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Aug 16 11 4:54 PM
drunknsubmrnr wrote:If that's the case, there's no longer any need for NSFS....
Aug 16 11 5:18 PM
Aug 16 11 8:25 PM
drunknsubmrnr wrote:There's probably a requirement for the F-35C. Its role doesn't depend on the USMC.
The rest is....problematic. If the Marines are the same as the Army, why have a separate service?
Aug 16 11 8:30 PM
Scott Brim wrote:If one assumes the USMC's written fire support requirements hold water just as they are written -- and this is by no means a universal opinion -- it has long been evident that the Iowa Class could become very useful as a technical and programmatic means for enabling an effective process for deploying a variety of long-term NSFS solutions. As was predicted by me and by others on this board in the early part of the decade, the DDG-1000 program has come a cropper with just three hulls planned -- two of which I personally doubt will ever be completed, given the DOD's budget problems which are now becoming acute. Moreover, 5-inch ERGM has been cancelled because of excessive unit cost per round, $190,000 per round giving about $2 billion needed for a 10,000 round purchase. 155mm AGS / 155mm LRLAP will likely suffer the same fate in the 2012-2014 timeframe.Generally, if one believes the written NSFS requirements are valid and that the Iowa Class could be useful as part of a long-term solution -- four primary issues have been identified:1: Manpower Requirements of the Powerplant 2: Powerplant Maintenance & Support Infrastructure 3: Future Availability of Conventional and Advanced Technology Ammunition4: Future Availability of Large-bore 16-inch Gun Barrels It has been assumed that even if sufficient funding became available to support the Iowa Class -- and by the way, I myself think that all four would have to be modernized to guarantee that two are always available -- the assumption is that lack of spares for the 16-inch barrels is the most important limiting factor in terms of killing any future possibility of an Iowa Class reactivation.I am not of that opinion. I think new-technology barrels could be developed that are better than the originals. I think it is the lack of an adequate powerplant maintenance & support infrastructure that is the most important limiting factor in thinking seriously about Iowa Class reactivation. In 2006, I expressed my opinion that the powerplants of the AOE's, which were then being decommed prior to being scrapped, should have been thoroughly scavenged for any and all spare parts and components that could be useful for the Iowa Class; and that these spare parts should have been held in storage on a "just in case we need them" type of justification. To my knowledge, this was not done, and the AOE's were scrapped without any of their useful engineering plant spares being retained. In my opinion, the absolute point of no return was passed in 2008 after the scrapping of the AOE's was complete, well before the decision was made in 2011 to scrap the Iowa's remaining spare 16-inch barrels.
Aug 17 11 12:30 AM
stoby wrote:The idea of re-engining Iowa is interesting but not very practical. This has been true of most such concepts throughout the period of battleship design and construction, but is especially so since that period is now over, with many of the supporting industries and skills gone or very rare….
stoby wrote:…Looking at MattReloaded's second post, he's thought about getting the prime movers into the boiler rooms and I think he's convincing that once in the space, they could be mounted on foundations, equipped with the right auxiliaries, and would run. However, there are two problems left hanging: the armor gratings across the smoke pipes at the level of the protective deck, which I think are 8" thick with regularly spaced perforations, and the necessity of getting a reduction/combining gear into the space somehow. No way an object as big as the MTU 8000 20V is going down the stack without first removing the gratings. I doubt they were ever designed to be removed, and while I'm not positive they are Class A armor, they are certainly not something that can be manufactured today in any existing facility.
stoby wrote:… So, you could cut them up and remove them in pieces to allow access to the boiler rooms through the exhaust, but you'd be leaving that part of the ship vulnerable to air attack. Same thing goes for the belt armor, antitorpedo bulkheads, and protective deck. So, there's no good way of getting the new machinery into the spaces, or even of getting the old machinery out, although of course that could, at great cost in labor, be cut up in place and the pieces hauled out through the escape trunks (what a nightmare!)
stoby wrote:…The second problem is that a reduction gear to step the diesels' output down from 1800 RPM (I think that's the "intermittent" rating, with 1200 the continuous, for most of MTU's medium speed engines) to about 200 to match up with the Iowa propellers, would be quite a big piece of equipment itself. You'd need a 4-into-1 type of gear which is not normally produced; the plan view with Russian labels clearly shows just how big the gears would have to be to manage that connection. MattReloaded says the boiler and engine rooms of the Iowa are 32' long and the MTU engine (without gearbox) is already 21.8 feet long. I doubt if the gearbox, bearings, flanges, couplings, and engine could fit in that 32' space. Furthermore, in engine rooms 1 and 4, the shaft is offset far to one side and we have to worry if the pair of engines on the outboard side of the shaft will fit between it and the holding bulkhead of the side protection system (leaving space for that bulkhead to flex when hit, as well, otherwise it won't satisfy shock criteria). I conclude that propulsion engines would have to be fitted in both boiler and engine rooms, with the gears somehow squeezed in against the transverse bulkhead between these spaces on one or the other side; that's the only way 4-into-1 could really work. This would be very tight, possibly too tight to fit the available space.
stoby wrote:…However, available power would be another problem. Geared diesels' "BHP" is something like 3 percent higher than an equivalent SHP, so the 195,280 BHP we'd be getting from the diesels would be about 189,500 SHP. This is more than 10% less than the design power and would result in a noticeable loss in speed; you should see "Speed Thrills V"
stoby wrote:… Since CVN's are also powered by steam turbines of a sort, and there is still a land-based steam powered electrical generating industry, I think this is one of those "what-if's" that is pretty far out. The Iowas worked for as long as they were needed, and their machinery had no significant maintenance problems. Why do they need to be "Fixed"? They aren't broken.
Aug 17 11 2:32 AM
Jeremy M H wrote: The rest is....problematic. If the Marines are the same as the Army, why have a separate service?
Jeremy M H wrote: The US Army, post Afghanistan, should be much much smaller. The Marines should stay about the same size and be the primary force for dealing with small brush fires….
Jeremy M H wrote: I am sorry but there is simply no role for battleship gunfire supporting a ship to shore operation any longer, certainly not at the manpower level needed to run an Iowa class ship. One could make an argument in the early 90s but with the proliferation of JDAM's, SDB's, Sensor Fuzed Weapons and the like for the US I just don't see the need. …
Jeremy M H wrote:…Any point target that necessitates a strike from a 16-inch gun can be destroyed much more simply with a JDAM. …
Jeremy M H wrote:….. One could make an argument for needing ongoing and on demand fire support but in any environment that an Iowa could operate safely in you could provide the necessary support in other manners if the operation were important enough…..
Aug 17 11 3:14 AM
Zenmastur wrote:I can agree with this statement. The problem here is one of manpower. The idea of reducing manpower requirements of the plant is on the right track. The easiest and most cost effective method in my opinion would be to lose half of the turbines and three quarters of the boilers. This will reduce the staffing requirements to acceptable levels. Maximum speed will be reduced but she will still be as fast as most any ship in the gator fleet. This has the additional advantage of freeing up huge spaces that can be used for other purposes.
Aug 17 11 3:19 AM
The US Army doesn’t “NEED” get out of “THAT” game. The quick reaction
force “is” supplied by the Army not the USMC. And I don’t see any good
reason to change this.
My point of view would be this. If the Navy doesn’t want to support the
USMC’s mission then the USMC should be disbanded. Their statutory
obligations should be transferred to the US Army along with any assets
the Army or Airforce cares to accept. The Navy can pick through what’s
left. The US Navy would then no longer need the gator fleet. It should
be decommission and offered for sale to foreign powers. If there are no
takers a few of the vessels can be placed in reserve and the rest should
be scraped. This will free about 22,000 sea-billets and an additional
66,000 to 110,000 shore personnel in the Navy. Those eligible for
retirement should be retired. The others should be immediately separated
from the service. The Navy’s budget can then be cut by the appropriate
amount (about half). This will allow the US DoD to place its remaining
budget in the hands of those best able to use it effectively.
This assumes that point targets are the only targets on the battle field… which is a false assumption.
It also assumes that the troops can wait a very long time for the delivery of the weapon… also a false assumption.
What about the assumption that a JDAM can actually defeat the target.
Lets suppose for a moment that the ground unit involved needs to
maneuver close to the target area to effectively engage it and that they
have no un-observable route to it, except, across open ground which is
known to be under observation by the enemy. How does your JDAM strike
There are so many implied assumptions in your statement as to make it completely worthless.
Why don’t you give us a “real world” example?
Aug 17 11 6:00 AM
Scott Brim wrote:
In 2006, I expressed my opinion that the powerplants of the AOE's, which were then being decommed prior to being scrapped, should have been thoroughly scavenged for any and all spare parts and components that could be useful for the Iowa Class; and that these spare parts should have been held in storage on a "just in case we need them" type of justification. To my knowledge, this was not done, and the AOE's were scrapped without any of their useful engineering plant spares being retained. In my opinion, the absolute point of no return was passed in 2008 after the scrapping of the AOE's was complete, well before the decision was made in 2011 to scrap the Iowa's remaining spare 16-inch barrels.
Aug 17 11 6:18 AM
Aug 17 11 6:28 AM
FreshAirSnipe wrote: Removing the engineering equipment vs. abandoning/lay up in place as was done occasionally in the past? Think removal would do interesting thing to their CG/stability, unless you are replacing the equipment with an equivalent weight/ballast.
Aug 17 11 9:20 AM
Jeremy M H wrote:In this case it is just a matter of different opinions. In my view it makes a lot more sense to have the Marines using fewer tanks and more LAV/Stryker types and the Army focusing on maintaining a true armored force.
Jeremy M H wrote:How does the Navy not properly support the Marines? Yes the Marines are not capable of staging D-Day right now and landing multiple divisions. But at the same time the army is not prepared to fight a massive land war in Europe anymore. It is not the Navy or the Army not wanting the capability, it is a matter of it not being a funding priority. Were it a priority to prepare the Marines for an opposed landing against a near peer then it could be done. That is not a priority so it is not.
Jeremy M H wrote:… The Marines can do many many useful things. The amphibious navy is perfectly suited to supporting short interventions in the huge amount of the world that is just a festering crap heap.
Jeremy M H wrote:… They are well equipped to do humanitarian work and disaster relief.
Jeremy M H wrote: For low intensity conflicts the Marines are pretty well setup really.
Jeremy M H wrote:…Well the point was about JDAM's vs point targets. Other targets would necessitate other munitions or equipment.
Jeremy M H wrote:… The point is that a battleship is hardly the only solution as many of their supporters have stated.
Jeremy M H wrote: Nor are they a practical solution to the problems of supporting troops ashore from the sea.
Jeremy M H wrote: … Might there be specific instances where a battleship might be the best answer to a problem? Sure. But there might be circumstances where the Army badly needs 8 inch artillery or rail guns and we don't have any of those anymore.The question is if other solutions are good enough given the constraints of the budget.
Jeremy M H wrote:… No one knows that answer for sure but putting massive ships back in service that have basically one distinguishing characteristic in their big guns means those guns need to be useful in more than a handful of circumstances a few miles from the beach.
Jeremy M H wrote: ….Well I think we can all agree you cannot operate an Iowa near enough to make use of its guns without first obtaining air superiority and second sanitizing the beach area of things like ASM's. As part of doing that you are going to have to take down the air defenses so you can operate with relative impunity. The question is then can you do most of the things you need to do with strike aircraft, helicopters, artillery you land with the troops or carry in with helicopters and the guns the fleet already has.My feeling would be that in most scenarios for which the US has sufficient troop lift you could get by with that. Certainly I think it would be irresponsible to put into service 2 or 4 hugely expensive to operate ships for the relatively limited circumstances in which they could help you.
Aug 17 11 5:04 PM
So is the Red Cross. I don’t believe the distribution of a few hundred million dollars in disaster relief aid justifies the existence of an $85B a year drain on the economy. For local disasters the Department of Homeland Security is responsible. “local”, meaning US disaster relief. For the rest of the world we can simply donate a couple of ships (that will now no longer be needed by the Navy) to disaster relief organizations and let them do the work they do best…..with some supplemental funds by the US government. It’ll be cheaper and more effective.
Aug 17 11 8:09 PM
Zenmastur wrote:Yeah,…so is the 82nd and 101st airborne….what’s you point.
Why don’t you gives us your analysis of the alternatives so we can
Who’s strike aircraft are you going to be using?
How much artillery does the USMC plan to land in the first evolution?
Which guns in the fleet are you planning on using?
How close are they going to be from shore and how many of them can you afford to loose?
Aug 17 11 9:56 PM
Zenmastur wrote: (in response to Stoby)
I suggest that your selection of engine placement is flawed. It’s very likely that with a little more thought you could find a suitable configuration for said engines. If the problem is too difficult for you to solve let me know, I might be able to suggest a few alternatives.
Mr. Toby is currently employed as a Naval Architect at Alion Science & Technology. He has a BA in Archaeology as well as BSE and MSE degrees in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from the University of Michigan and an additional MSE in Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering (aerodynamics) from Princeton. He has written numerous technical articles, many with a historical slant, notably a series on interwar destroyers in the Naval Engineers’ Journal. He originally contacted NavWeaps in January 2009 to ask some questions about one of the "Speed Thrills" essays which conflicted with his own expert knowledge of the subject. Recognizing an opportunity when I saw one, I took the opportunity to take advantage of Mr. Toby's expertise to cadge a longer, more detailed work that could be added to the Technical Board files. Mr. Toby also generously supplied the attached First of Class Trials on USS Iowa Report (2 Meg pdf file) mentioned above which contains many details on the speed capabilities of the Iowa Class Battleships.
Aug 17 11 10:04 PM
Dave AAA wrote: And all they need to do is train them in amphibious assault - as most interventions that Jermey speaks of are amphibious - and deploy infantry battalion battle groups on LHA's. Or, one could train a specialist corps to do that say a corps of marines.
Dave AAA wrote: Haven't we been around the block on this enough yet? You lost that battle ages ago.
Dave AAA wrote: Those would be the strike aircraft that already suppressed defences enough to permit ships and troops to close on the landing zone.
Dave AAA wrote:…They should have the full compliment of artillery directly attached to the MEU or MEB within the first few hours.
Dave AAA wrote:…The USN has sixty five-inch gun armed destroyers and can probably get the assistance of allied ships with similar armament.
Dave AAA wrote:… They shouldn't have any trouble getting sufficient fire support for landing an MEU or MEB…..
Dave AAA wrote:…As close as needed and there's no risk of losing any to shore-based defences if they have been suppressed enough to permit a landing.
Dave AAA wrote:… If they can sink destroyers, they can sink or mission kill battleships,…..
Dave AAA wrote:… and more important, they can sink the 'phibs If they can do that, the assault has failed.
Aug 17 11 10:16 PM
I would also consider other power plants such as the Fairbanks-Morse COLT-PIELSTICK PA6B 16V. It’s about the same length weighs less (~34 Mt) and produces less horse-power (~8,700Hp). It’s in use in LCS if I recall. Regards,Zen
Aug 18 11 1:16 AM
Zenmastur wrote:I guess this means you think it would be too simple of a solution to air-drop them into the target area.
when it came time to perform for real they had to rely on the USAF to do all of the heavy lifting.
And what are the Marines going to do for fire support in the mean time?
I don’t think we fund our Navy so we can depend on someone else’s Navy to do their job for them.
how long has it been since an Arleigh Burke or Ticonderoga class ship supplied NGFS to troops in combat.
I take these last two statements to mean that you now admit that all the arguments previously give by you and others about battleship vulnerability being an impediment to there use were lies.
Aug 18 11 8:52 PM
Dave AAA wrote:Their taxpayers are willing enough to fund their navies do it for you if needed.
Dave AAA wrote: … The argument was that battleships were much more vulnerable than you kept claiming.
Dave AAA wrote: That was never the argument, as you should know - we've said it often enough….
Some other poster” wrote: I know they are super sonic I am not stupid... but they still are not fast enough and are not heavy enough to penetrate 12.2 inches of class A armor
Dave AAA wrote: I take it you've never heard of shaped charges. Incidently, SUNBURN is both four times as heavy (4500 kg vs 1225 kg) and as fast or faster (Mach 2 to Mach 3) than a sixteen inch round .
Some other poster” wrote:… not the hardened steel that battleship armor is made of…
Dave AAA wrote:Which is no differnt from the armour plate that aircraft decks are made from. - the targets the Soviets had in mind for these missiles.
Dave AAA wrote: The relevant point is whether a modern anti-ship missile can penetrate to where the shaped charge can do the most damage. I've pointed out that it can.
Aug 18 11 9:57 PM
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