A 1964 memorandum by Llewellyn E. Thompson reveals that France was interested in a tentative American offer of the Skipjack class nuclear-powered submarine but De Gaulle's blocking of the British application to enter the European Economic Community in January 1963 "also slammed the door on the Skipjack sale" to quote the original text.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2219.htm
Cheers,41. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, December 29, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Bundy. Secret. Drafted by George and cleared by Kitchen.
SUBJECT
Denials of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Vehicle Assistance to FranceThis memorandum has been prepared in response to your recent request for detailed information on denials under our policy of not assisting France in her nuclear weapons effort, and on French probing of that policy.
In addressing the subject of U.S.-French nuclear relationships, it is important to recall that neither General de Gaulle nor any other high-level French official has ever specifically asked for U.S. Government cooperation with France in achieving a nuclear weapons capability. This is not to say that General de Gaulle is opposed to such cooperation and would reject it if offered; it is only to say that there has been no U.S.-French dialogue at any high political level which could reasonably be termed a French request for help met with U.S. denial.
[snip]
Submarines
French interest in nuclear propulsion for submarines antedates de Gaulle's return to power and stems in part from a U.S. offer of general assistance in this field made in the context of the 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting, and thereafter repeated specifically to France. Nothing came of this, for reasons of both a policy and security nature, and the 1959 agreement under which we undertook to furnish fuel for a land-based prototype reactor was a "consolation prize" to the French, inasmuch as no U.S. technology is involved, and the French are entirely on their own in developing the reactor.
In late 1961, the French indicated to AEC Chairman Dr. Seaborg an interest in acquiring fuel for an operating submarine. Preliminary consideration was given this matter within the U.S. Government and a decision was reached in early 1962 that while it would be necessary to know more of French plans before seriously addressing the subject, it would be undesirable to engage in any detailed discussion with the French unless and until we were prepared to imply that we might be willing to supply fuel under some circumstances. This we were not willing to do, and this particular French probe was therefore turned off with a "no-response" tantamount to denial.
In 1962 an Administration spokesman indicated to the French that it might be possible to sell them a nuclear submarine of the Skipjack (hunter-killer) class, indicating at the same time that it would be necessary to secure approval of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The French were definitely interested, and preliminary discussions with JCAE had been held when the de Gaulle press conference of January 14, 1963 took place,/4/ slamming the door on U.K. entry into EEC. This also slammed the door on the Skipjack sale, and in answer to a French inquiry a few months later, they were told that the events of January made it impracticable to pursue the matter.
/4/For extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 378-380.
Sunho
