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Sep 14 16 12:47 PM
NewGolconda wrote:I agree with some of their front page statements re SeaSprite, and I am by no means a fan of the current situation with regard the Submarine replacement.
Those people may be right in detail but I think they need to understand that in reality organisations make bad decisions for reasons that are good in isolation. Usually it is because there is a set of operational-organisational-technological-industrial-political-financial paramiters that are set with no ability easily make decisions with due considerations for all of those parameters concurrently. Seasprite, and the Collins combat system had flaws right back to the intial operational specifications, ie what they wanted was not possible given the level of industry and technology at the time, furthermore fixing the problem could only occur within organisational and financial restrictions that were not adequate to the problems at hand, and in the case of Seasprite, they were blindsided by left field organisation issues also.
This submarine replacement project has gotten into such a mess because organisationally the government have been kicking this can down the road for more than ten years, with a lack of leadership to either drive low cost, low risk off the shelf solutions down the operators throats, or alternatively develop the high cost, bespoke, made at home option with reduced risk*, and maximum return on investment in terms of long term development of local industry.
Tony Abotts captains call, single source Japanese option, only to be dragged kicking and screaming to a competitive international tender, reminds me a bit of Adolf Hitlers Olympics, once you start the race, there is no telling who is going to win and how embarrising that might be.
Anyway, I think its all too late at this point. I merely sit back and watch, praying that the boats are only very bad, the budget is only massively overun, and the timeframe is only years delayed.
* I think I have been consistant here in arguing for a long period of time, that if the intention is 12 boats, and there is commitment to a unique design to long range, long loiter, high transit requirements, then it would have been better to meet those objectives by succesive sub classes of "son of collins", with major defects made good, and periodic improvements once risk is assesed and managed. However the time for that approach was ten years ago - not now.
Sep 14 16 2:12 PM
Sep 14 16 2:35 PM
NewGolconda wrote:Funny that you say that yet say nothing specific. Personally I like to get things right and get information from more than one source.
This article is a reasonable summary of the things that went wrong.http://www.australiandefence.com.au/5FB79830-F807-11DD-8DFE0050568C22C9
I think the points I make above, about the initial specification being impossible to achieve, a lack of resources to fix the problems, and the program being blindsided by organisational changes (changes to flight certification rulles late in the program) are all consistant with that article.
Other navies got operational Seasprites, with working ASW and ASuW systems, on time and on budget by working with a less challenging initial specification.
Sep 14 16 4:25 PM
hardcash wrote:it's not my site! Yes I agree totally uninformed and this is why people like yourself need to contribute and correct their misguided notions.
I am a concerned Australian citizen and I do comprehend the strategic importance of a sub capability within our defense forces. Asia is getting scary mate, we need competitive subs and I think these guys understand this, they just want better more articulate advice about how to go about it....
Sep 14 16 9:46 PM
Sep 15 16 4:23 AM
Sep 15 16 11:55 AM
bager1968 wrote:The SH-2G (A)s that New Zealand has accepted have had the unique (A) systems stripped out, and are now basically the same standard as the earlier batch of SH-2Gs they bought.
Sep 15 16 12:11 PM
Sep 15 16 12:18 PM
Sep 15 16 12:53 PM
Sep 15 16 9:53 PM
lesa wrote:NG Wrote
The RNZN chose a different, less risky and much more achievable version, and got a useful aircraft more or less on time and budget, which is rather the point of the previous posts.
you realize the current SH-2g run by the RNZN are the same aircraft as the Australian ones? Obviously not.
Sep 17 16 1:37 AM
Sep 17 16 4:22 AM
Sep 17 16 5:46 AM
Sep 17 16 6:04 AM
lesa wrote:Yes those great NZ aircraft have been replaced early by, wait for it, the hopeless Australian ones which are now praised for their enhanced capability and are expected now to serve until the 2030's. The truth is the Australian aircraft were always better its just a convenience of circumstance that led to Australia losing patience on fixing the bugs. But thats only what the actual test pilots say I am sure you would know better.
Sep 17 16 6:17 AM
Sep 17 16 1:55 PM
Sep 17 16 10:27 PM
Sep 18 16 5:16 AM
klixrulz wrote:took advantage of having the development costs already payed
for by the Aussies to get what they wanted all along, which was enough helos for all of the platforms plus a reserve, with capable avionics and a respectable ASM. The RNZN wanted the Lynx with Sea Skua but had to nix the idea due to cost for Sea Sprite with Mavericks left over from the Skyhawks. Without aussies mistake i doubt NZ would have been able to afford a suitable helo fleet.
Sep 30 16 10:06 PM
DCNS Satisfied With Australia's Pick of Lockheed for Sub Project
By: Pierre Tran, September 30, 2016
PARIS — DCNS has warmly greeted Australia’s signing of a design contract with the French naval shipbuilder and choice of Lockheed Martin for its partner on the Barracuda Shortfin 1A, a planned ocean-going attack submarine.
“DCNS welcomes the signature of the first operational contract for the Australian Future Submarine Program and the selection of Lockheed Martin as the program combat system integrator,” the French company said in a statement Thursday.
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