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Arrrrrrgggggghhhhhhhh! Suez made practically no difference to the policy decisions of the mid to late 1950s. Eden decided in late 1955 that Britain would not join the EEC, MacMillan was for joining. Also Eden was undermined by MacMillan who actually asked the Americans to short sell Sterling, Butler was unswervingly loyal to Eden, SuperMac on the other hand was "first in, first out" on Suez, he pushed for the operation but once the invasion had taken place undermined Eden and the British position. It was MacMillan who dropped Eden in it with Eisenhower. Also what would become the 1957 defence review was originally meant to come out in November 1956, its conclusions were not changed however, Nukes were to be the main counter to external threat, as a result all non nuke supporting programmes were cut back - notably fighter and attack aircraft. Sandys was involved in this process as Minister of Supply before becoming Minister of Defence in 1957.

Also it should be remembered that Suez had little effect on British defence and foreign policy - even in the Middle East, more important in the retreat from the world was money. There are two important factors which could have delayed, reduced or possibly averted Britain's decline and retreat from East of Suez, the first is ROBOT in October 1951 - where Sterling would have been floated as a result found its "real" value, money would have been saved from not having to "protect" Sterling and industry would have been forced to compete on an equal basis - and hopefully would have become more efficient as a result. The second factor is Eden turning down the opportunity to enter the EEC on British terms in 1955 - 1956, Churchill was in favour of a United Europe (though he saw Britain as a semi detached member), and MacMillan was very keen to see Britain enter to boost exports and hopefully save some cash.

Decolonisation was well under way from 1955, Eden's government was in the advance planning stage of Independence for Ghana (then the Gold Coast) and Malaya - both of which would become independent in 1957, again Suez had no effect here.

Suez caused damage to the special relationship, but this was quickly repaired by the personal friendship between MacMillan and Eisenhower, ironically it was this friendship which MacMillan had used to undermine Eden and damage Anglo-American understanding. Suez was an embarrassment and was partially self inflicted, if Britain had rapid reaction forces available in June/July 1956 Suez would be no more than a footnote in history, had Operation Musketeer not coincided with a US election it is likely that American approval or at least non-opposition could have been secured. For Eisenhower consultation might have been enough, he was pissed off that he wasn't told, he would later admit that not supporting Eden was his biggest political mistake.

Suez has achieved a mythical status that frankly it doesn't deserve, Britain learned lessons though - it was essential to be aware of American politics and assure at least indifference to UK operations, and also the importance of rapid reaction forces - this is realised in the 1960s with the procurement of Albion, Bulwark, Fearless and Intrepid and ensuring that enough forces could be brought to bear before a problem became a crisis. Britain's heeding of this second lesson is in evidence in Kuwait 1961, Tanganyika 1964 and the Falklands 1982.

Ocean and Theseus were used as ad-hoc Helicopter Carriers during the landings at Port Said. Albion and Bulwark were both involved in Musketeer but as Aircraft Carriers, along with Eagle.

The reason the RN ever got Fearless and Intrepid was the Suez operation which showed up serious deficiencies in the RN's amphibious capability, especially the time in which an operation could be mounted, speed or lack there of was one of the reasons Suez was such a disaster, had Britain been able to act quickly and decisively then Suez might have ended very differently. Fearless and her sister were recognition of the need to have amphibious forces which could react quickly, this was still the case in 1982 with Fearless departing within days of the balloon going up, and contrary to popular myth Fearless was not about to decommission, her future had been assured by American intervention after the initial reading of the 1981 defence white paper.

Hermes was still used in the Commando Carrier role by the Royal Navy in 1982; Julian Thompson initially thought he would have use of her during the recapture of the Falkland Islands until told otherwise by CINC Fleet.

Yes, as always it comes down to cash, the 1957 review was a symptom of this. As I have said above opportunities were missed to improve Britain's financial position, and the lack of cash had much more to do with Britain's retreat from the world than Suez.