Were Soviet anti-CBG tactics likely to succeed?

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emc		#21	[-]
Posts: 3729 ( 5-May-2008 19:21:28) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Dolphinstriker wrote: But what about Vietnam...surely in the 1960s and 1970s no one had a better handle on logistics, but the USA got beat on tactics (both at home and in country)? The US didn't get beaten in Viet Nam in military terms, it won the tactical war. It got beaten politically and psychologically; the American public and leadership wasn't prepared to pay the price to win ultimate victory in Viet Nam, and that soon became apparent, thanks to the news media, to the Viet Namese communists. ...and an opponent willing to take roughly 10 times the casualties as the US, several US administrations that could not explain why fighting in Vietnam was worthwhile, and a largely valid perception that the SSS was rigged in favor of the well-to-do.
E F Draaijers		#22	[-]
Registered Member Posts: 188 ( 5-May-2008 22:46:34) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	The Soviet tactic to concentrate on the CVBG's was likely to be partly or so effective untill the comming of the USN Aegis system of Airdefense. Untill this, the systems on both USSR and USN (and other contemporary navies) were more or less equall, making the crude guidancesytems of the Soviet Missiles a match for the SM-1 and contemporary missiles of the West, but still having a change of obtainign a hit or so, since the targetting systems of the days before the Agis were not the most reliable and still unable to cooperate with other ships in the taskforce and also unable to target more than a few targets at a single time. A massed missile attack could in theory have resulted in chaos in the CVBG's SAM capacity. When the modern Aegis sytem and its successors came around, with state of the art communications and combined groupcoordinationsystems, this was corrected and from that moment on the CVBG's changes greatly improved, since all ships in a CVBG could be commanded from a singel commandpost resulting in far better defenses against incomming missiles. This combines with better, harder hitting, aircraft and more CIWS' made a CVBG more difficult to engage with both missiles and aircraft. The only way to get down a CVBG is with a submarineattack with torpedoes, rather than missiles. Torpedoes are more stealthy and do not give away the possition of the attacking submarine that obvious as a missilelaunch, even when the most up to date ASW detection systems are available. Especially the quite attack submarines, of both SSN and SS type can get more results than the bigger missile armed ones of SSGN types. The possition of a submarine normally is revealed when a torpedo is launched, only if the ship is within a short range, inside torpedorange. The longer the distance, the more difficult the attacking submarine is to detect by either surface or submerged sensors on both surface and submarine escorts. Combined with the devlopment of the Russian heavyweight type 65 torpedo with a very large payload of either conventional or nuclear origin, the Russian SSN is a force to be reconned with. Even with the less advanced targetiing systems of these weapons, the Russian submarine still can achieve serious damage to any target it hits.
drunknsubmrnr		#23	[-]
Posts: 1328 ( 5-May-2008 22:56:36) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	"The Soviet tactic to concentrate on the CVBG's was likely to be partly or so effective untill the comming of the USN Aegis system of Airdefense. Untill this, the systems on both USSR and USN (and other contemporary navies) were more or less equall, making the crude guidancesytems of the Soviet Missiles a match for the SM-1 and contemporary missiles of the West, but still having a change of obtainign a hit or so, since the targetting systems of the days before the Agis were not the most reliable and still unable to cooperate with other ships in the taskforce and also unable to target more than a few targets at a single time." You might want to look up NTDS at some point. It pretty much blows that particular theory out of the water. "The only way to get down a CVBG is with a submarineattack with torpedoes, rather than missiles. Torpedoes are more stealthy and do not give away the possition of the attacking submarine that obvious as a missilelaunch, even when the most up to date ASW detection systems are available. " Only electric torpedoes are quiet, and they're pretty slow. Not exactly what you want for attacking a carrier group. "The possition of a submarine normally is revealed when a torpedo is launched, only if the ship is within a short range, inside torpedorange." You mean a torpedo launch is only stealthy ehen the target isn't within range of the torpedoes? Why would anyone fire then? "Combined with the devlopment of the Russian heavyweight type 65 torpedo with a very large payload of either conventional or nuclear origin, the Russian SSN is a force to be reconned with. Even with the less advanced targetiing systems of these weapons, the Russian submarine still can achieve serious damage to any target it hits. " Assuming the H2O2 doesn't leak and blow up the firing sub. Kevin
Fermi2	All Incorrect	#24	[-]
Posts: 3270 ( 6-May-2008 01:59:54) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	E F Draaijers wrote: The Soviet tactic to concentrate on the CVBG's was likely to be partly or so effective untill the comming of the USN Aegis system of Airdefense. Untill this, the systems on both USSR and USN (and other contemporary navies) were more or less equall, making the crude guidancesytems of the Soviet Missiles a match for the SM-1 and contemporary missiles of the West, but still having a change of obtainign a hit or so, since the targetting systems of the days before the Agis were not the most reliable and still unable to cooperate with other ships in the taskforce and also unable to target more than a few targets at a single time. A massed missile attack could in theory have resulted in chaos in the CVBG's SAM capacity. When the modern Aegis sytem and its successors came around, with state of the art communications and combined groupcoordinationsystems, this was corrected and from that moment on the CVBG's changes greatly improved, since all ships in a CVBG could be commanded from a singel commandpost resulting in far better defenses against incomming missiles. This combines with better, harder hitting, aircraft and more CIWS' made a CVBG more difficult to engage with both missiles and aircraft. The only way to get down a CVBG is with a submarineattack with torpedoes, rather than missiles. Torpedoes are more stealthy and do not give away the possition of the attacking submarine that obvious as a missilelaunch, even when the most up to date ASW detection systems are available. Especially the quite attack submarines, of both SSN and SS type can get more results than the bigger missile armed ones of SSGN types. The possition of a submarine normally is revealed when a torpedo is launched, only if the ship is within a short range, inside torpedorange. The longer the distance, the more difficult the attacking submarine is to detect by either surface or submerged sensors on both surface and submarine escorts. Combined with the devlopment of the Russian heavyweight type 65 torpedo with a very large payload of either conventional or nuclear origin, the Russian SSN is a force to be reconned with. Even with the less advanced targetiing systems of these weapons, the Russian submarine still can achieve serious damage to any target it hits. All incorrect, and when are you going to answer my question about what qualifies you to comment on USN Submarines?
seasick		#25	[-]
Posts: 4637 ( 6-May-2008 03:09:24) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	When the modern Aegis sytem and its successors came around, with state of the art communications and combined groupcoordinationsystems, this was corrected and from that moment on the CVBG's changes greatly improved, since all ships in a CVBG could be commanded from a singel commandpost resulting in far better defenses against incomming missiles. This combines with better, harder hitting, aircraft and more CIWS' made a CVBG more difficult to engage with both missiles and aircraft. Task force coordination has good since WW2. The Navy's front line of defense has been AEW and interceptors. Coordinating missile fire was worked out early on. Aegis and NTU gave the USN a force multiplier because of time sharing of illumination radars. F-14A and AIM-54 combination gave the USN the capability to hit hostile bombers before they could locate the carrier groups. CIWS was an after thought. A last ditch defense against missiles. The NATO Sea Sparrow was far more significant.
tassilo27		#26	[-]
Posts: 91 ( 6-May-2008 03:35:50) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Wouldn't the threat to the carriers increase as the distance to the Soviet homeland decreased? As in, when the CVBG is in the lower latitudes of the North Atlantic (protecting the REFORGER convoys, say), it's under air threat from only Soviet Naval Aviation, whereas as they come farther and farther north then you might see some tactical bombers come into play and/or the Backfires be able to run in and out at high-Mach numbers? That can't be good for the Americans under any circumstances. The submarine threat is also dependent on range as well, but in a different manner I'd think. Unless the entire Soviet submarine fleet was already at sea when the shooting started, it would take time for the subs to transit from their bases in the far north to the lower latitudes. That would mean that on day 1 the threat at lower latitudes would be limited to whatever subs the Soviets had at sea. As the days progressed, the number of subs would increase at a given latitude even past the SOSUS barrier at the GIUK line. At higher latitude, the rate of increase in number of submarines would be higher. If I'm horrendously wrong please correct me, but those seem a lot more plausible than some of the things you'd read.
wabpilot		#27	[-]
Posts: 2036 ( 6-May-2008 04:21:08) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Admiral Beez wrote: But what about Vietnam...surely in the 1960s and 1970s no one had a better handle on logistics, but the USA got beat on tactics (both at home and in country)? And we lost the logistic battle. More to the point, we did not wage the logistic battle the way could or should have. Tactically we won every major battle. Yet, the NVA was able to survive because we would not bring enough fire power to bear on them. They got there first and were able to win a war of attrition. Once we left, the South Vietnamese were without sufficient logistic support to survive on their own.
Nightwatch2		#28	[-]
Posts: 3553 ( 6-May-2008 06:02:18) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	seasick wrote: When the modern Aegis sytem and its successors came around, with state of the art communications and combined groupcoordinationsystems, this was corrected and from that moment on the CVBG's changes greatly improved, since all ships in a CVBG could be commanded from a singel commandpost resulting in far better defenses against incomming missiles. This combines with better, harder hitting, aircraft and more CIWS' made a CVBG more difficult to engage with both missiles and aircraft. Task force coordination has good since WW2. The Navy's front line of defense has been AEW and interceptors. Coordinating missile fire was worked out early on. Aegis and NTU gave the USN a force multiplier because of time sharing of illumination radars. F-14A and AIM-54 combination gave the USN the capability to hit hostile bombers before they could locate the carrier groups. CIWS was an after thought. A last ditch defense against missiles. The NATO Sea Sparrow was far more significant. you are exactly right, of course. We had integrated, linked command and control a long, long time before Aegis showed up. Aegis is just a radar and shipboard system. The links already existed. Republican; because not everyone can be on welfare.
seasick	Removed By Seasick	#29	[-]
Posts: 4638 ( 6-May-2008 06:45:21) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Never mind.
StewartG		#30	[-]
Posts: 500 ( 6-May-2008 11:41:02) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Well my only experience of this was playing things like "Harpoon", "2nd Fleet" and the like, so my views aren't worth too much. However it always seemed that a US CVBG was a hard, risky target for SNA. In the early stages of a fight it always seemed more likely that they would hit the softer targets first - convoys, phib groups, any French or British CVG / CVSGs which could be located. In the latter case: 8 SHAR FRS.1s with 4 x Sidewinder each, 3 Sea Dart ships (CVS plus 2 T42s), 2 or 3 Sea Wolf ships (T22, T23 and/or converted Leander) and 1 or 2 basically useless Sea Cat ships (T21, Leander). Not a very comfortable match-up against a Backfire raid.

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Were Soviet anti-CBG tactics likely to succeed?

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