IIRC, the SEPECAT Jaguar was designed with STOL in mind. With its STOL capability could the Jaguar have operated from Stanley airfield in 1982? Did the Jaguar
have air refueling capability in 1982 in order to get the planes there in time? Assuming the Jaguars can make it to the islands a few weeks prior to the
invasion, you'll also need to get fuel, logistics and airfield SAM assets into the base. If we can get all that together, and assuming the Jaguars can take
off and land at Stanley, what role do we give them? With limited air-2-air capability (no radar, no medium range AAMs, etc.), the Jags may have trouble facing
Mirage fighters.
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 Admiral Beez |
Could SEPECAT Jaguar operated from Stanley airfield in... |
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Posts: 4520 ( 4-May-2008 05:24:16) |
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Red Admiral |
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Posts: 1861 ( 4-May-2008 11:29:22) |
I'm not sure how long the runway at Stanley was back in 1982. A Guardian newspaper report from the time says 4000ft, but the current runway is only 3000ft
long and it was extended post-war. I'd guess that Jaguars could have operated from the runway given that the fleet retired to RAF Cosford which has a tiny
runway.
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3494 ( 4-May-2008 13:41:12) |
Jaguar....?
Could be, I think the runway requirements are 450m of length. Sidewinder is the AAM they could carry on the overwing stations, twin 30mm ADEN cannon. Compared to the Sea Harrier their faster and have a potentialy higher ceiling, the wing is good for agility but they do lack power somewhat. Really need good AEW but whether they can perform interceptions in bad weather is questionable without radar. Assuming the time is there, once again a podded radar set inside a droptank might improve matter somewhat at the expense of drag and G loadings. Mind you, get a few of the Agave equiped variants the Indians have, or I think a few where built for France and you've got some interesting potential to spoof the Argentinians. Now talking of French kit, get a few Mirage F1's instead, and your cooking with gas. |
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taschoene |
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Posts: 4212 ( 4-May-2008 15:13:46) |
I'm not sure where you got that runway figure. I'm looking at Jane's from 1982-83 and it gives the following:
Take-off Run: 565m (Clean), 880m (4x1000-lb bombs), 1250 (8x1,000-lb bombs) Landing run: 470m (normal wt, with chute), 680m (normal wt, no chute) The pre-war Stanley airfield was around 920 m long, so in theory it was long enough to operate Jaguars at moderate loads. B(no comment on other requirements, like it's weight capacity) But what effect could that have had? Jaguar GR.1 had no air intercept radar and no AAMs--the overwing Sidewinder pylons were for the International version and were only added to the RAF models in 1990 for Op GRANBY. That could have been done in 1982, but a similar effort for Harrier GR.3 took two full weeks, even with a shooting war already underway. Contrary to Zen's post, a podded radar installation would not be feasible. Air intercept radars need to be aligned more precisely than a weapon pylon can generally manage, which is why podded forward-looking radars are so rare. On top of that are issues of power supply, vibration, and cooling, all of which would be challenging in a pod, much less one thrown together in a matter of days. And of course, there's the question of displaying the radar data, since Jaguar had no multi-function or CRT type display at the time. Of course, all this ignores the big issue, which was how to get several weeks of warning time. Even the Argentine Armed forces didn't have that much advanced notice of the invasion -- the decision to invade was made on March 26, the fleet sailed on March 28, and the invasion force landed early on 2 April. That's seven days to analyze the intelligence, decide on a course of action, design and install the modifications, and fly south. (The flight alone would take a full day.) The absolute first possible indication of imminent military action would have been the decision to accelerate planning for the invasion on 23 March. That gives you ten days. Even if the British somehow learned of this and reacted immediately, the timelines make it clear that there's no time for anything but sending forces south as is. And even that requires a sense of urgency that simply didn't exist until after shots were fired. |
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 Obi Wan Russell |
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Posts: 194 ( 4-May-2008 16:21:11) |
Jaguars with Agave radars wouldn't be much use for Air Defence, as it is primarily used for attacking surface targets. It would have been feasible to re
equip a couple of sqns of Jaguars with the SHARs Blue Fox radar from around 1980 onwards, and these would have been ready in time. Again the foresight and
political will were completely absent, there was no percieved need or threat. Far easier would have been a joint RAF/RN buy of Sea Harriers, with the RAF
examples being deployed to Germay alongside the GR3 force. The FRS 1 was based on the GR3 so a lot of commonality of parts. The whole point of the Harrier was
it's ability to survive a Warsaw Pact first strike on NATO airfields by deploying to rough strips and forest tracks. Following that logic if the HArriers
are the only survivable air asset then fighters would be required to escort the strike packages, so a mix of FRS 1s alongside the GR 3s would be sensible.
Assuming these aircraft were purchased and entered service on a similar timescale to the historical SHARs then the RAF if required would be able to deploy a
mixed FRS 1/GR 3 force to the Falklands in the months before March 82. This could be done under the guise of an excercise, and if properly managed may have
proved sufficient deterrent to the Argentine Junta. A sqn of Jags could certainly have accompanied this deployment to bloster the force, as at the time many
foreign governments (including Argentina) did not rate the Harrier as a 'serious' combat type, ie good performer at air shows but a toy, no more.
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3496 ( 4-May-2008 16:55:49) |
Well my figures might well be off I grant you for the TO and L runs, my only source being an old copy of FI with the appropriate data....somewhere in a large
stash of copies of FI....somewhere.
As for the rails, clearly it was do-able, cost and time is the big problems there. Which is of course the killer question on this whole scenario. As for Podded radar....anything it better than nothing which also goes for the Agave sets too. On the CRT front that is a problem no doubts about it. Blue Fox would be I grant you a far better option, and considering the priode was'nt Ferranti already pushing a development of that that would lead to Blue Vixen.....I do seem to reccal something like that, but perhaps thats later on. |
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bager1968 |
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Posts: 2919 ( 4-May-2008 21:38:53) |
taschoene wrote: So, when was the planning first started? If MI6 got word of this, then all bets are off... you have much longer to make the minimal preparations (re-activate 6 Gannet AEW and fit Jaguars with the overwing pylons & AIM-9) ands fly them down. From http://www.vectorsite.net/avalize.html
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Obi Wan Russell |
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Posts: 197 ( 4-May-2008 22:18:25) |
"The Gannet AEW.3 served into 1977. When the AEW.3 was obsoleted, the AN/APS-20 radars were salvaged again, this time being fitted to equally antiquated
Shackleton airframes to result in the Shackleton AEW.2."
The Gannet served until Ark Royal was withdrawn in December 1978 (last launch 28 November 1978, 849 B flight and HQ flight disbanded shortly afterwards). At the time only about 6 or 7 AEW3s were operational (4 with B flight) along with a couple of COD4s (since 73 they were only used for training, to save airframe hours on the AEW3s). The original production run was 44 airframes, and twelve of those withdrawn from service in 1970 had their radars removed for installation in the RAF Shackleton MR2s (becoming AEW2s), entering service with 8 sqn in 1972. After disbanding at least two Gannets were retained for trials work (at least one was used in 82-83 for comparative trials with the Sea King AEW2). Six of the Shackletons were withdrawn from service in 1981 as a budget cut, though concieveably some of these could have been sent south with the Jag/Harrier force. Depends on wether or not they could make the transit flight to Stanley from Ascencion and if they could operate from the runway there. Gannets would have to be shipped down, as they had no in flight refuelling capability and I don't think they could carry enough fuel for a ferry flight. AFAIK, Shackletons didn't have probes either, but could have been adapted more easily.
Last Edited By: Obi Wan Russell
4-May-2008 22:21:01.
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taschoene |
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Posts: 4213 ( 4-May-2008 22:40:32) |
The fact is, Argentine operational security was exceptionally good.
Planning for an invasion was initiated (as an option, not a commitment) in January 1982, with an initial draft completed in mid-February and a final plan in mid-March. Those plans called for the operation to go forward in early southern hemisphere winter (May-July). This planning was done by an extremely small team under intense security -- secret meetings in changing locations, handwritten notes, no secretaries, etc. No more than a dozen people knew what was being planned for until about 23 March. Pieces that had to be farmed out to lower-level staffs were done without telling them what operation they were planning for. The only people in the know were extremely senior officers, unlikely to be compromised. Bear in mind that there had been similar planning exercises before, in the 1968 and 1976 crises and several times in between. The Argentine Naval War School used the capture of the Falklands as a standard case for testing its planning procedures, so the scenario had been worked out on an almost annual basis at various levels. It's unlikely that intelligence notice of yet another planning round would have led anyone to expect imminent hostilities. There were none of the expected indicators (troops at increased readiness, concentration of transport assets, etc) until just a couple of days before the fleet sailed. And even then, the British political reaction was to read it as posturing and domestic political appeasement. Which was true, but misunderstood how far the junta was being driven by its own internal political concerns. |
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3501 ( 4-May-2008 23:24:22) |
The suspicion has always been there that senior elements in the UK did'nt want to hear any message about Argentina's intentions.
During the 70's forces where sent to the South Atlantic, at a time when Argentina was making noises about the Falklands, naturaly nothing happened
precisely because of such a movement. Demonstrating UK comittment to hold their territory and that they where aware of Argentina's intentions.
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emc |
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Posts: 3727 ( 4-May-2008 23:51:45) |
Zen9 wrote: I think that's a vast leap of logic, barring some contemporary evidence from the Argentinian actors to support it.
(added in edit) I suspect that Argentinian domestic politics were the prime driver of the invasion, with UK domestic politics (and the presence of woman as head of government) being enablers.
Last Edited By: emc
5-May-2008 11:37:04.
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