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Into the Great White Open - Side Story Two - The Prinz Heinrich Letter(s)

A Letterstime Side Story

There was a long discussion in German Historian circles, whether the later famous Prinz Heinrich Letter(s) might have had a different content, had they been written a day or two later and not in the morning hours of July 08^th, 1915. Even foreign historians had frequent discussions about that.

With hindsight, we now know that "Die Regenschlacht" in the night July 07th/July 08^thhad drastic consequences on future German Naval Strategy. Germany had lost its first Dreadnoughts in the morning hours of July 08^thand all Hochseeflotte's still active battleships were damaged there. All which remained of large Hochseeflotte units undamaged or in no need of an overhaul were only the SMS Seydlitz and SMS Derfflinger.

It was a strange fact that Germany's naval might suddenly had to rely on the five undamaged Predreadnoughts of the Braunschweig and Deutschland Classes of the Second Battlesquadron and the 'Rescuer-Force' of Fourth Battlesquadron with its two Braunschweig's and the five Wittelsbach-Class ships. Many a commenter would have had liked to send them to the scrap-yards after the Kaiserschlacht. They now had to rethink their positions, although few so did in public.

The pursuit of the Grand Fleet by Necki's ramshackle force of survivours was met by fierce resistance of the Grand Fleets Superdreadnoughts and for the first time it was acutely felt that the Hochseflottes 28 cm and 30.5 cm guns were really inferiour to the British guns of 34.3 cm and 38.1 cm calibers.

Prinz Heinrich perceived Viceadmiral Letters as an ally, that much we know today. He was of course extremely worried about the transfer of his strongest and most active units to the North Sea. He had lost his fast cruisers SMS Augsburg and SMS Luebeck in June as well as his strongest Armoured Cruiser, the SMS Roon . Ironically the Regenschlacht can be viewed in direct connection with the sortie of the German Arctic Squadron to their destination and fate, Archangel in Northern Russia.

His Baltic Fleet was augmented by still older ships, but these were hardly a replacement. Clearly the letter to the CO of the Hochseeflotte was influenced by the forthcoming sortie of the Libau bound forces.

The skirmish or battle , depending to whichever histoirian one listens to, in the Baltic some days later only aggravated his concerns and showed clearly that the German Baltic Forces were on their last legs.

Letters however was a natural ally for Prinz Heinrich, but it was not clear in the early days of the bloody July of 1915.

(Dr. Jan Wetzke, Deutsche Marinestrategie des Jahres 1915, Band Zwei, Ostsee, Hamburg 1962, Bernhard & Graefe Verlag)

From C in C Ostseeflotte to C in C Hochseeflotte Kiel, July 8^th1915

Mein Lieber Admiral,

it was my wish for a long time to congratulate you and your men on the recent successes in last month battle against the English Grand Fleet.

I am among those who hold their thumbs for the success of your operations in the North Sea.

However, I have urgent things to discuss with you when these operations will be over. I can only repeat that these matters are really urgent.

Let me explain:

1. Strategic situation in the Ostsee
   
   The capture of the port of Libau and its readiness as a fleet base in the upcoming weeks will greatly improve our strategic position. This is a good advanced base, which allows our ships to be in their operational theaters much faster and stay there longer.
   
   The soon to begin operations (Footnote ¹) of the Heer into the Baltikum will increase the importance of that port. Maybe soon our Kavallerie will bath their horses in the Gulf of Riga.
   
   The supply of iron ore from Sweden is one of the most crucial factors for our war efforts. The main task of my forces is to protect that traffic. Still there is hope to lure Sweden to our side as an ally against the Russians. Finland and the Aaland-Islands may be arguments for an entry.
   
   The protection of the German shore is of second importance compared to that, even though the publicity factor of an attack should not be under estimated.
   
   

2. German Fleet Situation
   
   Aufklaerungsgruppe Ostsee as the most active part of the fleet has a very agile commander with Kontreadmiral Hopman.
   It's main fighting units were greatly weakened by the transfer of SMS Roon to the ongoing special mission. Even harder is the loss of fast modern cruisers, especially that of SMS Augsburg for the Americas mission.
   The transfer of the 3 former Kuestenschutzverband Nordsee Gazelle-Class cruisers is no appropriate measure, for the cruisers are weaker and slower than their Russian adversary's.
   
   Please see Attachment OOB July 09^th 1915.
   
   The planned transfer of Fourth Battlesquadron is still pending and may not take place in the near future. (Footnote ²)
   
   Therefore it is mandatory to get reinforcements in the form of
   
   

3. Schlachtgeschwader Ostsee
   
   Former Fifth Battlesquadron is in the process of being reactivated. Tomorrow, July 9^th 1915 SMS Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse and SMS Kaiser Barbarossa will cover the transfer of SMS Woerth and SMS Brandenburg to Libau. Both units of the Brandenburg - Class are needed to protect the important harbor as mobile batteries. They ought to support the Kuestenpanzerschiff SMS Beowulf, which is currently the only unit with heavy artillery there.
   SMS Woerth and SMS Brandenburg, totally obsolete, are too old for any other task, even in this theater.
   
   We were fortunate to find enough crews for the two Old Kaiser-Class ships and the Brandenburg's. The two Kaisers will sail on to Danzig - Neufahrwasser after the covering task is completed, to form the nucleus of Schlachtgeschwader Ostsee.
   
   Unfortunately we do not have enough sailors to man SMS Kaiser Friedrich III. and Kaiser Karl der Grosse. The latter we ordered to be transfered from Wilhelmshaven July 6^th. It will arrive in Kiel today. I tasked Admiral von Ingenohl to take command of this force, as soon as we found enough crew-members. Please support me with this.
   
   About the transfer of SMS Kaiser Karl der Grosse, which was under your command, although it organizationally belong to the Baltic Fleet, I hope you do not object to that transfer.
   
   Which brings me to an important point. Since march this year, SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II. is acting as the nominal flagshipp of the C in C Hochseeflotte, which happens to be you of course. This old ship is only acting as a mobile office and as we were told, you do not really use her. Can you please release the ship with my brothers name? We urgently need it here in the Baltic. This is no request you should take lightly, for the loss for you and your Hochseeflotte will be small but the gain for us here in the Baltic great.
   
   

4. Fast Cruisers
   
   Furthermore consider the re-transfer of SMS Augsburg and the transfer of SMS Kolberg. We really need fast cruisers again. Without them we loose in the important field of scouting.
   Furthermore the transfer of both cruisers would allow to send one or two Gazelle - Class cruisers to Kuestenschutzverband Ostsee, which is currently operating with two of the resource hogs of the Freya-Class (Footnote ³). Konteradmiral Mischke by the way returned from a successful commerce raiding trip into the Skagerrak and Kattegat today.
   
   

5. Future Plans
   
   Depending on how active the Russian Baltic Fleet will be this summer and how well our land warfare operations will be concerning the Baltikum, we might be able to take the very important city of Riga.
   
   This will give us important docking facilities and deprive the Russians of the important Muehlgrabenwerft there, where they are building the big Hochseetorpedoboote of the Nowik-Class.
   
   If that succeeds, we will have to take the Baltic Islands, Oesel at least. Currently they are not heavily fortified and assuming that the Heer will be able to provide an Infanteriedivision for some weeks, this should be not heavy a feat.
   
   We are very unsure about the usability of the seven remaining Kuestenpanzerschiffe of the Siegfried - Class, but very likely they will be surplus in your theater of war. They would be ideally suited to operate near the Baltic Islands, assuming they will be covered adequately. Together with the five old Kaiser - Class ships they could form a potent force factor. Even a loss of one or two of those would not greatly affect our real strength, for they ought to be scrapped soon, after the war will end.
   
   This again is a good chance to strengthen Our Baltic Forces without really weakening yours.
   
   

6. The Russian Fleet
   
   Best current intelligence indicates that the four Gangut - Class Dreadnoughts will be operational at the End of Summer (Footnote ⁴). This will change the strategic situation greatly, assuming they will leave the Gulf of Finland. For July and August I assume that the addition of Schlachtgeschwader Ostsee with five (5)! active units will be enough to counter any possible threat.
   
   The two Imperator Pavel I. - Class Semidreadnoughts were not at all active during the last year. They are used to guard the Central Mine Position of the Russians. This may change with the availability of the Dreadnoughts.
   
   The older Battleships Tsesarevich and Slawa can be effectively countered by Ingenohl's force.
   
   The Russian Armoured Cruisers are very superior to our Aufklaerungsgruppe Ostsee available cruisers. Five Russian Armoured Cruisers stand against our two. The Rurik alone is more a Semi-Battlecruiser and totally comparable to our SMS Bluecher, which is unfortunately not available for us.
   The slightly older Admiral Makarov and Bayan are equal to our two Armored cruisers. The Rossia and Gromoboi are bigger but weaker protected than ours.
   Currently the old Protected Cruiser SMS Kaiserin Augusta has replaced the transferred SMS Roon, but is no match for those above mentioned ones nor the good and quite modern Russian equivalents Oleg and Bogatyr.
   To round their Cruiser Forces up there are the older cruisers Aurora and Diana. These are bigger and more powerful than our available small cruisers, but fortunately slower than those.
   
   Concerning Hochseetorpedobote the Russians are far superiour to our two Flottillas, one of which is with Kontreadmiral Mischke in the western Baltic and one with Konteradmiral Hopman in the eastern Baltic. I do not have enough boats to effectively cover the Libau transfer, let alone protect our core stength, the forming Schlachtgeschwader Ostsee. Clearly measures will have to be taken to add strength here. The Russina force a bit more detailed:
   Apart from the very potent Destroyer Nowik, which is absolutely far stronger than any unit we have available, it is significant to note that the larger units of the Russians are much more heavily armed with two 10 cm guns, which outclass even our few 8.8 cm armed ones by a wide margin. Fortunately our boats are much faster and carry a heavier torpedo armament. Intelligence suggests that up to four sisters of Nowik may appear in the next months. They pose a serious threat
   English submarines have augmented the growing numbers of Russian ones, which will even more stress our already far overstretched escorts.
   
   The main drawback is our slower speed compared to the Russians. This, combined with a weaker force, is very dangerous and may lead to disaster in the long run (Footnote ⁵).
   
   

7. Summary
   
   We urgently need more fast cruisers, crews for two battleships and SMS Kaiser Wilhelm II. back from your command. The transfer of at least three coast defense ships will be appreciated as well.
   
   We count on your support.
   
   I recommend a meeting to discuss this with our staff and invite you to visit me in Kiel or Danzig or Libau, wherever you like.

As this is concerning questions of our Kriegsstrategie, a copy of this document will be send to Reichsmarineamt, Admiralstab and Marine Kabinet.

Mit bestem Grusse verbleibe ich Ihr

gez. Heinrich Prinz von Preussen, Grossadmiral