Question: Given the inferiority of Japanese pilots up to this point in time and the advantages the Hellcat held over the Zero, and other advantages, could the
Americans have still won the battle with only half of their strength avialable for the battle? (Half the Fleet Carriers, half the Light Carriers, half the
Battleships, half the numbers of aircraft, etc.)
Marianas Turkey Shoot Question
| Author | Comment | ||
|---|---|---|---|
 Joshua Kintner |
Marianas Turkey Shoot Question |
Lead | |
|
Registered Member
Posts: 432 (22-Jun-2008 04:42:39) |
|
||
|
seasick |
Woudn't want to try. | ||
|
Posts: 4782 (22-Jun-2008 05:00:30) |
I don't know and the USN wouldn't want to find out. Its not a linear relationship.
The USN had force multipliers: 1. The VT fuse makes it first major appearance on USN 5 inch shells. Radar controled AAW gunfire vastly improved. 2. 40mm cannons are avalible in greates numbers yet. 3. F6F Hellcat fighters with direction from long ranged (for then) 2D air search radars. Interceptions directed by the grandfather of the E-2 hawkeye. 4. Task force in better defensive formations than earlier. DE used as radar pickets. You don't take anything for granted. |
||
|
E F Draaijers |
|||
|
Registered Member
Posts: 225 (22-Jun-2008 16:54:58) |
Seems logical when considering numbers only, but not when looking at history. The USN aircraft fighters were more than a mathc for the incomming raids of IJN
planes. If directed as in the real battle, half their number would most likely have resulted in simmilar results. (The USN already outnumbered the IJN with 3
to 1 in planes.)
In the opposite the changes of doing damage to the IJN fleet were negative for the USN, since actual history showed the USN having difficulties in combatting the three seperated IJN taskgroups and needed to seperate its own strikeforces, resulting in a below avarage result, mainly due to the vast distances the planes needed to fly to and from the targets. Only a few IJN ships got hit by the USN planes. Only one carrier, the auxiliary carrier IJN Hiyo, was sunk by torpedoes and the CV Zuikaku got some unimportant bombhits, that did not prevent her to maintain full power. Most damage to the IJN was done by submarines, not aircraft. The IJN still had one single advantage over the USN, namely: longer ranged aircraft, so it could strike from longer range than her opponent, reulting in less damage to the IJN fleet by USN airraids, while the longer ranged IJN planes could reach the USN fleet easlily. Luckily they were very untrained and easy pickings for the CAP and fighterpatrols. The majority was shot down before reaching their targets, so the handfull that made it to start a bombingrun, were to few in numbers to make much of an impression. (Only one single Judy divebomber was succesfull in hitting a target, USS South Dakota, but failed to do some real damage to her, due to her impotent bombweight.) The few IJN aircraft that made it back to their carriers were to few in number to be considered an effective fighting force. |
||
|
jlyons97 |
|||
|
Posts: 1547 (22-Jun-2008 17:26:15) |
seasick wrote: The VT fuze was out there - it did not work (or at least work at all consistently) due to a faulty battery. The battery got fixed but my guess is not for a
while.
The radar picket concept was up and running by then, but not with DEs. These ships simply weren't fast enough to keep up with carrier TGs. DEs so used
were converted post-war as an airborne extension of the DEW line. There would be DD conversions to pickets (with height finder radars) that were coming on-line
as the war ended.
|
||
|
Ichigo Kurosaki |
|||
|
Registered Member
Posts: 21 (22-Jun-2008 18:11:35) |
I wouldn't call Japanese pilots inferior. By 1944, most of the veterans were dead, or captured, so the pilots we faced then were simply inexperienced.
Their training was also rushed and they were sent to the fleet with less hours than a USN aviator of the same era.
The plane that was the proper ancestor of the E-2/C-2/S-2 was the Grumman S-1/C-1/E-1 Tracker. Both were high-wing twin-engine monoplanes. The Tracker used P&W radials, while the Hawkeye/Greyhound/TrackerII use Allison/GE turboprops. The E-1 used fixed radome shell, that had limited-vector sweep antenna (like pre-phased array fighter radar, but with a fixed vertical sweep area). It could scan about 120º laterally with about 15° vertical scan at 100 miles. The Avenger conversions had the radome in the belly and was for long-range surface search, rather than AWAC. Similar in principle to the APY-125 unit mounted on SH-60s and the retractable radome mounted on some Royal Navy Sea Kings. Very similar to what the British did with some heavy bombers used for maritime patrol. The USN had no AWACS-type planes until the early 1950s. All vectoring was done from ships.
I will NEVER give up!!
|
||
|
jlyons97 |
|||
|
Posts: 1548 (22-Jun-2008 18:59:19) |
Ichigo Kurosaki wrote: Project Cadillac which produced the TBM-3W was solely done for AEW reasons (the use of the term
"AWACS" is inappropriate for this era). It was only later that it was realized that the APS-20 was good for surface search too, particularly
periscopes. Thus you see it in P2V, AF-1Ws, and P4Ms, aircraft which by then nominally had ASW as the primary mission.
I'm not an airborne radar expert, but the prsence of the APS-20 in dozens (hundreds?) of AEW aircraft indicates to me the ventral location did not preclude its use in that role. These would include the afore-mentioned TBM-3W, the AD-2W, -3W and 4W, the AD-5W, the WV-series and the Shackleton AEW. |
||
|
Dave Bender |
Could the Americans have still won the battle | ||
|
Posts: 6627 (22-Jun-2008 23:32:35) |
Probably. But with less muscle available the U.S. is unlikley to put their CV task force so far out on a limb. You will end up with an entirely different
battle. The Marianas might not even be the target.
|
||
|
jlyons97 |
The Battle as it happened... | ||
|
Posts: 1550 (23-Jun-2008 13:14:43) |
Dave Bender wrote: The US was out on a limb anyway, because Ozawa was able by virtue of his longer-ranged aircraft to dominate where and how it would happen. Just an opinion,
but had the IJN in the air executed this battle a bit better than historical, the results might have been dramatically different. The Marianas invasion would
probably not been halted, however.
|
||
|
Dave Bender |
Ozawa able by his longer-ranged aircraft to dominate | ||
|
Posts: 6631 (23-Jun-2008 14:10:30) |
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australia/oceania_pol01.jpg
That works in reverse if the U.S. chooses a land based route to advance to the Philippines. Which is likely to happen if the U.S. Navy cannot provide adequate CV based air power. Darwin, Australia to East Timor East Timor to Celebes. Celebes to Borneo Borneo to Palawan Palawan to Luzon Luzon to Batan Islands (half way between Luzon and Formosa. Batan Islands to Formosa. No offensive movement is greater then 300 miles. The entire sequence of attacks would be supported by the U.S. Army Air Corps. P-38s, P-47s and P-51s all have a combat radius in excess of 300 miles. Tarawa will be seized to shorten the shipping route between Hawaii and Australia. No need to attack these places. They get blockaded by the USN and left to wither on the vine. New Guinea north of the Owen Stanley Mountains. New Britain New Ireland The Solomon Islands west of Guadalcanal Marshall Islands Wake Island Caroline Islands Mariana Islands Iwo Jima Palau Saipan to Tokyo = 1,274 miles Formosa to Tokyo = 1,146 miles. Advantages of the Southern Route. - American heavy bombers are 100 miles closer to Japan once they seize Formosa. - Japanese lose their oil supply. - The U.S. Navy can open up a direct supply route to China - Plays to an American strength. Even in January 1942 the U.S. was producing a lot more land based aircraft then Japan. Furthermore U.S. aircraft were largely superior to Japanese aircraft. |
||
|
Joshua Kintner |
|||
|
Registered Member
Posts: 433 (23-Jun-2008 15:34:17) |
Well the USN has attempted offensive operations when their strength was equal to or less that than the Japanese, so I don't see a reason why the USN
wouldn't attempt a Marianas operation. Roughly, half the strength of the US carrier force would comprise three fleet carriers, four light carriers, three
battleships, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two AA light cruisers, and 32 destroyers. That would bring a rough estimate of avilable aircraft to 270
for the fleet carriers, 120 for the light carriers, so in total the USN would have 390xA/C for the battle, just slightly less than the numbers embarked on the
Mobile Fleet.
|
||
|
binder001 |
|||
|
Registered Member
Posts: 8 (23-Jun-2008 15:49:13) |
Another advantage in using the large force available is that it allowed the 5th Fleet to take out a large portion of the land-based airpower that Ozawa was
counting on to support his carrier planes. The US forces basically ended up being able to take one opponent in turn rather than facing both striking at once.
Further, it gave the Americans "staying power". If half of the carriers were used and there were ships lost or rendered incapable of flight
operations then the whole operation might have been placed in jeopardy. Spruance wasn't there for a personal duel with Ozawa, he was there to protect a
major landing operation and provide air cover.
In an earlier post a gentleman resented the term "inferior" pilot. If you are thrown into action with less training, less actual flight time and no combat experience then you are rated an "inferior pilot" it is not a racial term but a tactical one. |
||
|
Dave Bender |
|||
|
Posts: 6634 (23-Jun-2008 17:07:43) |
USN has attempted offensive operations when their strength was equal to or less that than the JapaneseWhen was this? Even after the Pearl Harbor debacle the U.S. Navy had as many CVs and more large cruisers (10,000+ tons) then Japan. We also had more land based aircraft available from 8 December 1941 onward. |
||
|
bill sanderson |
strength equal to or less than the Japanese | ||
|
Posts: 2306 (23-Jun-2008 22:10:14) |
Wasn't there a time when the USN was down to one operational fleet carrier in the Pacific (Enterprise?) and continued to attack? What about CA numbers
after Savo? I'm open to correction since my knowledge of the Pacific war is rudimentary...
|
||
|
Dave Bender |
USN was down to one operational fleet carrier in the Pacific | ||
|
Posts: 6636 (24-Jun-2008 01:23:59) |
The IJN had 2 fleet carriers (Shokaku, Zuikaku) after the June 1942 Battle of Midway. One of these IJN CVs was sometimes in the shipyard and therefore not
operational.
CV Shokaku Repair Periods. 16 to 27 June 1942. 28 Oct 1942 to 19 March 1943 CV Zuikaku Repair Periods. 30 Jul 1942 to 12 Aug 1942. The USN launched the Guadalcanal invasion 7 August 1942. On that date the IJN had a single fleet CV in operation (Shokaku). The USN had 5 fleet CVs in operation (Saratoga, Enterprise, Hornet, Wasp, Ranger). If we add in CV conversions like the USS Long Island and IJN Zuiho the USN is still way ahead in CV strength. After the 27 Oct 1942 Battle of Santa Cruz the USN chose to leave only a single fleet CV (Enterprise) to assist the 50 or so aircraft based on Guadalcanal. This was opposed by a single IJN fleet CV (Zuikaku). That's hardly a suicide mission for the American force. In fact IJN airpower was so weak after the Battle of Santa Cruz that Guadalcanal probably did not require USN CV support at all. What the US Guadalcanal effort did need was at least 2 (of 6 total during Oct 1942) fast BBs to stiffen the cruiser fleet plus one of the numerous Army Air Corps fighter wings to take over from the depleted marine air wing on Henderson Field. |
||
|
Joshua Kintner |
|||
|
Registered Member
Posts: 434 (24-Jun-2008 02:11:32) |
When was this? Even after the Pearl Harbor debacle the U.S. Navy had as many CVs and more large cruisers (10,000+ tons) then Japan. We also had more land based aircraft available from 8 December 1941 onward. Doolittle raid we were outmatched in numbers. Eastern Solomons was an equal fight in numbers, as was Santa Cruz. |
||
|
Creeping Death1929 |
|||
|
Posts: 1031 (24-Jun-2008 02:23:38) |
Dave Bender wrote:Actually, Enterprise was opposed by Junyo, as Zuikaku's airgroup was too mauled after Santa Cruz. Dave Bender wrote:Don't forget Junyo, which entered service prior to Midway and Hiyo, which was commisioned on 31 July 1942. There is also CVL Ryujo and if you're counting CVE Long Island, there is Taiyo, and Unyo.
Last Edited By: Creeping Death1929
24-Jun-2008 02:29:09.
Edited 1 times.
|
||
|
seasick |
|||
|
Posts: 4792 (24-Jun-2008 02:24:58) |
I am aware of problems with the VT fuse, but it was effective enough.seasick wrote: The DE pickets: I'll recheck my source The predecesor of the TBM-3W was some sort of twin engine aircraft smaller than a B-25 that flew off a carrier and had a modified night-fighter radar in the nose and had to turn to make radar sweeps. |
||
|
Dave Bender |
Don't forget Junyo | ||
|
Posts: 6638 (24-Jun-2008 03:50:07) |
http://www.navsource.org/archives/03idx.htm
As I said, if we are going to count IJN CVLs / CVEs then we need to count USN CVEs also. It appears to me that the USN had 10+ in commission as of August 1942. |
||
|
jlyons97 |
|||
|
Posts: 1551 (24-Jun-2008 05:00:20) |
seasick wrote: If you have some metrics on the effectiveness of this fuse, please provide them. One data point, admittedly one only, from the Gunnery Officer of USS Dale ("Tales from a Tin Can" 2007, Zenith Press) says otherwise. I did not invent my comment on Picket DEs.The 'twin engine aircraft' off carriers? This is simply not true, but if you've got a source, please provide it/ |
||
|
seasick |
Got home . . . | ||
|
Posts: 4794 (24-Jun-2008 05:19:18) |
I dug up my sources:
Still checking about the radar plane. |
||
|
jlyons97 |
The VT fuse thing | ||
|
Posts: 1552 (24-Jun-2008 13:11:31) |
seasick wrote: I have suspicions, somewhat confirmed by the Naval History web site, that this device was not nearly the war winner of it reputation. Most of the claims for its effectiveness are pre-combat experience. When users began to be puzzled by lack of results (Dale fire 67 rounds at a Mavis with no result) there was probably no way to feed back results to the developers in real time (sound familiar? re torpeodes?). I think had NONE of them worked, the problem would have been solved sooner, but of course SOME of them worked, making life harder. Certainly if I were Dale's gunnery officer, it would have been hard to accept that a significant amount of my 5"38 projectile load-out might not work. After all the hype.Regardless, VT-Frag and VT-IR were in the 5"38 upper handling rooms of MT 51/52 on an FF with which I was on a first name-basis, in the Persian Gulf long about 1979. |
||
- Battleship Vs Battleship
- Should Battleships Be Back In Service?
- The United States Navy
- The Royal Navy
- The European Navies
- The Commonwealth Navies
- The Asian Navies
- Aircraft Carriers
- Fighting Ships Of The World
- Submarines
- Designing A Navy/Ship
- The Land Forces
- The Air Forces
- The Naval Fiction Board
- The Politics Of War
- Naval Help
