Try and clear the formatting.
"A fair point, let's compare this to what the RN promised before World War I, they promised the rapid destruction of the German fleet but did not deliver it."
Did they? I thought the RN's failure to articulate a clear strategic goal resulted in the arrival of Winston, the imposition of a staff, and by default, the acceptance of a continental policy for the forthcoming war?
"It is a fair criticism that the RAF were victims of their own propaganda, but can you blame them for being a bit cocky in those circumstances?"
The screw the other services, bombers at all cost mentality pre dated the war by a considerable margin, and it also had deleterious effects, or potential deleterious effects in their own service. The head of the service before Newell banned the establishment of repair depots, because a modern war would last weeks!
But if we were to examine the argument that war experience to date justified a heavy bomber or bust mentality in early 1941 then lets look at that experience. All of their bombing up to that point had included disastrous losses and failure to achieve much in the war of operational objectives (the attrition of the German invasion craft being one exception). Their success was a defensive fighter battle.
Had they limited future goals (and concentrated resources) to reinforcing this success, and putting well controlled, well serviced fighters over the heads of the key operational armies and fleets over the next twenty four months - what joy, what success!
Instead we have the visionary Freeman claiming it would be immoral to accept American singe engine fighters because they were completely useless.
"Hindsight?"
It is with the benefit of hindsight we can appreciate Freeman's technical achievements.
And it is with the benefit of hindsight that we now know this winning the war with bombing was wrong headed, at least in 1941. I have respect for Freeman, but up till now I had not realized to what extent, to miss quote Harris, he was a "bomber boy".
