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A couple of quick inputs.

Regarding Italy entering the war: From what I've read there are basically only three options in this regard:

1) Italy remains neutral;

2) Italy throws in with the Entente against the Central Powers;

3) Italy degenerates into civil war.

I don't see a viable option that causes Italy to throw in with the Central Powers. The only people in Italy in favor of getting into the war are the Italian nationalists and they are out for Austrian blood over the issue of Trent and Trieste. No faction in Italy at this period appears to be sufficiently put out with France, or coveting French possessions to overcome Italian internal issues and motivate a declaration of war against France and the Entente. Attempting to push Italy into war against the Entente would probably cause Italy to break down into civil war. Italy in a state of civil war is not a desirable option for the CP as it cuts off a transshipment route.

At the same time, the Entente is persistently losing at the moment, making the cost of any bribe for Italy to throw in with the Entente that much higher, but not necessarily something the Entente would be unwilling to pay. So the danger of Italy plunging a dagger into the back of her Triple Alliance partners remains significant. The CP need to consider what enticements they can offer (perhaps commercial or colonial) to keep the Italians neutral.

At this point, unless the Entente comes up with an offer the Italians can't refuse, neutrality will probably continue to win out. If you throw into a war late, you don't want to throw in with the losing side and which way the wind is blowing at the moment remains sufficiently unclear to overcome casual opportunism.

The real threat to the CP is a truly massive (even if possibly insincere) Entente bribe to Italy. Only four ministers took Italy into World War I on the side of the Entente, so there is a real danger here.

Regarding invading Malta: This is not an impossible operation unless the alternate landing sites that appear to exist are simply untenable. This would require a much more detailed map of the terrain than has been posted to determine. If every one of this smaller ports is at the bottom of a steep and narrow rocky draw (possible on Malta), it might not take but a company to bottle up a much larger invading force. How long that force could be bottled up remains a question. Can it be bottled up long enough to force its retreat, or only long enough for a central reserve to move against the site?

The state of naval bombardment in this period is such that there is probably no way that the bombarding force could prevent a defensive central reserve from moving and fighting. Malta is sufficiently large that there are probably places that the existing low-angle naval guns simply can't reach, and there is no air spotting organization. The fortress troops for Malta ought to be sufficient, backed by the coastal defense artillery (and any defensive mine fields) to dissuade an attacker from attempting to force the main harbor and land at the quays.

A landing will have to be remote from Valletta, and the overall operation would probably have parallels to what was done at the Falklands. Once again, we're back to the exact character of the small harbors and the heights that command them and whether it would be possible to bottle up the invaders long enough to make the landing non-viable. One important consideration for any landing force would probably be adequate supply of fresh water. How long could they hang onto a beachhead if the defenders stall them?

Attempting to blast the defenders out of their positions by shore bombardment is highly questionable in this period. The effort might just create more debris and rubble for the defenders to establish further fighting positions from which to resist without really killing many of them. Ammunition for the bombarding force is limited, much of it is probably ill-suited to bombardment, and a substantial fraction must be reserved to counter the danger of naval opposition. There might be enough ammunition of adequate character to silence a few forts at least temporarily, but provide naval gunfire support such as became the practice in WWII? No chance.

The key here is whether there are viable landing sites across which sufficient troops can be moved to secure a viable beachhead and fresh water supply to then move against the bastion at Valletta once adequate troops and artillery are brought ashore. We need more detailed and topographical maps.

UPDATE:

Having looked at both a satellite image of Malta and its road map, it should be possible to get ashore in a number of locations.

Marsaxlokk Bay to the southeast would be attractive, but is probably too exposed to Valletta itself to recommend it to an invader, particularly if any of the coastal artillery can be directed that way. It also has very easy road access to Valletta, permitting a central defensive reserve to act readily against such a landing.

About half-way up the coast to Valletta on the east from Marsaxlokk Bay, we come to Marsaskala, but this position is more exposed to Valletta and offers less room to develop a beachhead. It is also more easily bottled up with the limited road access.

There are no truly good landing sites on the west coast. The first potential one is far up the west coast at Ghaja Tuffieha and appears to be relatively undeveloped with limited access. Although roads lead out of this site toward Valletta, they lead to the two chokepoints/passes in the central ridge of the island.

The most viable landing points for an invader in this period, with the existing level of technology and tactics would appear to be in the extreme northeast at Mellieha Bay, Saint Paul's Bay and Salina Bay. Salina Bay is smallest and closest to Valletta and has only coast road access, so it's probably non-viable. Mellieha Bay is well-removed from Valletta, but has limited road access and is probably excessively remote for the needs of the operation. This makes Saint Paul's Bay the best option. It's relatively large with room to land and has relatively direct road connection to the interior.

Unfortunately for any invade landing to the west or north of Valletta, there is a north-south ridge of hills on Malta that divides the island in two. Passing this barrier leads along the coastal road past Salina Bay, or into the interior. Coming from the north, this means passing Mosta. Coming from the west this means passing Mosta, or moving slightly southwest and passing Mdina. This latter is a longer route and likely less tenable and exposed to being flanked or cut off. Going through Mosta is the more developed and obvious path.

So the two most viable landing sites are Marsaxlokk Bay and Saint Paul's Bay. The first is exposed to rapid reaction by a central defensive reserve. The second is apt to be blocked in attempting to pass the central ridge or the coastal road.

Beach stands never proved particularly effective against invaders, except in the rare and unusual case of Wake (where there really isn't much choice). So a central defensive reserve is probably the way to go. For the attacker, a protected harbor with a lot of landing area is the best choice with the technology of the day, leading to the two sites suggested. Whether the invaded lands successfully depends upon whether or if the defender masses enough defenders against the developing beachhead to destroy it. If the attacker can get enough men ashore, the defender probably can't get him off the island and it becomes a land-battle where the question is how rapidly can the attacker wear down the defenders in the field and the fortress. On land, coming up from the south is probably the most attractive as it avoids the major terrain obstacle. Getting ashore, coming down from the north is probably the most attractive due to the reduced likelihood of the defenders being able to move quickly enough against that beachhead.

Of course this is looking at very crude modern information, not detailed period information. Many of the present roads and developed areas may not have existed in 1915. Also, nothing shows how rugged the terrain is, or is not, with respect to developing an overland attack across the central ridge.