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May 20 17 8:11 PM
jlyons97 wrote:s rarely used, and had nothing to do with carrier aircraft capacity.'The reason the accelerator was rarely used is, that carrier aircraft complements were so low as to allow deck launches in all circumstancesAt the begining of the war in the Atlantic:Ark Royal: 18 Skuas, 21 Swordfish ( on a carrier that could have easily operated twice as many)Furious: 9 Skuas, 18 SwordfishCourageous: 24 SwordfishHermes : 12 SwordfishTotal: 102 (see Brown, David (1974). "Carrier Operations in World War II Volume I The Royal Navy. Annapolis, MD:Naval Insitute Press Contrast any combination of two US fleet carriers at the time had combined air groups of 144 aircraftThe 'accelerator' was designed for a 'one size fits all' concept wherein all shipboard aircraft were equipped with four spools that were engaged by the accelerator as it moved underneath the aircraft from behind (in the case of carriers) and lowered onto in (in the case of all other aircraft- equipped ships).The 'accelerator' concept on carriers was sound but for two issues1. The spools, as noted, inflicted a drag penalty, espeially on fighters, but as we have seen there were no real fighters, and there was no permanent deck park.2. The accelertor when not in use (after the lauch, presumably), was parked on the bow where in was in the way. But, with so few aircraft aboard, that was probably not an issue until the aircraft complement rose (see L-L and the BPF). It was then that tail-down launching ala' USN was adopted and the accelerator as a concept disappeared.
May 20 17 9:13 PM
jlyons97 wrote:by ship's company, who have no skin in the game, because, well, they can't be trusted. I advise you to go to the cited document and Actually Read It - all of it. The shipyard never heard of Slade & Worth - it was merely reporting what it had been told those many years ago.
The person that claims something is the one that needs to back up that claim. I don't see that any basis for that claim has been provided. Doing it would be pretty tough, we're talking very complex structural engineering here and it would be quite a project to come with a basis that would withstand serious scrutiny. Slade & Worth just claim something and that's it. I'm not trusting them here, I'm not giving them the benefit of the doubt, their piece is very strident in tone and has been thoroughly debunked so there's reason to be suspicious.
May 21 17 12:58 PM
May 21 17 9:02 PM
ChrisPat wrote:Jl, Andy - Many thanks for those numbers; only Eagle unaccounted for if Argus was out of aviation service at the outbreak of war.It seems the RN was trying to get the most carriers out there with a big enough air group to hunt and attack non carrier targets (unfortunately U boats) rather than to fight a carrier battle, Glorious being the exception with a search / strike heavy full group. Given the lack of carriers on the other side at the time it seems reasonable to do so. Agree more ac would always be handy but what was out there were U boats, enemy merchants and two PBBs. Shaving a few Swordfish off of the big carriers and maybe redistributing a few Skuas amoungst them might allow Argus to add a Swordfish group to the effort.
If I can find the figures NewGolconda posted for FAA ac strengths at the time that would seem to be the complete picture.
May 21 17 10:06 PM
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May 23 17 10:10 AM
May 23 17 10:39 AM
May 23 17 4:56 PM
ChrisPat wrote:Very interesting, thank you.
Seems to me the political risks outweighed the possible material gains in a long war even while the larger operation was being considered. We tend to think in hindsight of a long war but what the planners had in mind at the time may well have been very different. Similarly a lodgement being held in France or Norway throughout whatever war might develop seems startling now but why not, in theory at least?
Very different conditions but, knowing as well that Taranto was planning for C and G, a larger attack there doesn't seem at all impossible given the ac and decks lost earlier.
May 23 17 6:18 PM
May 23 17 8:06 PM
May 24 17 12:52 AM
IcelofAngeln wrote: As would any carrier fighter before about 1943. Even the Zero wasn't all that much more agile than the Emil and a lot more fragile.
May 24 17 2:45 AM
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May 25 17 11:13 PM
armouredcarriers wrote: - HMS Courageous was lost as it was believed in 1939 that the existing technology was suited to carrier hunter-killer ASW operations (based on wargaming). Interestingly, the last carrier operations in the North Atlantic were carrier hunter-killer operations from escort carriers as the hard lessons of war had produced proven effective sensors and weapons. That whole learning from experience thing again.
- Indian Ocean was very important to the British Empire supply network (Thus Britain's "Midway" / Japan's Operation C). It was a tempting target for German raiders (aka HMAS Sydney/Kormoran). Carriers were present as they offered the opportunity to scour greater areas of ocean for raiders than cruisers could cover alone. There are plenty of sources for this. Even in 1942 the old carrier Hermes was conducting an anti-raider, anti-submarine escort role here – as it was necessary.
Agreed, but sending carriers to secure the IO but not to do the same in the Atlantic is inconsistent.
Jun 11 17 3:39 AM
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