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Historically, their effectiveness was almost nil. It is a truism of warfare that for every measure there is a countermeasure. A large platform has the ability to absorb several iterations of this cycle into its design, while a smaller platform cannot and is quickly rendered obsolete. Larger platforms are also inherently more dangerous to approach and generally armed with longer-ranged weapons compared to smaller platforms which forces the smaller platforms to resort to surprise and/or numbers to achieve their goals. At the same time, smaller platforms don't achieve scale savings in maintenance costs, and, in fact, wear out more rapidly and require more frequent maintenance, often due to the high performance demands placed upon them to cope with the larger platform's defensive capabilities.

In World War I, losses to motor torpedo boats (MAS) were practically nil, with the only truly significant kill being that of the Austrian dreadnought Szent Istvan, the newest, least-trained unit and reportedly suffering from a certain lack of quality control in its watertight features due to being constructed by a yard new to building such large and complicated vessels.

Also in World War I, losses to seagoing torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers were also practically nil, with the most significant casualty being the pre-dreadnought Pommern, which blew up from a torpedo hit in the magazine at Jutland.

World War I losses to submersible torpedo boats (submarines) were more significant, but failed to touch the ranks of the latest and most powerful battleships, the dreadnoughts. These were faster than the older pre-dreadnoughts and more difficult for slow submersibles to intercept. Pre-dreadnoughts were slower, easier game which also suffered from poor torpedo protection, having been designed predominantly before torpedoes became serious weapons.

In contrast, other capital ships killed Invincible, Indefatigable, Queen Mary, and Lutzow (although in fairness, the last did absorb one torpedo from a torpedo boat or torpedo boat destroyer along with about two dozen heavy shells).

In World War II, capital ship losses to motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and patrol torpedo boats (PTs) and their foreign ilk (E-boats, S-boats, etc...) were non-existent.

World War II capital ship losses to seagoing torpedo boats were also non-existent.

Losses to destroyers did take place in World War II, with such craft contributing to the loss of Scharnhorst, Hiei, and Yamashiro, and claiming Fuso without assistance.

Submarines achieve greater success in World War II, sinking Royal Oak in harbor, and Barham and Kongo at sea. Submarine-delivered special attack craft and swimmers sank Queen Elizabeth and Valiant in harbor.

Again, in contrast, Hood and Kirishima were killed by other capital ships, and Bismarck, Scharnhorst, and Yamashiro were also heavily bombarded by other capital ships, and Hiei by cruisers.

Lesser platforms did not live up to their billing as capital ship killers/alternatives. Only aircraft changed that, and even then their effectiveness was limited and the necessary investment to achieve results was massive and not altogether economical. Aircraft displaced capital ships more by virtue of their range than their effectiveness.

The only American capital ships losses in World War II were to massive air attack which took place while the ships were moored in harbor in peace-time condition.

The only British capital ship losses in World War II to aircraft were to a massive air attack that pitted approximately 80 aircraft against two capital ships.

The only German capital ship losses to air attack in World War II involved massive bombing raids against ships in port, although in fairness, the Bismarck was lamed by aerial torpedoes although she was primarily done in by gunfire.

The only capital ships lost by the Italians in World War II were either sunk in harbor by air attack, or hit by radio controlled bombs at sea.

The Japanese capital ships suffered the most heavily from air attack in World War II. Hiei was stung to death after being ravaged by cruisers and destroyers the night before by virtue of being only about 50 miles from an enemy airfield from which repeated sorties could be launched against her. Musashi absorbed the combined attentions of three carrier task groups. Yamato also absorbed the combined attentions of multiple carrier task groups. Ise, Hyuga, and Haruna were all blasted in harbor by repeated air raids from multiple carrier task groups.

Given the investment in hundreds, if not thousands of aircraft, and aircrew; the massive cost of training and maintenance; the provision of capital ships in their own right (carriers) to transport many of these aircraft; the operational and battle casualties involved; the overwhelming numbers that had to be employed to achieve results; and the jeune ecole style predictions of massive effectiveness from minimal numbers with reduced cost compared to capital ships promulgated by their proponents, one can only cast a jaundiced eye on the "economy" of such force.

The trend against jeune ecole solutions continues into the present day. SAMs were supposed to render aircraft obsolete, but aircraft have adapted, survived and taken to hunting SAMs. Larger surface ships were declared passe after the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk by SSMs, and similar predictions were revived after HMS Sheffield was sunk by an ASM. But the Israelis turned right around and fielded better electronic warfare systems, resulting in the mass-wastage of SSMs in the next engagement and the slaughter of their launching platforms by larger, better-equipped and armed Israeli vessels. And the Argentine air force shot its bolt sinking a couple of British ships, but suffering disproportional damage to its own effectiveness and the British ships also fought back with improved countermeasures. And when the Libyans attempted to engage the US Navy, planes from carriers over the horizon hammered their patrol boats before they ever got in range. During Operation Praying Mantis, Irani patrol boats attempted to fight US Navy frigates and cruisers, but were pummeled by fast SAMs carried by the larger ships before they could fire their own SSMs, and then they were finished off by the US ships' SSMs after being disabled by the SAMs. And when the US went into Iraq, naval aircraft simply conducted a preemptive hunt for the Iraqis' patrol boats and systematically slaughtered them before any surface ship came remotely within range of them.

Hope continues to be held out for submarines to tip the balance, but they suffer as much from their medium as it helps them by hiding them. HMS Conqueror got in and killed the General Belgrano, but the San Luis spent weeks failing to come to grips with the British task force. The US Navy deploys its own submarines specifically to hunt and kill other submarines, making an attack on an American capital ship (a carrier) likely to expose the attacking submarine to prompt and lethal retaliation, assuming the American does not preemptively kill the attacker. There can be little doubt that in the event of hostilities with Iran, any Irani submarines that did not promptly clear port would be blasted out of existence at their moorings, and those running for sea room would probably be proceeding directly into the waiting trap of American SSNs that Iran possesses no means of forcing back to a respectful distance.

Similar thoughts play out in land warfare. Wits like to state that "everything on the battlefield is designed to kill a tank" and foolishly miss the fact that they're designed that way because a tank is the hardest thing to kill. Such thoughts have also popped up in air warfare, with parties touting "lightweight fighters" as an alternative to larger, more complex fighters. Some were seduced by the artificialities of the Vietnam War into believing this view had some validity, until the Israelis--unhampered by criminally self-defeating rules of engagement--showed what larger, more powerful fighters could do when allowed to fight as they were intended. Subsequent American air attacks have verified the massive advantage of the more sophisticated aircraft over their poorer brethren.

None of this is to say that gigantism in weapons systems is universally good. Yamato is an example of too much of a good thing. But just as a knight could mow down dozens of pitchfork armed peasants and set scores more to flight, so a battleship could shatter a few destroyers and chase off a flotilla. As a matter of historical record, the little guy, the little battalions, the little ships and the little planes, tend to lose when going up against the big guy, the big battalions, the big ships and the big planes. This shouldn't be surprising. After all, it took divine intervention for David to defeat Goliath...