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Apr 11 17 2:58 AM
Apr 11 17 5:20 AM
Apr 11 17 5:46 AM
Apr 11 17 5:57 AM
Apr 11 17 6:07 AM
Cody2 wrote:Stupid question.
Your platoon runs into a "single" rifleman firing well aimed rounds at you. How do you react?
Your platoon runs into a LMG throwing well aimed bursts at you. How do you react?
My guess would be you react almost exactly the same.
Apr 11 17 1:55 PM
sergeante wrote:1. Soldiers and Marines really don't think in abstract terms like suppression and degrees of suppression, They think in fire and maneuver terms. One element maneuvers while another provides a "base of fire". If your task is base of fire, then you're not trying to suppress, you're trying to hit what you're shooting at. Most of the time you don't get hits. But that doesn't mean you're not shooting to hit.Even looking at it from a training PoV to get rounds close enough to suppress small arms have to be aimed to hit. NATO says suppression has to be within one metre to work. That might sound ridiculously inaccurate to a competition shot but try it at an unknown range, out in typical weather, against a fleeting target from a fire position that's a compromised mix of protection, potential fire and, most of all, availability. That's quite without anybody firing back, to get close enough to suppress anyone reasonably determined you need to aim to hit. Spraying the area (mostly the tree tops) may actually do the opposite of suppressing as a professional enemy draws conclusions about who's tipped up.3. I've been at the receiving end of several different types of fire. In my admittedly limited experience, you can't tell what's shooting at you or exactly how much it's missing you by. First firefight I was in, as soon as I got off the track I detected incoming fire from what had to be 7.62x39 mm or 7.62x54 mm. My first thought? "Wow, just like the rifle range." That would be a rifle range where 5.56 mm was being fired over my head. And that's about the only thing I could sense -- that I was receiving fire and, in that case at least, it wasn't close enough to be a serious threat.British army used to have a thing called the Marksmanship Under Fire Range where remotely fired weapons were fired into shot boxes close to OPs that then had to try to identify the firing point and return fire then report the type of weapon. Even given that effort the aim was to get useful information in an NI type internal security situation.In a real battle the boys are not going to identify much more than very broad classes of weapon and then only with isolated enemy firers. Given just an enemy squad / section firing with MGs and rifles that might be on auto or singles nobody's going to guess right.The DP had a cyclic RoF of 550rpm or so, MG34 about 900rpm and MG42 1,200 to 1,500rpm. As I mentioned the Tommies on the wrong end all reported "Spandaus". As you say, we can read that as "Receiving fire" and no more.8. US didn't have platoon machine guns in WW2. US had company and battalion machine guns.I thought there was an air cooled Browning .30" in the Pl. Fiction I know but there certainly is in A Walk in the Sun; they were tasked to seize a junction / farm, maybe the gun was attached as for the paras?9. CP: "Except many of the MGs that faced British troops in Normandy were Russian DPs which were not GPMGs but LMGs. They still got called Spandaus at the time."Really, where can we read about this? (Not that I doubt it, just intrigued.)I'll have to root about in my books, one of them lists the MGs used in big enough numbers to get a MGxy(z) designation, leMG120(r) for the DP. It doesn't list which formations got what but might have numbers for them.Use in Normandy was mentioned as part of a battlefield study of 43 Divs operations there, first generally then, IIRC, specifically for one engagement in which (Wilts regt?)) troops closed up to a German position by F&M under fire of a Spandau and finally destroyed it with grenades. Our guide had been on a dig that recovered 7.62x54R cases from the still extant trench the MG was firing from. The approach was up a sunken path and most of the surviving members of that Pl had walked the ground with that guide, including the Pl Sgt who was the boy with the grenades.The whole incident provoked questions from guys used to how we do it now, which relates to how the weapons they had then actually got used and how today's use might differ from theory.Where were the Pl Bren guns? The DP opened fire on the Pl at one point, they went to ground and worked about fifty yards or so left to the sunken lane. From the initial contact point to the firing point is steeply uphill over pasture (today, probably then too). Looks like an awful approach but a good field of fire for three Brens.Why did the German not use grenades himself down a steep sunken path that he couldn't get the barrel low enough to fire into without exposing most of his body?Why did the Germans site an MG in a cPl sized position where it could not cover dead ground right up to a grenade throw without any support?Why did the rest of the German Pl do nothing until the gunner was killed then tamely withdraw?10. Bren gun is an interesting example of a system that was incorrectly implemented for the entire scope of its intended role (GPMG), but excellently implemented for a narrow portion of that role (LMG).Accounts of the Bren in other roles are limited to say the least. It had large mags for the AA role and both big mag boxes (twelve mags) and a very good quick change barrel for the sustained fire role. How it was actually used is rarely described and then only in sidelong hints.http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Bren_light_machine_gunhttp://www.milweb.net/webvert/76814Includes an empty case collector, which doesn't sound like something an LMG gunner might ask for.https://www.etsy.com/uk/listing/385293930/ww2-british-army-bren-magazine-box-withFound in Normandy, how close to the battle I know not.12. Sniping is both over- and under- valued. It's over-valued in that it's been hyped up to 11 by fan boys and the media. It's under-valued in that it isn't treated as an ancillary skill that all expert marksmen should be introduced to in peacetime, so that there will be a wide base of basically skilled troops in wartime.Today probably yes. In days gone by the public attitude was the old fashioned disdain going right back to Fred the Great.
Apr 11 17 1:57 PM
henshao wrote:If we are thinking of the same incident I believe Hathcock's partner had a bolt action, no less.
Apr 11 17 2:15 PM
Apr 11 17 5:29 PM
Supreme Dictator of the Universe
ChrisPat wrote:henshao wrote:If we are thinking of the same incident I believe Hathcock's partner had a bolt action, no less.
IIRC an M-16, possibly a different incident. In the circumstances a bolt action would have been "no less". Single, carefully aimed shots.
Apr 12 17 3:40 AM
Apr 12 17 7:03 AM
ChrisPat wrote:Pretty sure that's the incident I had in mind. Stuck behind a berm for two nights and a day plus parts of two more. Couldn't move, couldn't fight, couldn't locate the people firing at them. Suppressed.
Apr 12 17 7:20 AM
A G Williams wrote:There may be some misunderstanding about the suppression analysis I described. There is no implication that soldiers should do anything other than aim to hit (assuming they can see the target, of course). However, the great majority of shots "aimed to hit" actually miss; but a useful proportion of them are close enough to have a suppressive effect. One test on a 300m firing range in which the targets were clearly visible and were surrounded by enough paper to record where all the bullets hit showed that when firing rapidly under range conditions, for every shot which hit the target, ten others missed by less than one metre - and therefore would have had a suppressive effect in battle.
It isn't necessary for the men on the receiving end of fire to be able to identify what is shooting at them. But for an equal suppressive effect (levels of acoustic and visual impact) 5.56mm has to miss by much smaller margins than 7.62mm. So 7.62mm will generate a significantly greater "zone" of suppressive effect around the target - which is what soldiers reported in after-battle reviews.
Apr 12 17 12:11 PM
sergeante wrote:Finally, all of this screwy fascination with how close a round can come before a guy in the target area is truly convinced he's under effective fire. It's nonsense. You can't quantify that kind of thing to such a high level of granularity. No guy in combat is going to even subconsciously evaluate the sound of incoming rounds to see if they're really scary. All he's going to know is that he's getting shot at. If rounds impact close enough, nobody is going to care how big the impact appears to be. That's because nobody wants to get shot by anything.
Apr 12 17 1:02 PM
I think most Marines would tell you Hathcock and his partner took advantage of weak and indecisive leadership on the part of the enemy. It's an interesting anecdote, but it doesn't really say anything about the actual utility of sniping overall.
Apr 12 17 9:00 PM
Apr 13 17 1:34 AM
Apr 13 17 5:26 AM
A G Williams wrote:...no-one was in danger of getting killed so the psychological factors were missing.
However, the results do match up with combat experience, as reported by both the UK and US armies in Afghanistan. Troops were willing to carry the extra burden of 7.62mm guns and ammo because they were far more effective,
with suppression being specifically referred to in the UK studies.
Apr 13 17 5:49 AM
henshao wrote:I've often wondered if a better combination of fireteam small arms wouldn't be the M14/FAL backed up by the SAW, than the M16/M4 backed up by the M60/240.
Apr 13 17 7:19 AM
Apr 13 17 7:50 AM
henshao wrote:Basically I wonder at: more power for the rifleman, deeper ammo reserves for the machine gunner, as opposed to the other way around. Enemy cover from the individual rifleman more difficult; suppression from the machine gun limited more-so by spare barrels than ammo
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