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 DMc |
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Posts: 314 (22-Jan-2008 10:59:39) |
Would be interesting to find out the relative positions of each the ships - If the silkworm was screened from the T42's radars by the Missouri it might
explain the problem trying to engage it.
Echos of the Falklands? Wasn't Coventry sunk because at a critical time Broadsword's SW radar line of sight was blocked?
Last Edited By: DMc
22-Jan-2008 17:54:14.
Edited 1 times.
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Navaleye |
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Posts: 1038 (22-Jan-2008 18:30:33) |
That Gloucester was able hit her target with an "over the shoulders" shot is to the credit over her ops team. The Americans were rightly concerned
that it got as close as it did to high value units and elected to have an Aegis cruiser in attendance thereafter.
I heard that the Sea Dart launch decision was allegedly taken by the MGD in the absence of the Captain and the PWO, neither of whom were in the ops room at the time. If so it showed great initiative. The other concern was that it took a visual report from the nearby MCMV group before action was initiated which is why it got as close as it did. I'm not saying the Americans could do it any better. But they thought they could at the time.
Last Edited By: Navaleye
22-Jan-2008 19:04:13.
Edited 1 times.
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Meeware |
never knowingly underhyped | ||
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Posts: 1714 (22-Jan-2008 20:03:52) |
contagious professional calm indeed!
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seasick |
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Posts: 4334 (22-Jan-2008 21:39:09) |
Sounds like the USN scapegoating the RN. If the missile launcher was close enough for the Missouri to hit it with her 16 inch guns and the USN didn't know
it was there it sounds like someone wasn't doing reconnaissance. The real problem is that the Missouri and the rest of the Iowas didn't have an onboard
AAW system that was up to the task of defending the vessel from a missile attack.
Nicotine: America's number one mind altering chemical.
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Navaleye |
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Posts: 1039 (22-Jan-2008 22:04:06) |
The Iowa class always had a strong escort so long range anti air capability was considered unnecessary. Gloucester was a strange choice to guard a BB against
air attack in the littoral. The limitations of the Sea Dart system close in to land were documented and shared with our Allies. AFAIK, Gloucester still her 992
radar then which may have contributed to the lack of warning.
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nickthefuzz |
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Posts: 102 (25-Jan-2008 22:43:31) |
The story I heard, from the ops room of another T42, was that Gloucester detected threat and reported to the AAWC (a Aegis ship further back). As AAWC could
not see it on Aegis he told G not to fire (G would still be able to fire in self defence) . Remember that at this time no one had seen a ASCM but plenty of
friendly aircraft were around. Not sure if the Jarrett had seen the Silkworm. G did fire when could regard as self defence threat, but it was over the
shoulder but before silkworm passed Missouri.
- just another 3rd hand account. Note that Gloucester's report was voice, if I recollect correctly it never became a L11 track. Initial detection was visual as launch is not exactly cover and all the radars were having problems with coastal clutter. USN opinion afterwards was that needed an Aegis ship nearer the threat although at the time SPY-1 was very poor in this environment. Even over the shoulder a Silkworm should have been a easy target for all systems on all ships - its large slow and medium altitude Somewhere on the web is a chart showing the missile tracks and ship stations but I don't seem to be able to find it |
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Mark F |
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Posts: 2369 (27-Jan-2008 19:27:50) |
Sounds like a lot of rubbish to me. The Iraqi's fired their missiles down a bearing without painting them with a search radar which would have provided
early warning by the ships ESM systems. The missile seekers were not active at any time during their flight meaning they were not emitting either. With no
pre-launch warning and operating in a highly cluttered and busy environement the intercept was nothing short of remarkable. The USN has nothing to complain
about and I have no knowledge that they ever did. If anything the incident shows the limitations of extant NSFS platforms which of course ultimately led to
the decommissioning of the last Iowa's in the following months and the instigation of the SC-21 and later programs.
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