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 Glenn239 |
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Posts: 1070 ( 7-May-2008 18:42:09) |
Mark - thanks for the correction on the B5N2's - question are you confirming the Soryu Zeros immediately entered into the CAP battle upon return to the carriers, and if so, what does this indicate about their fuel state? Also, what is your take on the argument I made, that the tactical advantage was less along the lines of striking range and more related to an ability to remain aloft searching for friendly carriers after an attack? |
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Mark E Horan |
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Posts: 354 ( 8-May-2008 18:19:22) |
Glenn;
You are correct that the Japanese scout planes routinely went out up to 50-100 miles further than the USN carrier planes did. Further, if both sides opted to go 250 miles, the IJN recon birds had longer time over target than the US birds did. They were, of course, out ranged by the PBYs at Midway, but only as long as the base was safe. Expectuing the worse, most of the PBYs aloft on 4 June had headed for landing points much father East, and only about ten remained at Midway on 5 June. Had the Japanese continued the effort to invade, the PBY search effort, coming from several diverse locations, would have been far less effective. Mark |
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Mark E Horan |
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Posts: 355 ( 9-May-2008 19:27:50) |
Glenn;
Yes, some of Soryu's and Kaga's A6M2s did jump right into the CAP action over the fleet. With 7+ hours of fuel on board each fighter, they never had fuel problems. However, it did reflect their ammunition situation, specifically that of the two 20 mm cannon. The A6M2 only carried 60 rounds for each of its relatively low velocity cannon. In the case of the aircraft on CAP, those chutais had not been heavily involved in the air battle over Midway nor in strafing. Thus, they returned with a significant, and in some cases, likely all of their ammo. At the same time the number of aloft fighters on CAP was at its lowest during the entire morning, and they were welcome additions at a key moment in the fighting. It is demonstratable that the American losses over Kido Butai that morning are directly related to the number of fresh (read fully ammoed) Zeros the participated in the interception. The four VT-6/VT-3 TBDs pilots that I interviewed in the air that day all noted that they survied, at least in part, because may of the Zeros attacking them were, apparently (by the lack of such hits) out of cannon ammo and the TBD withstood the 7.7 mm rounds. This was true with a large number of the USN/USMC SBD and VMF crews I interviewed as well. One of Kaga's escort fighter pilots that jumped into the CAP battle paid a severe price for his elan, as he was wounded in the fight and, although he made a deferred landing on the ship, he died on the flight deck immediately thereafter. Mark |
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Glenn239 |
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Posts: 1071 (10-May-2008 14:12:09) |
Understood on the ammunition issue. But with reference to mission fuel reserves and whether the Japanese had an advantage, how does the tactical utility of the Zero's range that morning compare to, for example, Hornet's ten escort Wildcat fighters? |
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SeaTurtle Prince |
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Posts: 310 (12-May-2008 23:43:49) |
Well the Hornet Wildcats ditched so I'll bet they wished they had a little more range that day. Of course none of them exploded from being hit by 0.50
fire so there is that tradeoff.
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Glenn239 |
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Posts: 1072 (13-May-2008 18:03:32) |
Yes - but there is a tradeoff....
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Mark E Horan |
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Posts: 357 (17-May-2008 02:57:33) |
Gebts;
Actually, the ten VF-8 F4F-4s of the the Hornet's Strike Escort Hornet that force-landed at sea on out of fuel on 4 June did not do so because they did not have enough fuel to get home. Do to poor understanding of their location in relation to their own carriers, the eight that formed the main group actually saw TF-16 and, believing they were enemy carriers they continued past "home". Meanwhile, the other two, flying about 10 miles further to the south, knew they were near where home was supposed to be, by they did not see the carriers. Thus, when the lot eventually force-landed 100 miles further to the eastward, they were actually on the disengaged side - and area that no one was seaching for downed US aviators until,, while lost in bad weather on 8 June, a Hornet search plane saw their rafts and PBY searches were flown in the area on the next two days got the eight that had survived the water landings. However, the relatively short legged F4F-4s, whcih could only stay up a about 4.5 hours max with out much fighting, certainly had to leave the Hornet strike group's formation prior to the expected target position, but that was primarily due to the incredibly stupid decision made by the Hornet Air Staff to range and spot the escort fighters at the front of the strike group and, as a result, they wasted far too much fuel orbitting and climbing the the excessive altitude of 22,000 feet. So, argueably, the true blame lay in a poor mission plan. None the less, there is no question that until the F4Fs were modified to the new drop tanks in the fall of 1942, they were the weakest link when it came to the range of our carrier strike formations. That said, however, I never interviewed a F4F pilot that would have traded his bird for a Zero. (of course, the one Zero pilot I met wouldn't have traded for an F4F either). Mark |
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robdab |
B-17 Ranges | ||
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Posts: 298 (18-May-2008 16:18:27) |
I finally found some manual information about B-17C ranges at http://www.tailwheel.nl/downloads/boeingb17chandbooksmall.pdf
And wrt the B-17F/G at http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/attachments/other-mechanical-systems-tech/47675d1189629120-b-17f-g-plus-british-model-ii-fortress-b-17-part-4.pdf Still need to find hard data about the ranges of the B-17D and B-17E models ... |
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jlyons97 |
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Posts: 1493 (19-May-2008 04:31:57) |
robdab wrote: Manual information is good as a baseline. But, can we answer the question of what is the tactical radius of this aircraft based on the information
provided? My guess is no. This information you've found does not look at the question of how far can the bomber carry a bomb load to a given distance,
drop the load, and then return to base. The 1285 mile figure gets into the ballpark, as they say, but doesn't answer the question. The data you've
shown implies carrying the bomb load to 1200 miles, which is nonsensical, but that's what it says.
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robdab |
B-17 Ranges | ||
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Posts: 299 (19-May-2008 15:37:00) |
jlyons97,
I agree that this is a VERY complex subject but you are looking for combat radius data while these charts present theoretical MAXIMUM range data only, not radius details. The wartime answers that you want would depend on the inclusion of much more mission specific information, much of which the aircrew could only "guesstimate" and keep a fuel reserve to answer for. The data charted includes runway surface type for take-off distance and fuel since a cement runway requires less fuel than does short turf, than does sand etc. How high the B-17 will have to climb (using more fuel to do so) will depend on the reach of ground flak between it's base and it's bombing target as well as the height of storm clouds and the twisting route between them that it's navigator can plot. A prop feathered by battle damage will cause drag and use more fuel ... They were brave men. Manual information is good as a baseline. But, can we answer the question of what is the tactical radius of this aircraft based on the information
provided? My guess is no. This information you've found does not look at the question of how far can the bomber carry a bomb load to a given distance, drop
the load, and then return to base. I believe that somewhere in all of that fine print (edit: see tactical range charts on page 28 of 29 at http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/attachments/other-mechanical-systems-tech/47675d1189629120-b-17f-g-plus-british-model-ii-fortress-b-17-part-4.pdf
) the manual indicates that the ranges shown are 90% of flight tested values and that they INCLUDE dropping any bomb-load at the 50% distance point.
Last Edited By: robdab
19-May-2008 17:26:21.
Edited 6 times.
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