Why did IJN close to within range of Midway's aircraft?

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jlyons97	Can you name a real world event where the Japanese were able	#21	[-]
Posts: 1461 ( 2-May-2008 04:03:12) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Dolphinstriker wrote: Real world too hard? Stay in statistical fantasy land if you must. But while so doing, you might look up the distance to targets in a couple of other real world carrier battles and see if you can draw comfort from them. You claim only "real world" numbers mean anything, then fail to cite any to prove your point; is the real world too hard for you, as well? I cited sources, but I'm not claiming they are infallible, only that they are all I have. Given the land-based planes available to Midway's air group, I find it difficult to believe that any informed person could seriously think Kido Butai's planes could attack Midway from outside Midway's reach. Can you name a real world event where the Japanese were able to take advantage of their alleged carrier strike aircraft "range advantage" and hit a target without being attacked in return? It has been observed (by you possibly) that there was no knowledge of what airplanes were there. Probably true in the details, but surely there was an educated guess. Well, if there was, what was it? What did Nagumo and his air staff think they knew, or could guess, about Midway's air defenses? Maybe that's the answer to the question; Nagumo didn't try to stay outside Midway's range because he intuited that he would be attacked at any distance at which he could reasonably launch his own strike. I don't know and neither, apparently, do you. I think it had to do with lack of intelligence on what types of aircraft were actually on Midway, a feeling that he couldn't possibly out-range land-based aircraft, and possibly the fact that Nagumo's force was a day late compared to the invasion force. I know if I was in Nagumo's place, I certainly wouldn't want to make a costly long range attack; I'd try to preserve my strike and fighter aircraft as much as possible for the carrier battle that was scripted in Yamamoto's plan. to take advantage of their alleged carrier strike aircraft "range advantage" and hit a target without being attacked in return? Yes. And again, Philippine Sea. Who launched on who first? Ozawa's searches found Spruance first at (I think) 500+ plus miles. Spruance knew he was coming; his subs told him so. But, he couldn't find his opponent before his opponent found him. So he got to fight a defensive battle in the worst pre-war scenario. He was lucky, for Ozawa not only found him first, he got in the first blow. Good CAP and ill-trained IJN aviators saved Spruance, but it was no way to run a railroad, as they say. Your last paragraph is solid IMHO. P.S. You found a lot of range stats on various web site and chose to believe them. This is not scholarship unless the stats get a real world test. The latter is all I ask.
Dolphinstriker		#22	[-]
Posts: 1825 ( 2-May-2008 06:19:55) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Yes. And again, Philippine Sea. Who launched on who first? Ozawa's searches found Spruance first at (I think) 500+ plus miles. Spruance knew he was coming; his subs told him so. But, he couldn't find his opponent before his opponent found him. So he got to fight a defensive battle in the worst pre-war scenario. He was lucky, for Ozawa not only found him first, he got in the first blow. Good CAP and ill-trained IJN aviators saved Spruance, but it was no way to run a railroad, as they say. Sorry, but the Japanese attacks at the Battle of the Philippine Sea proves nothing about their alleged "range advantage" and Ozawa's attempt to exploit the special conditions of the situation cost him dearly. Of the 43 scouts he launched on the morning of the 19th., fully one half failed to return, many because they simply got lost and ran out of fuel. When Ozawa did launch his strike on the 19th., it was from around 400 hundred miles range, but this was only possible for the Japanese because they (thought they) had the option of landing on Guam or Rota about 180 miles distant from their target. Thus they would have flown only about 580 miles total, which was not a significant range advantage over the then current US planes. As it eventuated, many Japanese pilots became lost and never did make contact with the American fleet, another reason long range strikes were a bad idea, although one could argue that poor pilot training had something to do with this. As for Spruance not knowing where the Japanese carriers were, this is true, but only because the radar equipped PBM which did find the Japanese carriers had a defective radio and couldn't report the contact. Both sides had shore-based aircraft making long range searches, the Japanese got lucky in that, the US did not, it had nothing to do with aircraft range. Spruance ended up fighting a defensive battle because his orders to cover the Saipan invasion force demanded it. Neither side at the Philippine Sea battle seemed particularly interested in getting in the first strike. Ozawa recalled the strike planes that an eager subordinate had ordered launched on the 18th. and Spruance decided not to close with the Japanese fleet because of his responsibility to cover the invasion force. Finally, the Battle of the Philippine Sea ended with Ozawa being attacked by carrier planes, so it's not an example of the Japanese being able to hit a target without being attacked in return due to any "range advantage". P.S. You found a lot of range stats on various web site and chose to believe them. This is not scholarship unless the stats get a real world test. The latter is all I ask. I never claimed to believe them, I was simply comparing them to the stats listed for Japanese planes listed in "Shattered Sword". The stats for the Japanese also seemed unrealistic to me, and I specifically stated that the Japanese "range advantage" seemed more illusory than real, as there was never a concrete example of the IJN carrier planes launching a strike outside of the range of the USN carrier planes and thus avoiding any counter-attack. It's academic anyway, because Nagumo, at Midway, had no intention of trying to exploit any "range advantage", real or perceived. That fact, and the lack of any historical "real world" test, tends to support my theory that the Japanese had no real "range advantage".
StewartG		#23	[-]
Posts: 498 ( 2-May-2008 10:16:59) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Dolphinstriker wrote: The stats for the Japanese also seemed unrealistic to me, and I specifically stated that the Japanese "range advantage" seemed more illusory than real, as there was never a concrete example of the IJN carrier planes launching a strike outside of the range of the USN carrier planes and thus avoiding any counter-attack. Yes. I think that's what Mark Horan's point was.
jlyons97	The Battle of the Philippine Sea - the Real Deal	#24	[-]
Posts: 1462 ( 3-May-2008 04:31:43) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	"Sorry, but the Japanese attacks at the Battle of the Philippine Sea proves nothing about their alleged "range advantage" and Ozawa's attempt to exploit the special conditions of the situation cost him dearly." Ah, but it does, and less selective reading of the evidence reveals this….. Morison addresses Ozawa's philosophy on how he fought this battle, and recall Morison interviewed him post-war. I tend to take both at their word, although others who have talked to Ozawa may know more. He was well aware of his range advantage, and worked to take advantage of it. "Ozawa could search out to 560 miles [actually did so], Mitscher only to 325 or 350; Japanese could profitably attack to 300 miles, our not much beyond 200, although they had to fly farther on 20 June. " "He had found the enemy and he intended to maintain a 400-mile gap in order to benefit by the longer range of his planes and chose his own time to fight" "Ozawa's intention for the night of 18-19 June was to keep his main body about 400 miles, and his van about 300 miles, form Task Force 58, outside its presumed striking range. That had been laid on day attacks with large forces operating beyond the range of enemy planes." "These negative results from searches, whether carrier-based, Admiralties-based or tender-based, were exasperating. Even Spruance was irritated" The US carrier-based searches could not reach out far enough, but the Japanese searches could… "At 0520 another enemy snooper appeared, and escape; and shortly before 0600 an American plane shot down one only 37 SSW of the carrier disposition. Obviously the enemy was on our heels." Ok then, the search range advantage possessed by Ozawa is underlined in spades here. Still a non-believer? Lets press on. Of the 43 scouts he launched on the morning of the 19th., fully one half failed to return, many because they simply got lost and ran out of fuel. Possibly, but many (8-10, depending on whose count one believes) got close enough to be shot down, which sort of indicates they were doing SOMETHING right. When Ozawa did launch his strike on the 19th., it was from around 400 hundred miles range, but this was only possible for the Japanese because they (thought they) had the option of landing on Guam or Rota about 180 miles distant from their target. Thus they would have flown only about 580 miles total, which was not a significant range advantage over the then current US planes. But then, what do of the survivors of Raid III? "That was the end of Raid III, which could consider itself lucky; 40 out of 47 returned to their carriers." Not true? Looks to me if true there was a VERY substantial range advantage- a couple of hundred miles worth. What say you? I have no idea why they did return to their carriers, perhaps to ditch alongside a DD, but Morison/Ozawa say they did, and I believe them. DS, it's a bit amazing to me that (1) you discount in some counterintuitive way that more range meant anything and (2) the real world evidence in this battle proves it did mean something.
Dolphinstriker		#25	[-]
Posts: 1831 ( 3-May-2008 18:52:59) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	DS, it's a bit amazing to me that (1) you discount in some counterintuitive way that more range meant anything and (2) the real world evidence in this battle proves it did mean something. Now you're putting words in my mouth; I never claimed that superior aircraft range had no advantages, to say I did is a falsehood. What I'm saying is that the IJN was never able to take practical advantage of it's theoretically superior carrier aircraft ranges to attack without being attacked in return. If you want to rewrite history to make the Battle of the Philippine Sea an example of the IJN using superior range to avoid a counter-attack, that's up to you, but I must point out, historically, Mitscher's carrier planes did attack and severely maul Ozawa's force at The Philippine Sea. So kindly explain exactly how the Japanese range advantage kept them from being counter-attacked? But then, what do of the survivors of Raid III? "That was the end of Raid III, which could consider itself lucky; 40 out of 47 returned to their carriers." Not true? Looks to me if true there was a VERY substantial range advantage- a couple of hundred miles worth. What say you? I have no idea why they did return to their carriers, perhaps to ditch alongside a DD, but Morison/Ozawa say they did, and I believe them. Talk about selective reading! Raid III consisted of 47 aircraft, 40 of which were Zeros. Most of these aircraft never made contact with any target; some were tracked by radar and were seen to be turning back 100 miles short of the American carriers. I'm not surprised quite a few of these planes returned to their carriers, but it doesn't prove any Japanese ability to attack without danger of a counter-attack due to superior range. I repeat; historically, the IJN was never able to take practical advantage of any perceived "range advantage" to attack a target and thereby escape a counter-attack.
Dave Bender	Had to secure some form of negotiated peace	#26	[-]
Posts: 6483 ( 4-May-2008 18:54:08) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Japan cannot afford to sit and wait for the American military steamroller to arrive in 1943. They must keep attacking and winning, to maintain their moral ascendancy. Milne Bay is a better place to do that then Midway.
Dolphinstriker		#27	[-]
Posts: 1836 ( 4-May-2008 20:16:10) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Had to secure some form of negotiated peace Japan cannot afford to sit and wait for the American military steamroller to arrive in 1943. They must keep attacking and winning, to maintain their moral ascendancy. Milne Bay is a better place to do that then Midway. It's fantasy to think that Japan could have forced negotiations by winning any conceivable battle in 1942. The Americans knew that their military/naval cornucopia would begin to overflow in 1943; Japanese victories would only increase the threat to American interests and produce increasing resistance to any thought of negotiating. Further taking Milne Bay would just create one more Japanese base that had to be supplied and defended and a Japanese base at Milne Bay only made sense if they either held Port Moresby, or wanted to capture that place. In May, 1942, the IJA had other issues on it's mind, and didn't need another defensive and logistical liability to stretch their already paper thin resources. Besides, in 1942, the Japanese perceived the major threat to their Home Islands to be from the USN striking out of the Central Pacific (i.e. Hawaii), not Australia. If the Japanese really wanted negotiations with the Americans in 1942, there was only one way to entice the US to the table; that was to cease all offensive operations, withdraw to a minimum perimeter consistent with the defense of the Empire, and offer serious concessions. The military/political leadership of the US wasn't impressed with Japanese victories and knew that it could defeat the Japanese, so why negotiate when the Japanese temporaily held the high cards and demonstrated no intention of accepting a compromise?
Dave Bender	Offer serious concessions	#28	[-]
Posts: 6484 ( 4-May-2008 20:39:22) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Japan went to war with the US because the US was unwilling to allow Japan to have total control of China. If Japan was willing to make serious concessions on that issue it would have happened long before Dec 7, 1941. After December 1941 Japan has no choice but to strive for a naval victory victory in the Pacific, however unlikely that may be. Sitting still means getting steam rolled.
Dolphinstriker		#29	[-]
Posts: 1837 ( 4-May-2008 20:52:10) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Japan went to war with the US because the US was unwilling to allow Japan to have total control of China. If Japan was willing to make serious concessions on that issue it would have happened long before Dec 7, 1941. After December 1941 Japan has no choice but to strive for a naval victory victory in the Pacific, however unlikely that may be. Sitting still means getting steam rolled. I agree that concessions likely to entice the US to the negotiating table would have been highly distasteful to Japan, but that remains the one, albeit extremely remote, chance that Japan had of avoiding the coming US onslaught. Each Japanese offensive, and each Japanese victory simply reduced the likelihood that the US would ever be willing to negotiate. It seems to have escaped the Japanese that every version of WP Orange and the later Rainbow 5 envisioned a total war against Japan should war ever come to pass. The US had every intention of settling Japan's hash once and for all even before the Pearl Harbor attack, and nothing Japan did afterwards came close to changing that resolve. Only a radical change of strategy had any hope of changing the US outlook; unfortunately for them, the Japanese underestimated US determination and embraced an unimaginative and losing strategy.
E F Draaijers		#30	[-]
Registered Member Posts: 187 ( 4-May-2008 21:12:23) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	IJN tactics used at Midway were complex and the planes used still burned a lot of fuel during their froming up of formations and during the landing on the carrierdecks. Most aircraft of the Midway operation were very low on fuel when they returned to their ships. Landbased aircraft have only one advantage over carrieraircraft, namely, they can be launched much faster and with multiple planes starting at the same time, giving them a relatively theoretically greater range than equal planes of equal range operating from a carrierdeck. The other advantage of getting the carriers in range of the outermost reach of the landbased USN bombers was to get them provococed to attack without fightercover, since the common F4F-3 and F2A-3 lacked the range needed to escort the bombers that far away. Unescorted bombers were easy prey for the CAP of A6M-2 fighters of the day. Secondly the IJN expected the strikeforce was capable to destroy Midway airfield by surprise as an effective base, rendering airoperations impossible, making the counterattack less likely from Midway itself. Tomonaga's aircrew simply failed to achiev this, provocing a counterstrike from Midway aircraft.

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Why did IJN close to within range of Midway's aircraft?

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