FYI, FFO is still bubbling away. Imah and much of the Paris crew are working on the 1940 French Campaign, the North African Campaign, Abyssinian campaign and so forth (these are sort of 'backfill' activities triggered by constructive criticisms noted on this board and investigated on the FFO Team boards). On the latter, we have one in English and one in French, thank the Lord for babelfish!.
There are two major papers under development, the British and Imperial Aviation Industry in FFO, and a similar paper on Axis aviation, both are proving to be radically different in FFO. These papers are in the 20,000-40,000 word range and are requiring an inordinate amount of research.We have a good working model for the impact of FFO on the Japanese merchant marine, and again it is a radically different situation to OTL.What is driving these major 'foundation' style works are the four major changes from OTL:
1. France not surrendering in the first place
2. Postponement of Barbarossa for a year (this has enormous consequences due to the OTL German-Japanese Technical Cooperation Agreement or GJTCA). The GJTCA operated at the technical level.
3. Japanese salvage on HMS Prince of Wales and sharing of that data with the Germans
4. Complete absence of 'victory disease' in Japan
Basically, all this means that the 'easy' part of FFO is over, the stuff where there was little variation from OTL. We have hit
the hard stuff, and it requires very significant research efforts. Hence large papers describing entire industries. These are 'backbone' items for an
AH like this. Basically we have to work out the 'policy' before we can 'do the campaigns'.
- in turn that kills J2M
- in turn that means Jiro Hirokoshi is not pulled from A7M to work on J2M because the He-100D/0 (AXHe1) project collapsed
- that means that A7M gets developed from very early 1941 (16-Shi with a delay as it changes to 17-Shi in early 1942)
- However, with Barbarossa delayed Mitsubishi can get German assistance with its MK9 engine very easily (and fuel injection solves most of its problems)
- that means that A7M enters service in early-mid 1943 and replaces A6M at roughly the same time F6F-3 enters service
This is just one example, what it means at the macro level is that in aviation matters, there is a tendency for the Japanese to remain a half-tone ahead of the Allies in many areas. This is due both to their design expertise, and to their obtaining both lead additives and a significant ability to manufacture high octane aviation fuels. In FFO, the Japanese are NOT routinely flying on 62-81 Octane avgas. And when you put 92-98 octane into an A6M3, God help your local F6F-1 pilot. Even the F6F-3 is by no means superior to the A6M3 with high octane fuel in it.
Oh, and German exposure to Japanese radials blows their socks off, which means that the Luftwaffe may easily have 2000-2500HP radials in 1942/43.
So we are dealing with a series of extremely complex research tasks at the moment. There are literally hundreds of such little logic
chains to work through, hence the aviation papers. I won't even start on tanks, just the FFO Panzer V was a long one to resolve. We all learned a lot,
though, which is the aim of this game.
IJN Trade Protection Planning and Shipping
Translators note (TN). This is a first known version of the IJN Trade Protection Plan dated 20 February 1942. It is clear that the IJN clearly understood the issues confronting it even at this very early stage of the war. It is clear that this was a result of Vice-Admiral Kondo's experiences against RN and MN submarines in the South China Sea. It is also clear that their planning was realistic and logical given their resources at the time. The outcome of this early planning was, of course, different from that contained herein. But its effectiveness is simply not in doubt, as the submariners of Allied nations can attest. Although finally overwhelmed by sheer weight of Allied (especially USN) numbers and our superior electronic technology, IJN convoy escorts and A/S aircraft remained supremely dangerous opponents until the last day of the war. The last Allied ship - indeed the last warship - lost in battle in WWII was a USN submarine, two hours before the cease-fire, during a typically vicious A/S action off Hokkaido. The well-turned out IJN 'good faith' ships which proceeded ahead of the victorious Allied Fleets in to Tokyo Bay were A/S escorts, each with Allied submarine kills painted on their bridges.
The extraordinary skill levels of Allied (and especially USN) submariners by 1945 were necessary merely to stay alive in the face of a well-equipped, proficient enemy with very good tactics. Current information is that Allied submarines sank about 4 million GRT of Japanese tonnage during the war, most of their merchant fleet, and a significant amount of their Navy. This was never an easy task, and the cost was extremely high.
Report Start (TN - that the typically flowery Japanese introduction has been deleted)
Introduction
The lessons of this war so far contain many lessons for the IJN and even more for the IJA. The performance of the IJA has been of especial concern for the IJN, as it is placing severe strain on our ability to support them and to exploit our conquests. We are required to implement careful control of shipping movement and allocation just to supply the Army. The Army has agreed to this. We also must export home all possible raw materials from the conquered area, this being essential to providing the weapons we need to fight the enemy with. The Army has agreed to this.
If we do not exploit the conquests, we have failed in the very reason we went to war. The Army has also recognised this.
Seventh Fleet
It is planned to establish a new Fleet to be known as Seventh Fleet. This will be done next month [TN - actually done in March 1942]. This Fleet will be based in Tokyo and will be located within the Ministries of Transport and of Industry. Responsibility of this Fleet will be resource transport from the Southern Resource Area, safe shipping of military support from the Home Islands, and the destruction of enemy submarine fleets.
This fleet's responsibilities do not override the control over requisitioned tonnage by the IJN and IJA, but this Fleet will coordinate the activities of those fleets with that controlled by the Shipping Control Association, with the aim of minimising the waste of shipping capacity so that industry can obtain the materials it needs to produce the weapons the military needs to fight the war. This is the reason it is located where it is, the Army insisted as the price of their cooperation.
Commands
Seventh Fleet will have the following Commands. Each will include local Port War Signal Stations and War Signal Stations, as well as IJN local land based and seaplane formations on shore station.
Home Waters Command. HQ Yokosuka.
Yellow SeaCommand. HQ Port Arthur. Main DY Darien and Port Arthur.
China Sea Command. HQ Hong Kong. Main DY Taikoo Docks
South China SeaCommand. HQ Singapore. Main DY Singapore. [TN: Singapore did not fall until 21 September 1942. Until then this was based at Kuching Bay.]
Indies Command. HQ Surabaya. Main DY Surabaya.
Pacific Command. HQ Truk.
Terminal Routes
Translator's Note: IS means Inland Sea, but should be taken to mean 'Japanese home waters'
Terminal Route Groups Needed
IS-Kuching Special tanker terminal route 1A 3B
IS-Tarakan Special tanker terminal route 1A 3B
IS-Haiphong-Saigon 1A 4B
IS-Manila 1A 3B
IS-Singapore-Tanjung Priok 1A 4 B
IS-Truk 2A 4B
Totals 7A 21B
There are, therefore, two tanker main convoy routes [TN: which actually met together at Labuan, in the safe bay there, really meaning it was one route for the tanker convoys] and only four main convoy routes. This [is the] 'spine' [of the Japanese system to] extract[ing] resources from the 'Southern Resource Area'. The IJN staff understands the need for few but large convoys. This allows best use of available escorts. One vital factor is that the best use of available ship and aircraft escorts is with convoys. This is where the enemy submarine presents himself for destruction.
[TN: In the main, they were a smaller than the Atlantic large convoy average, with smaller merchant ships but with more escorts. This was due purely to the smaller size of the Japanese merchant fleet and the small size of the Japanese economy.]
Hub and Spoke Route Main Hubs
The main hubs for local traffic are to be:
Hub Groups
Home Waters 8C 8D
China Coast 6C 8D
Saigon 2C 2D
Singapore 2C 3D
Manila 2C 2D
Batavia and Surabaya 6C 8D
Truk (a special case) 2B 2C 2D
Palau (a special case) covered by Truk
Totals 2B 28C 35D
Standard Escort Group Makeup.
Class A Group (Aviation Group)
One aircraft carrier 18-21 knots
Four 1000 ton 19 knot kaibokan
Class B Group (Oceanic Group)
Two fast escorts (TB, old DD, Tachibana or 1000 ton escort)
Four screen escorts (800 tons, 16.5 kt kaibokan)
Class C group (Coastal Waters Group)
Two 800 ton 16.5 kt kaibokan
Four Ch-13 coastal kaibokan
Class D group (Local Command group)
Eight local escorts (mostly auxiliary escorts)
Numbers Needed
Aircraft carriers 7
Tachibana 20
Fast Escorts (old DD) 22 (to be replaced with Tachibana)
1000ton Kaibokan 28
800 ton Kaibokan 84
Ch13 subchaser 112
Auxiliary Escorts 280
Ships Existing
Due to an urgent need to train more pilots, only one of the four existing small carriers can be spared to develop tactics and procedures.
Aircraft Carriers 7 + 6 uprated seaplane aircraft carriers
To be converted:
Argentina Maru,
Brazil Maru,
Kamikawa Maru (burned out above main deck),
Scharnhorst Maru,
Aikoku Maru,
Hokoku Maru,
Gokoku Maru.
Kamikawa Maru will be refitted new above the main deck as a conventional austere carrier. She will be the experimental ship for this program. Her conversion may take several months or more as much of her current upper structure has to be scrapped due to fire damage.
Auxiliary Seaplane Carriers
Kunikawa Maru,
Kiyokawa Maru,
Kinugasa Maru,
Sagara Maru,
Sanuki Maru,
Sanyo Maru
These ships are suitable for quick conversion and already have fuel systems and magazines as all are in service as auxiliary seaplane aircraft carriers. These ships are to be converted by removal of top hamper to the boat deck level, and erection of a wooden flight deck on truss frames over the present superstructure. The navigation bridge will be relocated to a small port side island. These are all motorships, so a small portside diesel exhaust will be provided. A simple enclosed hangar will be fitted forward of the bridge for up to eight wheeled aircraft with a single elevator there. All existing catapults and aircraft positions aft will be retained. This area will be open-sided. Existing winches will be used via a simple winch-out gantry crane to lift aircraft. There will be no aft elevator. These ships will be used for training, aircraft transport, seaplane bases or escort duties as required. Conversions are very simple and will take 8-12 weeks depending on yard. Their armament will be confined to light AA weapons.
Note: 11 Mutsuki class DD are still in Fleet service.
Note: No minelayers are considered below.
Note: There are already reports of numbers of captured and salvaged enemy ships to be incorporated. This will be reported later.
Tachibana (20 +22 needed)
None exist, this is commencing design.
The following old DD exist.
Fast (above 18kt) 22 needed (57 in service Feb 42)
3 Tomozuru modern TB
6 Ootori modern TB
15 Momi (5 to be reactivated from tender status)
7 Wakatake
15 Minekaze
8 Kamikaze
Slow (below 18kt) (6 available)
2 Momo
1 Urakaze (to be reactivated from tender status)
1 Amatsukaze (to be reactivated from tender status)
1 Tanikaze (to be reactivated from tender status)
1 Yodo (ex survey ship to be reactivated from tender status)
1000ton Kaibokan 28 needed (36 in service Feb 42)
2 Hashidate (modern)
1 Eritrea (Italian Allied)
4 Shimushu
30 Modern minesweepers
14 Etorofu (completing)
8 Mikura (building)
30 Ukuru (planned)
800 ton Kaibokan 84 needed (1 in service Feb 42)
1 Lepanto (Italian Allied)
100 Type C (diesel) and Type D (steam) Planned
Ch13 subchaser 112 needed (29 in service Feb 42)
14 subchasers
15 Ch-13 class in service, 36 building
73 Ch-13 class planned
Auxiliary Escorts 280 needed (220 in service Feb 42)
110 auxiliary minesweepers in service
110 Auxiliary submarine chasers in service
22 Wa class minesweepers building
200 Pa class trawlers building
201 Cha class building and planned
129 escorts and 220 auxiliary escorts in service in February 1942
Most of these ships will transfer to Seventh Fleet control. The CVL Hosho will be diverted by Combined Fleet to training and tactical development in escort of the fast tanker convoys until the first replacement austere carrier is available to take over this role.
Ports
Convoys cost about 10% of tonnage according to our WWI experience with the British in the Mediterranean. This is acceptable if the enemy submarine force is being attacked by the escorts. Japan is fortunate in that there are a large number of ports around the Inland Sea. Once in the Inland Sea and Sea of Japan, no further oceanic escort is required as the trade there can be protected by minefields. Similarly, trade along the Chinese coast is mostly carried in small or minor vessels and is conducted in shallow waters unsuitable for submarine operations in many areas. The Gulf of Chih Li and much of the Yellow Sea is also protectable by local escorts and mines.
Shipping Management
Japan had 6,366,000 GRT of merchant shipping in vessels over 500GRT as of 1 Jan 42. Of these, 2,180,000 GRT is in Army service, 1,560,000 GRT in IJN service, and 2,626,000 GRT serving the economy. It has always been planned to return most of the requisitioned tonnage to economic use as soon as the conquest phase is over. This is now unlikely to occur when planned. Therefore, wasteful practises are to be eliminated through use of management boards of the Shipping Control Association. These will be civilian shipping personnel, responsible for moving military cargoes out and civil cargoes back to Japan and on cross trades. The present Army and Navy practises of exclusive use, with half of the voyages in ballast back to Japan, is to cease instantly. Where not carrying military cargoes, these ships must carry economy cargoes or the military will not be able to obtain the additional weapons needed to prosecute the war. The Army has agreed with this.
The Army will be able to hand back the equivalent of 1,100,000 GRT of shipping through management of backloading and elimination of 'ship warehousing' and ballast voyages. Their requisition will remain for outward use, but not for inward use. Again, this function will be managed by a Dry Cargo Control Board run by the shipping company personnel (and military staffs) forming the Shipping Control Association.
Both services have been instructed to return as much tonnage as possible to exclusive economic use. The IJN will be able to return 250,000 GRT immediately, and has captured about 150,000 GRT of operational dry cargo ships to date for about 400,000 GRT. The IJN is well aware of the problem, and is making very strong efforts (cruiser sweeps and so forth) to capture enemy merchant ships intact. They have also assembled a Salvage Command to raise as many of the sunken enemy ships in southern waters as possible.
115,000 of slower tankers (11 ships) have also been captured intact to date, an invaluable prize made better by all being fully laden.
However, the Navy will take over management of all tankers afloat (presently only 575,000 GRT plus the 115,000 GRT of prizes) through a Tanker Management Board manned by the tanker shipping companies, especially ASKK, ISKK Nippon Tanker KK, NKKK, OSKK and YKKK. This is to ensure that all tankers are escorted. Special air groups are also being assembled to provide aerial escort to these absolutely critical convoys. Tankers will also be modified with truss frames over their decks (where possible and without disturbing their arrangements) for the carriage of aircraft on outward voyages. Army was agreeable to this, noting that this would save it many aircraft and much engine wear. Aircraft will not be able to land aboard these ships, but single engined machines will be able to take off.
The pride of the tanker fleet are the 18 large, fast tankers (6 more are building) and the ex-whale factory ships. These ships will be used exclusively on fast and special tanker convoys and will be heavily escorted at all times. This is a primary responsibility for Seventh Fleet and will be its tactics development school in the first case. Seventh Fleet will be able to call on Combined Fleet assets to protect these special convoys, the same as it can for troop convoys.
Genyo Maru 10,019 GRT 18kt
Kyokuto Maru 10,052 GRT 17kt
Toa Maru 10,052 GRT 17kt
Toho Maru 9,987 GRT 17kt
Tatekawa Maru 10,152 GRT 19kt
Sinkoku Maru 10,030 GRT 18kt
Omurosan Maru 9,205 GRT 16.5kt
Otowasan Maru 9,205 GRT 16.5kt
Akatuki Maru 10,216 GRT 19kt
Akebono Maru 10.183 GRT 19kt
Itukusima Maru 10,008 GRT 18kt
Teiyo Maru 9,850 GRT 17kt
Nitei Maru 10,020 GRT 18kt
Toei Maru 10,023 GRT 18kt
Nissyo Maru 10,526 GRT 18kt
Kurusio Maru 10,383 GRT 17kt
Nippon Maru 9,974 GRT 16.5kt
Kokuyo Maru 10,027 GRT 19kt
And the five very large ex-whale factory tankers
Nissin Maru 16,764 GRT 13kt
Nissin Maru No.2 17,583GRT 13kt
Kyokuyo Maru 17,549 GRT 13kt
Tonan Maru No.2 19,262 GRT 12.5kt
Tonan Maru No.3 19,209 GRT 12.5kt
Merchant ship Construction
Plans are being prepared in 1939 for simple merchant ships by the Transport Ministry, under the 1st War Standard Program. These will be mass production ships of simple design, also designed to use minimum materials and low-skilled labour. Fortunately, the Army has already initiated construction of Type E 830GRT motor coasters at a specially constructed yard, so a model already exists for this purpose.
The orders to commence building these ships have already begun. As existing yards clear their ways of prewar ships, they receive orders for these ships and instructions to optimise their yard for their construction.
Conclusion
This plan, therefore, is for Seventh Fleet to be established immediately, for escorts to be ordered, and for immediate convoy of all possible ships using all existing escorts. This is critical to the war, which is going very successfully, but which has revealed large gaps in our preparations for war.
Miscellaneous matters:
Coastal Forces. Coastal forces will be demanded in quantity in Malayan waters, and soon. I have requested to Admiral Yamamoto, and he has given orders that development and construction of such light forces are to be accelerated. The Germans have been approached for assistance with the G class MTB and have been most forthcoming. Tokyo Yacht Co. has become the major contractor for these vessels, which will aid production.
Coastal Cruisers. As part of this need for coastal vessels, the laid up ex-Chinese cruisers Ioshima and Yasoshima are being prepared for southern service. These shallow draft ships have a heavy armament and will be of great value in these waters. Their aircraft arrangements are being removed.
The need for additional cruisers is already acute. The Katori class is suitable for 7th Fleet area flagships. In addition, ex-Hirado, ex-Yahagi and ex-Yodo are being reactivated. The old armoured cruisers are proving to be very valuable in cruiser auxiliary roles as well.
Annex 1
Captures to date in NEI Waters
Tankers (all Prize)
Ceronia, 8,096GRT 12,033DWT, 1939, 12 kt NV Petroleum Co. (NE)
Taria, 10,354GRT 15,147DWT, 1939, 13kt, NV Petroleum Co. (NE)
Macoma, 8,011GRT, 12,136DWT, 1936, NV Petroleum Co (NE)
Papendrecht, 10,746GRT, 15,597DWT, 1939, 12.5kt, NV Maastschappi Motorschip
(NE)
Dalfonn 9,860GRT, 14,410DWT, 1928 10.5kt, Bergensen Sigval (NO)
Thorsholm 9,937GRT, 14,800DWT, 13kt, 1937, Thor Dahl Co (NO) CO
Stillman 13,006GRT, 24,000DWT, 11kt, 1928, Panama Transport Co. (PM)
Diala, 8,106GRT, 12,150GDWT, 12kt, 1938 Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (UK)
Solen, 5693GRT, 8,370DWT, 10kt, 1922 Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (UK)
Stanbridge, 5,863GRT, 9000DWT, 1917, 9.5kt, Billmier Shipping (UK)
British Tenacity, 8,439GRT, 12,254DWT, 12kt, 1939 British Tanker Co. (UK)
Note: all ships laden and heading independently for Australia, mostly
with product from Java and Banjarmasin loaded up to some weeks earlier.
At this date, no unladen tankers were heading in for cargoes.
Dry Cargo Ships/Cargoliners
Tjikembang 8013GRT, 11,476GRT, 12.5kt, 1914, Java-China-JapanNV (NE) Prize
Ruys 14,155,GRT, 11,930DWT, 1938 17kt KPM (NE) Prize (3500 evacuees aboard)
Poelau Laut 9272GRT, 10,984DWT, 14.5kt, 1929, Nederland NV (NE) (1000 evacuees)
Poelau Bras 9278GRT, 10,911DWT, 14.5kt, 1929, Nederland NV (NE) (900 evacuees)
Salabangka 6586GRT, 8989DWT, 12kt, 1928 Nederland NV (NE) (900 evacuees) Zaandam 10,909GRT, 10,150DWT, 17kt 1938 NAS NV (NE) (1100 evacuees)
Others
Op ten Noort (Hospital Ship in evacuee service) 6076GRT, 4330GRT, 15kt,
1927, KPM (NE) (2000 evacuees) prize Amsterdam 850 GRT 1300DWT 10kt,
1937 (NE) Hansa Salvage (ocean going salvage tug) towing the Surabaya floating dock (20,000DWT lift) prize
11 small coastal ships below 1500GRT prize
Many more captures are expected, and are already taking place.
Annex 2
Japanese Trade (Note: Written by ex-SCA staff for Allied Economic Evaluation team December 1945)
Japanese exterior commerce during the Empire of Japan and up to 1945, was highly significant. Japan was dependent on imported foods and raw materials for industry. It had to export energetically, and had one of the largest merchant fleets in the world, with a total of 6,800,000 tonnes of displacement, before December 1941. Heavy naval losses during the Pacific War, to June 1944, still left 4,700,000 tonnes.
In spite of the popular perception, during the 1930s Japan was exporting low-cost items successfully. However between the years of 1929 and 1938 the foreign commerce dropped from 3.7% to 3.5%. Japan ran a trade deficit, selling a total of US$12.85 and buying US$15.25 per capita. This was in part brought on by the purchase of wartime materials.
Japan's primary trading partners in order were:
United States
Manchukuo
Reformed Government of the Republic of China
Mengchiang
Chinese occupied lands
India
England
Dutch Indies
Japan exported 32% of its total output to the United States, and purchased 21% of its foreign trade.
Japan's imports were as follows:
32% - cotton
9% - wool
9% - iron
6% - petroleum
4% - machinery
3% - soybeans
2% - wheat
Japan's exports were as follows:
19% - wool articles
15% - silk
15% - rayon
3% - machinery
Japan's primary exports were silk (from silk worms) where they controlled 80% of the world's production, and tea, where they controlled 10%.
Their total foreign trade was equivalent to Belgium, a country with less than 10% of Japan's population.
In 1897 the local monetary unit, the yen, was valued with pure gold patron at a base level of 24.5 British Penny; which permits the use in the figures of the pound sterling or gold-backed US dollars.
(10.8 Yen = 1 British Pound)
|
Values in millions of British Pounds |
||
|
Dates |
Imports |
Exports |
|
1891 to 1895 |
11.51 |
12.61 |
|
1901 to 1905 |
35.92 |
30.23 |
|
1906 to 1910 |
46.40 |
43.70 |
|
1911 to 1913 |
64.63 |
55.51 |
|
1925 to 1929 |
213.48 |
187.55 |
|
Values in Millions of Gold U.S. Dollars |
||
|
Dates |
Imports |
Exports |
|
1891-1895 |
55 |
60 |
|
1901-1905 |
175 |
150 |
|
1906-1910 |
230 |
215 |
|
1911-1913 |
320 |
275 |
|
1925-1929 |
1,050 |
925 |
During world depression (1931 to 1934) counted in Yens the Japanese exterior commerce are dilated in continuous form. The expansion of these commerce if because at European difficulties to provide European colonies most material, for all Japan approved these opportunity in excellent form. And theirs decided to expand your selling, for convert your commerce in cause extend around the world. Before at war crude silk represented the one-third of exports and processed silk 10%. Other products for export are rayon, cotton process silk and others, of theirs cotton represented 5% of the total. In 1934 the exports changed with crude silk falling to 13%, cotton maintain one 23%, rayon stay in one 5%. At contrary your imports stay in cotton crude stay in 32%, brute wool in one 8%, imported Petrol Products (crude or processes) one 4%. In 1937 the exports stay in crude silk (13%), cotton textures (20%), rayon(5%). The imports in foreign represents: crude cotton(23%), brute wool (8%) and Petrol imported products (6%).
Other exterior commerce statistics
Japan are the unique Asiatic independent state why in first place export manufactured objects (e.g., silks, fabrics) and import machinery and prime material.
Between sellings figured textile products with 60%, metal industry less active in 1918 but still selling porcelain, paper and matches, prime material sent one 7% with value of 1,879,657 Yen (1925), sugar and tea from Formosa, coal, etc.
In imports stay prime material with one 60%, cotton in raw state, unfinished metals and machinery, foods with 14%.
For more numbers, see the following statistics from 1890 to 1927:
|
Buyings |
|||
|
Date |
Asia |
Europe |
United States |
|
1890 |
35% |
50% |
9% |
|
1913 |
48% |
30% |
16% |
|
1921 |
41% |
18% |
35% |
|
1927 |
39% |
23% |
37% |
|
Sellings |
|||
|
Date |
Asia |
Europe |
United States |
|
1890 |
30% |
29% |
36% |
|
1913 |
43% |
23% |
29% |
|
1921 |
49% |
6% |
40% |
|
1927 |
37% |
7% |
55% |
In 1915, the exterior commerce are against local economy, with previous four year of great exports and present times of augment the these area over buyings.
In 1925, the exterior commerce are for one value of 404 French francs per inhabitants.
In 1926, the general value of exports are 2,045 million Yen, the imports are 2,377 million of Yen.
During 1927, the same values correspond in ones 1,992 million of Yen in sellings and 2,179 in buyings.
The theoretical monetary value of Yen are in time ones 12.72 Frs., with variations why changed between 13.60 in 1918 to 10.46 during 1925.
Other Japanese selling numbers (1900 to 1925) in thousands of Yen (one Yen equalled 5 Spanish pesetas in 1925)
|
Foreign Sellings |
|||
|
Date |
Asia |
Europe |
United States |
|
1900 |
200 |
200 |
200 |
|
1905 |
190 |
200 |
300 |
|
1910 |
300 |
200 |
300 |
|
1915 |
900 |
400 |
300 |
|
1920 |
600 |
190 |
800 |
|
1925 |
1000 |
180 |
1000 |
The total of these exports in the same years:
1900: 600
1905: 500
1910: 700
1915: 2,000
1920: 2,200
1925: 2,400
More of 90% of Chosen exterior commerce is realizing with Japan and Manchukuo. In 1939 Chosen buying for value of 300,000,000 U.S. Dollars, and selling with value of 250,000,000, signed one deficit why continuing for years.
Your principal articles for export are:
Rice
Silk
Soybean
Wolfram (Tungsten)
Graphite
Gold
Chemical Products
Your principal sellings are:
Petroleum
Metallic Products
Machinery & Trucks
Sugar
Rye
Rice
More of 16,000,000 tonnes of merchants vessels entering to province in 1936 by Fusan, the fourth port in Japanese Empire.
Practically Japanese Industry and Commerce are one mounted Machine for export and foreign sellings, and unsatisfied your poverty local market for the scarcities in money for acquired basic needed products.
Formosa exports: (1929 to 1933)
Rice: 20%
Sugar: 55%
Tropical fruits: 5%
Camphor (processed or raw state): 2%
Oolong and other types of tea: 2%
Minerals (processed or raw state): 5%
Other Japanese foreign investments in Asia (pre-WW2)
Japanese companies, had compromised 18,560,000 Yen in the Dutch Indies, in Sumatra & Borneo and ones 51,195,000 Yen in rubber plantations in British Strait establishments (British Malaya) (260 km² in plenty rendiments during 1927).
If evaluated in 1900 millions of Yens the Japanese capital investment in China until 1927. Apart of Manchu inversions, the Japanese interests stay concentrated in Yang-tze Kiang Basin areas (Shanghai, Hankow-Wuhan, Kiangsi lands) thanks at your loans at local empreses, Japanese Banking controlled 50% of the Chinese cotton industry sector.
Naval construction industry (before and during WW2)
In 1893 naval construction was in the range 177,000 to 1,528,000 tons. In 1913 this increased to 3,565,000 tons. In 1924 with ones 237 vessels of 500 tons and others 11 of 10,000 tonnes for continuing your growing at 4,140,000 tonnes in 1928. The Japanese Navy was third in the world behind British and American Navies and dominated the West Pacific area before the war. The first modern shipyard if founded in 1891 since this time the naval constructions are rapidly advanced. The Japanese boats of more 100 tonnes represents one tonnelage total registered of 5,007,000 tonnes of theirs 1,198,000 correspond to the naval construction period of 1936 to 1938. This put the nation in third place among maritime powers, one notably realization in more short times. The old vessels were destroyed or disarmed of mode, while the regular fleet was efficient and modern. Without scarcity of Petrol, much of these modern vessels are pushed for these energy source.
In peace time Japan constructed a lower annual figure of 500,000 tonnes of shipping. Japan still rivalled Norway for third place in the world merchant fleet. Its vessels were of lower quality. Almost 1,000,000 tonnes were of the modern type, but the larger part of the current fleet was antiquated, with only half-a-dozen vessels of tonnage over 10,000 tonnes
Annex 3
Private Correspondence Kondo-Yamamoto
[TN: notes such as this are insertions by translators to explain issues]
YAMAMOTO
I think that, considering the way we do things, we could well have ended with 5 different escort types.
(1) The DDL I mentioned [TN:which could be seen as their equivalent of the "War Emergency" RN DD]
(2) The simplified and early Matsu/Tachibana, probably without torpedoes or may be just 21in tubes from older DD [TN: a bigger and more effective Japanese "Hunt" DE]
(3) The large Kaibokan (19.5kts) [TN: actually the Japanese equivalent of a River-class frigate]
(4) The 800t [TN: being the Japanese equivalent of "Flowers"]
(4) the Ch-13 type [a bigger PC, conceptually a sort of coastal corvette].
To this one has to add the true Fleet DD of the Yugumo and then Akitsuki types.
Now, naval building is to be constrained by manpower (constraint to be eased with simplification and some standardization) and shortages of steel, non ferrous metals ores and other raw materials.
Even if Japan can procure from USSR some wood and iron ore before May/June 42 the industrial constraint is a real one.
We can cancel one light cruiser, but Oyodo would be needed as radar equipped ship to work with the Kido Butai.
The Alternate Tachibana could be even simpler than what you write.
The fleet engineer notes that reducing the shp is not a real time/material saver. We have one machinery design for 19,000hp. So we keep it as re-designing one for just 2,500 hp less is a waste of resource. My staff recommends keeping the 19,000 unit but do with just two single 5in/40, 21in TT if needed and a lot of light AA guns (and DC + ASW weapons). We are removing many twin 21" tubes from old destroyer classes and the staff inform me that making a quadruple 21" mount with these tubes is a simple matter. They can also use oxygen fuelled torpedoes of course.
The IJN has suffered so far much heavier destroyer losses than we expected. Could it be possible that, without disrupting the Fleet
destroyer program, the IJN command order "second class" destroyers like the Matsu/Tachibana at the earliest date, but to the destroyer design?
I am specifically thinking here to the Matsu class. The machinery is similar to the Otori TB (19,000hp). Could the Uraga dock in Tokyo, which has been heavily
involved into the Shiratsuyu program, produce a cheaper and smaller variant of the scaled-down Fleet [TN: Yugumo] design?
Such a ship could have had following characteristics:
Lwl x b x d = 96.8 x 9.9 x 3.5 m, standard Dsp 1517t / Trial Dsp 1755/1838t, 42,000hp, 33.5 kts.
Armament: 4 x 5in/40DP (2 x 2), 18 x 25mmAA (4 x 3 / 6 x 1), 8 -24in TT (2x4), 42DC.
One could even better the concept by increasing beam by may be 1ft. that would increase stability to a probable 0.75kts cost. The ship will still be fast
enough to operate with heavy cruisers.
This "Improved Matsu" will be cheaper than the original Shiratsuyu but costlier than the Matsu. Recall, we even simplified the Matsu design to make
it the Tachibana for lower cost and faster construction. On the "cost per Ton" ratio, 15 ships could have been built against the 18 Matsu.
Performances would have been less not so much different from a Shiratsuyu, particularly for AA fire or at night when the more powerful 5in/50 used in IJN
"Fleet" DD is not much superior to the 5in/40. They can be ordered by March 1942, laid down between late summer 1942 - spring 1943 and launched
between spring 1943 and the end of the year.
The "original Matsu" class will appear in a similar form as a " Tachibana" class, but with the first ship laid down as soon as the design
is completed, say in April this year [TN: 1942]. The yards say that build time on this design is 8 months for the first ship from the same yard coming down to
5 months by the fifth ship at that yard.
KONDO
This is a very serious issue. I had not thought along quite these lines, and I commend the idea. I think that it is more in accordance with our concepts in March 1942 in the light of the tactical progression we have seen. It actually fills the lighter destroyer role in numbers role better than the Matsu as it is capable of acting as a destroyer - a real one - which the Matsu is not. This is a reasonably formidable ship with a true DP armament. Numbers are crucial here. I would actually commend cancelling Sakawa in favour of another 5-7 of this class. To partially compensate for that cancellation, some of my staff have recommended completion of Oyodo as a 9-gun ship. She will take the additional turret aft. However, her completion along the lines suggested by yourself, as a specialised air protection and command ship for the Kido Butai is a more sound idea.
This leaves the 'fast A/S escort' classification empty, or does it? The kaibokans fall in to three distinct types. These are the 19.5 kt Etorofu/Mikura/Ukuru of about a thousand tons FL, an the 16.5kt 800 ton FL Type C, with the Type D in the middle at 940t FL and 17.5kt.
This is a good array of escorts, mostly because they can all deal with a submarine and the range means that all sorts of slipways can be used. This meets our needs. The partially unresolved question is the need for a fast 28kt escort, the Tachibana? Staff studies here and interrogation of Allied personnel confirms that there is, but in an austere form. These would be escort destroyers or fast kaibokan, not second class destroyers, and would not really be a multi function design. Although capable of accepting a 24-inch quad TT amidships (We believe that this should be a design requirement for the hull), we would not fit the first order with these tubes but with 21" quadruples made from tubes removed from old destroyers.
These ships have to be brought forward, but in small numbers, as A/S group flagships for a group of 3-5 kaibokan and other escorts. The designers have come up with a Tachibana that is:
1500tN, 1250 light, 328'OA x 322'WL x 302' PP, 30' beam 8' draft, 2 shaft GTU 2 Kanpon boilers 19000SHP 28kt
Depending on availability either two, three or four 5 inch 40 cal AA (2x2), 12 x 1 25mm, 4 x single or twin (?) 37mm, 2 x ASW rocket launchers, 60DC, 4 21" tubes
RDF and ASDIC
Building time average 5-6 months, no sheer, no camber, straight sections, very simple structure.
Early plans called for 29 Matsu and 113 Tachibana
With very large orders for kaibokan, I suspect that only about 20-30 Tachibana will be needed over the duration of the war from ordering in early 1942. I believe this will actually permit a few more second class fleet destroyers to be built because of the 'evening out' impact all this will have on our ship production.
In essence, we have been forced in early 1942, to six standard types. This will increase production quite considerably through early standardisation.
Yugumo DD
Mod-Shiratsuyu DDL
Tachibana fast kaibokan
1000ton Kaibokan
800 ton Kaibokan (for the smaller yards)
Ch-13 subchasers (for the yet smaller yards and really a coastal vessel. Perfect for the Indies)
Merchant Conversions to Carriers
Kamikawa Maru (burned out above the main deck but afloat at Kuching) conversion (5 months after arrival back in Japan) in to a very austere carrier using her own engines.
Brazil Maru (and sister to Argentina Maru/Kaiyo) conversion to austere carriers with their own engines and much simplified. 6 month rather than 11 month conversion with ships retaining original name, in service by end 1942
In other words, the ending of the massive, complex conversion of liners to carriers and the use instead of much simpler, faster, cheaper conversions. These will be about half the time, one-third the cost, and one-third of the industrial effort.
Cancellation of the entire AMC program and the use of the ships as transports/seaplane tenders. This is simply essential if we are to be able to move the equipment we need to fight the Americans in the far Pacific.
Exceptions to be Aikoku Maru, Hokoku Maru and Gokoku maru (sisters) to be converted to austere carriers
YAMAMOTO
This seems sensible, and has been discussed with Nagano. He was not happy with the need to cancel Hull 111 and Shinano, or the urgent need to increase Unryu orders from the 1941 program, but is realistic. He is working with Ozawa on an idea for Shinano, we may be able to complete her as an aircraft support ship.
The Premier has accepted that conquering the southern resources area is a failure if we cannot move the resources back. The Army has really been rocked back on its heels, even frightened by the fight Lord Gort is putting up in Singapore, by British tanks, and above all by missing the Burma monsoon.
The Army is in real trouble as the enemy has now a year to move forces into Burma. Taking the Rangoon area is essential to closing the Burma Road. Our own information is that the Army may not be able to do it, and even if they can it will require an all-out effort by the Combined Fleet. The Americans may not give us that chance. Although we defeated them, the British inflicted a level of loss on us we could never have imagined in planning. That said, I am glad Phillips was foolish enough to fight. We would be in a very difficult situation if he had retired on Ceylon.
Ugaki has said that we have placed the first Tachibana order already to allow for engines to be built. He expects the first to be in service by November this year. I have ordered that it actually be assigned to you as an escort for your battleships so you can personally examine its potential. I want it fully evaluated.