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The Japanese planes knew that they had an appreciable advantage in strike range and were used to making long range strikes, yet Nagumo moved his fleet to within range of Midway's planes and thus had to defend itself from a strike when it really didn't have to. Why did Nagumo do this when he could have just as well waited until after his first strike had returned from taking out Midway's airfacilities (and thus crippled Midway's offensive capabilities) before exposing his fleet (and its air operations) to the bother of a potencial strike from Midway?

The "range advantage" supposedly enjoyed by IJN aircraft over their USN counterparts seems to have seldom had any practical effect in actual combat. But where Midway was concerned, you have to ask yourself, how much of a range advantage did Nagumo's planes have over the B-17's, PBY's, B-26's, TBF's and SBD's ranged against them on Midway? Did Nagumo even know what planes he was facing at Midway and their potential combat ranges? It was actually Nagumo's air staff who decided on the Midway strike plan, they probably realized they had little chance of out-ranging the land-based planes which could operate from Midway.

Even if he had, Nagumo may not have elected to make a long range attack because range, especially where carrier aircraft are concerned, comes with a price. Payloads have to be reduced, exact navigation, which is difficult for the fighters, becomes a necessity, time over the target is restricted, and cripples (and there were a lot of them after the Midway strike) are much less likely to make it back to their carriers. Nagumo wasn't conducting a raid as at Pearl Harbor or Ceylon, he was supporting an invasion which might require many sorties, and then he would, if all went according to the Japanese plan, have to fight a carrier battle. He was already short of planes before the battle opened, so he could not afford to lose many neutralizing Midway; striking from longer range would increase the chances of doing just that.

This is doubly perplexing because is it a basic of IJN doctrine to avoid facing two threats at once, AND to always maintian first strike capability.

Where is this written? Nagumo and his air staff certainly didn't seem overly concerned about getting off the first strike against the US carriers at Midway. It was Fletcher and Spruance who sacrificed the possibility of a coordinated strike in order to achieve the first strike against the Japanese carriers.

Just out of curiosity, I looked up the respective ranges of the aircraft on the opposing sides at Midway. It would appear that, if either side had a range advantage, it must go to the Midway aircraft. Nagumo had no choice but to attack Midway from within Midway's strike range.

"Shattered Sword" list the ranges of the Japanese planes as follows;

A6M2......................................1010 miles
B5N2........................................528 miles
D3A1........................................795 miles


Various websites, and "Victory at Sea", give the following ranges for the American aircraft at Midway;

B-17 (full load).........................1094 miles
B-26.........................................1100 miles
SBD............................................950 miles
SB2U.......................................1000 miles
TBD1..........................................650 miles
F2A...........................................963 miles
F4F...........................................770 miles
PBY.........................................2540 miles

The whole operation went wrong when the IJN could not conduct aerial reconaissance of Midway because some USN PT boats were at French Frigate Shoals.

The plan to refuel reconnaissance planes from subs at French Frigate Shoal was called Operation K by the Japanese. It failed when the subs involved arrived at French Frigate Shoal and found it occupied by an American seaplane tender and a destroyer. (Shattered Sword", page 99) Operation K, which had been intended to reconnoiter Pearl Harbor by air, thus failed. The Japanese apparently never attempted an aerial reconnaissance of Midway which they could have easily accomplished from Wake, 1,200 miles to the west, but they did have Midway under observation by submarine, the commander of which reported heavy aerial activity at Midway from about May 29th. on. The report was forwarded to Yamamoto, thus the Japanese were aware of large numbers of American planes at Midway, but , for whatever reason, no one on the Combined Fleet staff seemed to recognize the obvious implications.

Japanese intelligence about Midway was very poor; they had little idea of the American ground or air defenses, and indeed, little basic knowledge of even the geography of the island. Yamamoto's plan was intended to catch and destroy Midway's defending aircraft on the ground, and little thought seems to have been given to what might happen if Midway's defenders failed to follow the script.