constitute an effective deterrent. Has it got legs?" No. You might recall the TV footage of Tomahawks bimbling around over Baghdad in 2003. If they move slowly enough that a CNN or BBC cameraman can track them, how much of a deterrent are they? |
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Phil Gollin |
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Registered Member
Posts: 3743 ( 4-Jul-2009 09:36:46) Banned User |
Zen9 wrote: Wishful thinking I'm afraid, Thatcher's policies detroyed all that. It is possible (look at Germany's industries with equivalent or higher wages) - but only with State support and intervention at a level that even the Libs Dems could only dream of. The future of the UK lies with the Financial and service sectors - the problem is that the banks by means of artificially low savings rates and artificially high borrowing rates are essentially taxing the UK population, industry and finance to get themselves back into the black (as well, of course, as the Government taking out long-term debt which will end up as "proper" tax in future years (and less defence spending). Of course, if we lived in a truely "globilised" economy, we would have German, Australian and Chinese (!) banks offering more attractive saving and borrowing rates - but strangely enough it doesn't happen - I wonder why ? . |
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Jim WH |
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Posts: 1285 ( 4-Jul-2009 09:45:09) |
The point of the deterrent is that there is precisely no way to stop it. If HMG wants to play that game, then the only sensible way to do it is with ballistic
missiles armed with really nasty nuclear warheads, anything else is too vulnerable to high-end SAMs. Also, without nuclear warhead the opponent may be able to
rationalise the threat (i.e. "we can handle a few thousand pounds of explosives") which reduces the chance of the deterrent having it's desired
effect.
Of course, the fact that the Royal Navy has TLAM (and that the RAF has Storm Shadow) is very helpful in terms of overall deterrence value of the British Armed Forces. It means that any potential adversary knows that HMG has a variety of ways of causing them pain with no risk to her own personnel, thus lowering the 'credibility threshold' (to use the game theory terminology as described by Gil Merom in his work discussing sub-nuclear deterrence). And, it also complicates the task of deploying a Area Defence SAM system since it means that high value targets need to be defended with a high density of the available systems at the cost of low value targets, which in turn become vulnerable to strikes by other platforms (manned strike aircraft, the current generation of UCAV, and even potentially the soon to enter service Loitering Munitions). |
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Nauticus27 |
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Posts: 139 ( 4-Jul-2009 11:11:46) |
It's an interesting debating point whether deterrence must have gold plated certainty of delivery, or whether a sufficient measure of deterrence may be
achieved by placing sufficient uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor. With that in mind it seems to me it's possible to discern differences in
the treatment afforded to those rogue states known to have a nuclear capability, however limited, compared with those that don't. So a country that could
deliver nuclear effect from a range of sources (eg air and sea launched cruise missiles) might be seen as a risk not worth taking. It may be that you could
achieve a high level of deterrent effect that would exert useful influence in a wide range of potential circumstances, even if not every potential
circumstance. It depends how much is considered enough.
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 4426 ( 4-Jul-2009 12:00:27) |
The problem with a TLAM type missile armed with a nuclear warhead, is essentialy that the TLAM can be shot down, and done so by a functioning air defence
system such as most developed countries possess. This is after all a weapon that is not that stealthy, nor that fast.
The situation gets worse of course the larger said country is and the longer the flight time over said to reach a target. In order to get your weapon to its target therefor, without interception, requires you either swamp the defences on the assumption one or two of your missiles will get to that specific target or you use your airpower to invade their airspace and degrade their ability to intercept the missile. The problem with swamping is you must arm all your missiles with the nuclear warheads since you cannot know which will actualy make it to target and this all costs a pretty penny or two. Now an RV comming in at multiples of the speed of sound from outside the atmosphere is both faster to its target and beyond the reach of all but those systems able to perform ABM. If nations develople ABM and intigrate it into their defensive systems then ballistic missiles will cease to be credible weapons. Interception outside the atmosphere is achievable, since the RV is effectively without any serious power of manouver, the longer it is tracked the more accurate the plot and the predictable the course, thus interception is 'reletively' easy. You loft the interceptor into the path of the incomming missile. Now what this reveals is that there is in fact a Air Defence systems gap, created by the lack of investment into SAM systems for dealing with high speed vehicles inside the atmosphere that can manouver. The most notable case being the SR.71, whose mach 3+ speed and 80,000ft+ ceiling put it beyond the effective reach of SAMs. It needs to be understood that most SAMs have a volume of airspace in which they can achive a kill, and in cross section this looks like an onion. They are most effective in a altitude band ranging from a few thousand feet to around 40,000ft and beyond that the actual area conracts down to ever lesser areas until you reach its maximum altitude where it can only hit a aircraft if it flys directly over the launcher and the missile was launched in time to reach that maximum height. |
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Trouble |
accepting this thread deviation ! | ||
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Posts: 281 ( 5-Jul-2009 21:57:59) |
whats the difference between a "light" brigade with light infantry and helicopter support such as demonstrated in afghan now (e.g. Black Watch's
assualts) and an "air assualt" brigade where the only differce is that some/most of the guys are qual'd to leap out of hercules ? (which isnt
then used) there isnt a difference. all brigades in afghan are operating as a mixture of mech, light mech and airmobile/assualt, as dictated by the balance of
taskings and protection/mobility requirements. a golf bag approach.
the key purpose of centralising the apaches in 16 was training, doctrine and support, spread them out and you lose the economies of scale in every respect (from posting options to equipment and log support costs). helos are (and always have been) a centrally controlled resource because they are scarce, hence run by JHC and its operational JHFs rather than as part of formations. my observation is that since everyone in the Army needs AH/LUH support and training time, then the current concentration in a single brigade seems odd. as for TLAM vs ICBM, former would be a daft solution, its only supported by many as a stalking horse to kill the entire thing and by idiots who dont understand what the practical differences are. the entire premise of deterrance is to put that certainty into the enemys mind. and given the enlarged numbers plus the need for additional weapons & SSN/aircraft platforms, I cant see how it would be cheaper anyway. I think its ironic that huge anti BMD stance of the "left" prolongs the lifetime of the ICBM, as if the effectiveness could be reliabily expected to be significantly reduced (as BMD will one day) then that for the first time removes the guarantee and to me is the only way possession of nukes could be seriously questioned (i.e. if they couldnt be delivered) and the "revolution" that occurs will parallel the 50s switch from mass convetional to MAD. |
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pymes75 |
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Posts: 1246 ( 8-Jul-2009 13:29:43) |
whats the difference between a "light" brigade with light infantry and helicopter support such as demonstrated in afghan now (e.g. Black Watch's assualts) and an "air assualt" brigade where the only differce is that some/most of the guys are qual'd to leap out of hercules ?The difference is that what the Black Watch have been doing in 'Stan is just one small part of 16 Air Assault Brigade's intended capability - i.e. they're not performing any Parachute insertions, TALOs, massed aviation attacks, or a mixture of all of the above! Equally, they're conducting the helicopter assaults in comparitively benign conditions - i.e. not against heavily defended air space, requiring the close co-ordination of AEW, Fast Air, AH, artillery, support helicopters and Hercs. Damn, got a conference call to make.... |
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 4434 ( 8-Jul-2009 14:00:21) |
Indeed, to defeat ABM with ICBMs would decrease the available weight of warheads (due to increasing the suvivability of each RV) on each missile and likely drive up the numbers of missiles themselves or force larger missiles, all of which is 'virtual attrition' since its sucking monies away from others things to fund such a force to effectiveness. Worse that attrition would see the same spend produce less numbers of missiles and RVs. SO ABM means the manouvering bomber is back, which at high speed and altitude is remains more survivable and far more difficult to defeat. Duncan Sandys was wrong....although oddly enough he did put forward the hypersonic research effort, so perhaps he saw this then but it lookes like it was just a sop since he so favoured the missile. Alternatively you 'walk' the bombs to the target by blasting corridors through the enemies defences, most achievable with more nuclear weapons. So its all going to cost a heap more one way or another once ABM proliforates and if the Air Defence Gap is closed against hypersonic bombers, then the costs become astronomic. Under those conditions I suspect we'd see the real militarisation of orbital space. |
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