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This discussion seems to have gone somewhat afield. In 1942, the IJN did not have external tanks for their strike planes, only the A6M. If you examine the Japanese Air Group records for their actions prior to Midway one thing stands out. Most of their lost aircraft and aircrew resulted from damage that caused fuel loss such that the aircraft could not return and, whether they chose to "kamikaze" themselves or to just force-land, they were lost, along with their experienced flight crew.

Further, because of navigational and fuel concerns, no nation was striking targets from carrier much beyond 250 miles in 1942, even though their aircraft could, perportedly, go further. Thus, for very real and practical reasons, the IJN had no "range advantage" in 1942

The goal of the operation was to knock out Midway's air defense prior to the arrival of the invasion force. Due to outside circumstances, the Carrier Striking force had lost an entire day, cutting in half the time they had to do this. Japanese intelligence had indicated that Midway had fighters, and patrol aircraft (IIRC, 30 of each or 30 & 50 - I'd have to look). Thus, they expected fighter opposition. Prior experience against US and Commonwealth opponents had shown that while the .30 caliber rounds could do damage, the .50 caliber machinguns used caused havoc with the light Japanese airframes.

When fully loaded, the B5N could not carry fuel in the outboard wing tanks. Thus, their fuel load was less on strike missions, reducing their range and time aloft. That fact that Midway did not move made the navigational problem for the aircrew much simpler, but the expectatuion of combat with enemy fighters and an unknown AA defense meant that they could expect significant damage to aircraft in the strike. Considering the time for form up at home, the climb to The mission was expected to take three and a half hours, which, if expectations were met, would allow the carriers to shorten the return distance by 80 miles. A mission launched from further away would take longer and severely restrict the ability of the aircraft to be "turned around" and used again that day.

The Japanese doctrine assumed that the fighters would need the aid of a true navigator to get home from distant targets. Like most allied services, the IJN aircraft had a designated rally point about visibility distance from target area at which the strike force was to form up prior to taking their course towards home. The primary purpose for this was to let the fighters form up to follow the rest home.

At Midway, the B5N force departed from this point very quickly while the D3A force remained their for some time waiting for the fighters to join. The decision by Tomonaga to leave the rally point so quickly with the kates was certainly influenced by the severe damage many of the B5Ns had taken in the action and the fact that many, including his own, were trailing fuel from holed tanks. Likewiase, the ability of the D3As to stay longer was because of the relative lack of damage taken by the Vals over the target and the fact that they were not intercepted by the Marine fighters.

As it was, several B5Ns (I can't recall, and will have to look it up at home) force-landed upon the return to Kido Butai and one did near Kure. All of these aircraft went in from fuel exaustion. Had the Japanese launched at a range beyond what they had, its is most likely that more aircraft, notably including Tomonaga hmself, would have been forced down. This wa the delicate game the IJN faced in every action. Their aircraft were extremely vulnerable, to suffering fuel tank hits from even light MG gunfire that, even if they were not immediately fatal, caused a very real crisus to the aircrew in terms of making a safe return.

Further, I have taked extensively before about the concept of aircraft range, especially in combat worn carrier aircraft that are attacking targets at sea. There is no more complex navigational problem than leaving a moving base to find a moving target and then to return to the same moving base 4-5 hours later. While Midway was not moving, the problem was only simplified by degree. There fuel aboard the strike planes had to be used for warm-up, take off [full power], form up, the climb to attack altitude [full power], the trip to the target, combat over the target [full power], climbing to return altitude [full power], orbitting at the rally point, the return flight, orbitting the carrier awaiting it to clear the flight deck and trun into the wind, and continuing to do so until your turn to land. All of this is compounded by the fact that the junior pilots in the formation take off first, spend more fuel maintaining formation, land last - and have the least experience at using fuel economically. And in the case of the IJN, there was no homing becon to aid the formation in finding the task force!

The ranges noted in books are done in clean, new aircraft, in good weather, with an expert pilot flying a expertly tuned and performing aircraft that is not concerned with maintaining formation or flying in combat at full power. This is hardly a "combat" mission. Combat pilots routinely talk in terms of factors of 60% the book range being what a plane could go in combat.

All in all, the IJN did strike at maximum range at Midway. Further, regardless of the range they did strike at, they had the expectation that the USN strike planes, if they got off the ground, could strike as far out as the IJN had come. In the event, this really was the case

1. The SB2U-3, with its extra tankage, could have gone well farther than the IJN.
2. The SBD-2 had a more than respectable range with the 500 pounder.
3. The TBF-1 had more range than the SBD.
4. The F2A-3, with its extra tankage could stay aloft much longer than the F4F.
5. The F4F-3 had longer legs than the F4F-4 and had gone 200+ miles at Coral Sea.
5. The B-26/B-26A were well able to go 400 miles.
6. The B-17Es had easily gone 600 miles every day.

Hope this is of interest.

Mark