An exert from "Wilfred Freedman - the Genius behind Allied Air Superiority" Written by a post war RAF fighter pilot.
Bear in mind that the period he is referring too is the twelve months that included;
Innumerable reverses in the western desert.
The bombing up of illustrious.
Greece
Crete
The bombing up of Formidable.
The loss and damage of scores of naval ships off Crete.
The loss of PoW and Repulse, the loss of the Malay Peninsular and Singapore.
Meantime heavy bombers are using a huge portion of British industrial resources, taking heavy losses, and getting 50% of bombs within 5 miles of their target…
Was Freeman just another light blue @!+*!!%? Or perhaps a very good example of one?
Once Roosevelt had been re-elected President in November 1940, and his Lend-Lease proposals had been announced, Harry Hopkins, his great friend and confidant, was told that he would be given the job of administering the new scheme. By the time the Lend-Lease Bill was submitted to Congress, Hopkins had arrived in Britain, and Churchill instructed Beaverbrook to give him the latest information about British aircraft production. Other US appointments soon followed: a new American Ambassador, John Winant, took over from the pessimistic, anglophobe Kennedy,* and Averell Harriman arrived to become Hopkins' London representative on Lend-Lease matters. The change in attitude soon became obvious to Freeman and the rest of the Air Staff. Hopkins, Winant, and Harriman were dedicated opponents of Hitler's Germany, and staunch friends to Britain, and Freeman - and Britain's allies - had good cause to be grateful for their advice and support over the next four years.
The commencement of Lend-Lease quickly revealed the deep divisions between the Air Staff and the MAP over American aircraft orders. Given access to MAP's figures by a very reluctant Beaverbrook,` the US Air Attache, Scanlon, told Hopkins: 'The Air Ministry wants bombers [while] Beaverbrook thinks they need fighters. I think the Air Ministry is right" Without telling the Air Ministry, Beaverbrook also tried to persuade the Army to place large orders in the USA for dive bombers. - which they refused to do."
By the end of March 194 1, Sir Henry Self, head of the British Air Commission [BAC] in Washington, had drawn up a programme, probably on MAP advice, for the delivery to Britain of 3,000 medium bombers, 4,000 light bombers, 1,400 dive bombers, 6,500 single-engined fighters and 1,ooo twin-engined fighters. A high proportion of these aircraft would, in fact, have been completely useless for RAF operations, because of their short range, and poor performance, whilst only 600 four-engined bombers were scheduled for delivery to Britain between January 1941 and June 1942. As soon as Freemannsaw the programme, he slated it as `deplorable' and `grossly immoral'.
We will be unable to use many of the aircraft which will be delivered ... They arc paid for by a foreign nation, and their performance rules them out of the sky."
To prove his point, he ordered the Air Ministry's Director of Bombing Operations to produce a map to show how the short range of the American light bombers would restrict their operational utility if they were flown from typical UK East-An glian bases." Courtney was advised to tell Self not to place these additional orders, and to instruct the Americans that the factories concerned should be instructed to turn over forthwith to heavy bombers. `If they refuse, the raw materials [to make these useless aircraft] should instead be fabricated to our needs and embodied in British heavy bomber types such as the Halifax and Lancaster.'"
But it was the job of Beaverbrook at MAP, to condemn the programme, and on 7 April, in a prompt volte-face. MAP cabled BAC in Washington to press for a review:
The programme is quite unacceptable in its present form: too few heavy bombers: too many fighters. Additional heavy bomber production must be obtained by diverting existing capacity from other types and creating new capacity.'
By March 1941, Freeman had convinced Hopkins and Scanlon that heavy bombers were of far greater importance than other types, offering huge advantages in terms of operating costs, but he was still desperately worried by the mounting evidence of Beaverbrook's quest for `numbers', regardless of whether the aircraft were of any use to the RAF, and he realised that Beaverbrook's influence over aircraft production must be terminated as soon as possible.
