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This is put together from various discussions on the FFO site. It illustrates the shipping situation in late 1942, and so is useful background material for you.

Cheers: Mark

Ministry of Trade Report - Global Shipping Update

Dated 30 September 1942

Note: This document is to provide information for War Cabinet Briefings.

The shipping situation continues to worsen as has been the case since the start of the current conflict. The current and forecast state of the import program is as follows.

As has to be recalled, prewar estimates were that the UK should be able to import 47,000,000 tone of dry cargo per annum.

French Merchant Fleet.

The French merchant fleet in 1939 was 413 ships of 3,000,000 GRT. It is now down to 2,000,000 GRT. This is not sufficient to support the buildup of French forces in North Africa. Only the use of about 15% of the Imperial dry tonnage fleet has allowed that buildup to occur, this being about 2,000,000 GRT of dry cargo ships added to the 1,500,000 GRT of French dry cargo ships. French country ships have, however, been very useful on cross trades, especially in the Indian ocean.

Achievements to Date

Thus far, the UK has been able to achieve the following things:

1. Avoid workforce malnutrition while improving stockpiles marginally in the UK.

2. Maintain war production about 3-5% above the estimates made which forecast results following from a French Armistice with Germany.

3. Maintain our industrial infrastructure properly, including upgrading and modernising plant and equipment.

These are major issues compared to the 'worst case' forecasts of late 1940.

The decision to hold the Pacific theatre to 15% of US output (as compared to Admiral King's oft-expressed desire for 30% of US output to that theatre), has guaranteed two things:

1. Supporting all the build-up and fighting that has been occurring in Europe including Operation Bolero.

2. Building up in Burma, supplying China and the Pacific Dominions, albeit thinly.

This has left us short only the buildup in Australia, but this has been solved by the firmest rejection of appeals to use the best and fastest (the most ton-mile efficient) of our merchant ships on a supply run Murmansk. With this rejection, calls for delivery of tonnage to the USSR via Persia commenced. This also cannot be supported except by cutting the UK dry cargo import program. This is not agreed. Some token shipments can be made, but that it all. There is no possibility of upgrading the rail route from Persia tot eh USSR, and the trucks needed for a road route are also unavailable. They are being used in China and on the Burma Road.

Infrastructure in Burma

We have hit a wall in terms of supporting infrastructure. We are building a large logistic infrastructure in India and Burma to support a new offensive from there, and we are building up in Australia (including a Darwin-Alice Springs railway and upgrading the Adelaide-Alice Springs route, plus building a Mt Isa-Tennant Creek railway and conversion of a lot of existing rail to standard gauge. This is to support Allied Grand Strategy in 1943 and 1944.

The real issue remains ports. We want to build a Dover-sized deployable port for the invasion of Europe, upgrade a many Mediterranean ports, upgrade the British south and east coast ports in order to improve turn-around times, build/rebuild Burmese ports and river ports and upgrade some Australian ports. We have to build a new East Arm type port in Darwin to support the spoiling offensive as well.

This is not impossible, but the timeframe is a most difficult as it is all simultaneous. There is therefore no ability to rebuild the Persian ports and conduct a major railway expansion there as well. We just do not have the wherewithal.

Worse, this route is extremely inefficient. It means that a large, modern merchant ship had to do a round the world voyage each time. A 14 knotter, routed independently for most of it, could just barely manage it twice in a year. The problem is the ports, too many of them were not designed to handle that class of ship, resulting in months being wasted in unloading times in such ports. They lack cranes, warehouses and the shore-side distribution infrastructure to get the goods away from the dock. We cannot upgrade these ports. In addition, we cannot waste our largest and more valuable ships on such an inefficient run. This is because a large fast merchant ship on the UK-Australia run manages 5-6 round trips, carrying valuable cargo each way even with the need for convoy past Dakar. This is simply more efficient in ton-mile terms.

We have called on the Russians to build a decent, simple 9 knot freighter to support themselves, and are willing to contribute some old, inefficient, slow tonnage unsuitable for the Atlantic. We will run the worst of them Port Suez-Bandar Abbas (a calm water run to maximise their efficiency) and we will use the 'best of the worst' from Durban to Bandar Abbas. The ships to Durban are the slow reefers, and they then go to the Plate to load frozen beef and bagged flour. We will continue to use the fast reefers for the routes they were designed for - UK to Australiasia. This means that ships to Australasia also may carry some lend-lease deck cargo for the Russians, but they only have a brief delay at the Cape to offload it. We need the Russians to help themselves with new 9-knotters on the Australia-Persian Gulf run, they can carry tinned meat, tinned fruit, sugar and bagged flour out and partial cargoes of drummed POL back, along with piece goods if they visit an Indian west coast port.

Summary: This is only possible because of several factors as follows:

Europe

1) No mass shipping to the USSR yet, so supplies are available.

2) Supplies for Original Torch can be diverted.

3) The small Aegean campaign

4) The economic position of Britain

Pacific

1) Supplies already stockpiled

2) Good material position of Australia and New Zealand

3) Good supplies of material in theatre for both Britain and France.

4) Large oil supplies because of how the Dutch pulled out of the NEI.

5) The US was shipping for most of 1942 at the 15% rate and not Admiral King's desired 30% rate.

This said, supplies became critical in the autumn of 1942 which has forced Nimitz to open up his stockpiles in Hawaii to keep Guadalcanal going.

Details

Europe

1) No mass shipping to the USSR yet, so supplies are available. This is very important because the ships involved are the most modern, biggest and fastest available. So they are the most efficient available, and on the Murmansk run they will be exposed both to heavy losses and extreme levels of damage from the weather. That, and the much small Aegean campaign is why we could find the tonnage to assist with the French in Africa, maintain the import program to the UK, support China and reinforce Malaya simultaneously. However, this ability vanished when the USA entered the war. Now, the Greek campaign is stressing Allied shipping, but it is US entry and Operation BOLERO (the movement of US forces to Europe) which is causing shipping to enter a period of severe shortage. The Ministry does mean severe, the word is deliberately chosen. We will struggle to keep the import program to the forecast level in 1942 and 1943.

These impacts are serious, we can simply forget using Allied shipping to send material to Russia. The shipping simply does not exist unless we move planning for the invasion of Europe further into 1944.

2) Supplies for Torch can be diverted, but only partially. The impact of BOLERO and TORCH as originally 'planned' by the US Army on the British economy would have been dreadful. Their extravagant demands for shipping would have forced us to run out of meat, industrial stockpiles essential to production would have had to be run down to wafer thin margins (a few weeks rather than six months) and so forth. While the US WSA is merely inept, as is to be expected at this stage of the war, the Army Service Forces under General Brehon Somervell are almost actively malign towards British interests. Discussions with Sir Arthur Salter have indicated that he is Anglophobic, disparages actual shipping allocations to civilian and war economy needs as they advocate cross-channel action, requisitions ships without civilian oversight, assumes that Army requirements take absolute priority over all US ships both extant and to be built in the future, and yet has absolute control over all cargo loading in the USA. He routinely cuts off food shipments to the UK to assist military deployments. This has led us to a policy of shipping grain from the USA only from specialised grain ports as they cannot be used for anything else, to shifting grain imports to Canada and Argentina, and to lifting meat imports from Canadian, Argentine and Australasian ports in that order of priority, before US ports. Analysis shows that this costs less wasted tonnage than the constant delays in US ports forces.

3) Small Aegean campaign. This is a boon and provides the wherewithal which enables us to reinforce China and run the counter-offensive into Malaya in 1943. Had we been forced into am extended African campaign by a French armistice, it would have been logistically imprudent to a remarkable degree, entailing a 16,000 mile trip to ports which had nothing available to bring back to the UK.

4) Economic position of Britain. This has to be very carefully monitored as this matter is easy to over estimate. We exist on a thin margin TL, and it is all too easy to cut this to dangerous levels if we get too exuberant in regards to military operations. The level of military operations underway is the absolute maximum that the Allies can possibly perform in logistics terms. There is no 'shipping slack' slack left in the system, something the WSA and ASF simply will not believe.

Pacific

1) Supplies are already stockpiled. These have allowed Operation allow WATCHTOWER to occur. However, there is not sufficient to permit any more such operations logistically, but there is enough to evict the Japanese from Papua and to take Guadalcanal although that will be a hard campaign. There is noi more. The Allies ay be able to make some minor advances up the Solomons chain, but plans such as Operation CARTWHEEL simply cannot be supported.

2) Material position of Australia and New Zealand. This is reasonable thanks to the Dutch and then to our ability to retain the UK-AS longhaul route at about 50% of capacity. Basically, this is where the reefers and cargo liners built for that trade went after easing the first French logistics surge into Africa. This is a benefit of not having major and costly convoy battles to fight in the Mediterranean and not having to do the Murmansk run.

3) More material in Indian Ocean theatre for both Britain and France. This is maintained by great efforts and planned exploitation of all possible local resources -and especially Dutch and French refugee merchant ships from the country trade. The French are conducting a small freighter construction program (as are we) in our respective colonies.

4) Larger Pacific and Indian Ocean oil supplies. This is a major issue as it enables the USN and RN to deploy capital ships to SOPAC/Australia Station. Without this oil, this would be impossible.

5) The US is shipping at the 15% rate. This means that by the end of 1942 things are now running short but we have cut our offensive suit to suit our cloth. Operations int eh Mediterranean require the equipment and shipping which might be used int eh pacific. This is merely efficient strategic planning. We still have ample support there in the form of fuel, and enough supply inflow to support a US Division in PNG and two more in action in the Solomons. Further operations are outside the realms of the logistically possible.

Recent Discussions Regarding Barents Sea Convoys

The Soviets are being insistent on this matter. However, there is absolutely no Imperial shipping available for this purpose. We have used it all to the absolute limit. To provide it means cutting off Imperial support to our Asian theatres. In view of the fact that only our current efforts there which prevent the disintegration of the Empire, this diversion is just not going to occur. That all our Allies are expressing bewilderment with our absolute and ironclad refusal to either shrink our import program or reduce material flows to Asia means that they remain unaware of the mortally perilous internal situation in which the Empire is presently mired.

However, if a couple of Barents Sea convoys are to be run, we might reluctantly provide a heavy escort, but only if the Russians have the merchant ships and can provide the close escort. If all that is needed is a minimum number of ships, there is the only available answer. Other than that, either Algiers would have to accept a severe cut in their own support (which directly endangers all operations in the Mediterranean), or the USA has to accept a reduction to BOLERO which endangers plans to invade Europe. Cabinet has formally notified the US Government that we will not, under any circumstances, provide shipping which would endanger our minimum import program, our support for China, or our support for the Asian Theatre.

We have also formally informed the US Government that we are at the point where there is no slack in the system any more. So, unreasonable demands such as those of the ASF will not be responded to, except by a rejection note. This means that Washington and Algiers will take the decisions to rob Peter to pay Paul. We will not provide tonnage to the ASF and we have informed them that the ASF is the reason we have placed US supplied foodstuffs at the lowest edge of our shipping priority.

So if our Allies wish to run Barents Sea convoys, the questions are: do they postpone the invasion of Europe (by use of US ships supporting BOLERO) or postpone the invasion of southern France (by use of US and French ship supporting that theatre). We have informed them that the option of closing the Burma Road by using Imperial ships will not be supported. Those are the available choices - there is no 'free lunch' in logistics. The other possibility we have pointed out is that we might evacuate the Aegean theatre.

Russia. We have reports from the USSR that they will very quickly hit an ammunition wall. They will not have enough chemicals in production to meet there requirements for various types of explosives and ammunition. With the more intense fighting this should occur by late 1942. This may stop their offensives in their tracks. Further losses to breakdowns and such may also begin to effect the Russians and both armies may sit across from each other, spent. This may occur quite soon. It will be the first one back on its feet that will get the advantage. Here Russia needs raw materials if they want to do any more than just hold the Germans. The raw materials they wish shipped will effectively double their present output. Russian capacity for production is staggering but Russia needs the raw materials to produce the finished goods.

A serious strategic decision is going to have to be made. Food will allow Stalin to pull more people from the farms to put in his army but he needs the equipment. However, we do not have the raw materials to send at the present time, it has all been allocated before Russian entry into the war. As increases occur and as the US can use her purchasing power to buy from Neutrals, more can be had but not until 1943. Then we have to find a way to ship these goods to the USSR. We have no shipping.

Therefore, we have to rob Peter to pay Paul. So who goes without? The possibilities are limited especially if the Russians refuse to help themselves through a 9 knot tramp freighter building program. One possibility is for country-built coasters in the Indian Ocean to ship raw materials from Africa and the oceanic basin to Persia. The infrastructure for the rail to Russia is there from WWI, it just needs to be upgraded and repaired. We might also be able to use coasters to get finished goods from the Mediterranean to Black Sea ports. This is very inefficient. It means many smaller loads but a more constant supply as Algeria is at the end of one of the large convoy routes.

We note that the USSR, even with a materials-limited production can still go toe to toe to with Germany in production on most levels. Her upper capacity for aircraft production seems to be about 18,000 machines based on average use of aluminium per machine. Here, using wood or alternative materials could expand production to perhaps 22,000 to 24,000 but requirements for aluminium, diesel engines and aircraft engines, explosives and electrical facilities will begin to compete should efforts rise much beyond this level.

Soviet Responses on the Barents Sea Issue: We all agree that Soviet Union has needs and that we will do what we can to meet those we can, without endangering our own critical interests. The Soviet Navy is reportedly able to send some escorts, there are 6 destroyers and 6 sloops based at Murmansk. If forced, we can probably provide some escorts from the Home Fleet for a heavy distant escort. At best, this would permit some symbolic convoys to Murmansk using Soviet ships.

SOVTORGFLT. According to Lloyds, the Soviets have the following merchant fleet. It is mostly old, in poor condition, and very poorly operated.

Dry Cargo about 152 ships, average about 4000 GRT, average 9-10 kt

21 passenger vessels, average about 5000GRT, 12-13 knots

16 tankers, average about 6000 GRT, 12 knots. Mostly in the Black Sea

Perhaps 50 dry cargo ships available for the Murmansk run but there is nothing much else. Mostly these are older ships. The Trade Division estimates that will give provide one 20 ship 8 knot convoy per month, with about 120,000 tons of cargo per convoy. The capability will decline quickly as winter weather alone will sink these smallish freighters and cause them dreadful weather damage. Trade Division estimates that this pool of ships will last, at most, 6-8 months before they are all lost or too damaged to continue.

The Admiralty will reluctantly provide the heavy (distant) escort of 2 BB, but the Soviets will have to find the close escort. They need a cruiser, 6 DD and 6 A/S escorts per convoy to take the hand-off north of Iceland at a MOMP. With an escort that light, the Heavy escort is going to have to be within 50 miles. That is not good, and the Admiralty forecasts that the RN heavy escort will take a beating from German aircraft. The only good thing is that such a slow convoy can be escorted by old battleships.

The Trade Division regards the Barents Sea run as such a foolish waste of resources that only a Communist trade ministry could possibly think it worthwhile. They state that the Murmansk route proposed is 70-80% of the length of the Seattle-Vladivostok route depending on ice conditions. The Seattle-Vladivostok route has zero losses from enemy action (no permanent loss) and at worst about the same from weather (equivalent sequestered loss). So it is much more tonnage efficient on a port to port delivery basis.