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Mar 9 17 8:11 PM
Mar 9 17 8:30 PM
Mar 9 17 9:13 PM
Mar 9 17 10:08 PM
Mar 9 17 10:16 PM
OG51/1946 does mention that there were insufficient escort ships to form convoys before April, and that they became barely adequate in numbers starting with April, but not actualy sufficient until July.
Documents and especialy itnerpretation of documents vary though.. I'd take it with a grain of salt, as everything else.
Mar 9 17 10:53 PM
Mar 9 17 11:39 PM
IcelofAngeln wrote:"Any vessel or ac on watch is a threat due to comms just as any little old lady can call the peelers"
Assuming that the peelers are in the neighborhood. This was the case in inshore British waters, with Coastal Command and ASW ships always in the vicinity-- but off the US seaboard in early 1942, who was going to answer the call? Within flight range of Norfolk you might be able to get a PBY on-scene... an hour or two from now. The two to six DDs and up to seven CGCs would, according to this scenario, already be tied up escorting convoys of their own. Moreover, the merchies themselves could and did radio contact reports.
The V&Ws that had boilers stripped out were so done to conserve weight and increase fuel bunkerage- as built they could barely make the Atlantic run. Nobody's saying that one needs a 35-knot fleet destroyer for escort work; but the USN didn't have anything of the sloop/corvette/DE type in early '42.
Mar 9 17 11:44 PM
Mar 9 17 11:45 PM
IcelofAngeln wrote:..... You are telling me what the RN did, and that I (like King) am a pigheaded idiot for not accepting the RN's word as gospel. But did it "actually work?" As mentioned above, in summer-fall 1940 the RN, despite being the Experts, lost as much tonnage as the USN did over a similar period in 1942. ....
Mar 9 17 11:51 PM
IcelofAngeln wrote:What "facts?" By now the one "fact" which has been established is that Ingersoll had but a handful of destroyers and WHECs available; what's left is the huffily-expressed opinion that he could and should have made effective convoy escorts out of yachts and colliers.
Mar 10 17 3:16 AM
Mar 10 17 3:46 AM
Cherry, Commander A. H.
Published by Jarrolds (1951)
Quantity Available: 1
From: World of Rare Books(Goring-by-Sea, WTSX, United Kingdom)
Destination, Rates & Speeds
Item Description: Jarrolds, 1951. Hardcover. Book Condition: Good. 1951. 544 pages. Brown, pictorial dust jacket over blue cloth. Firm binding. Noticeable foxing, tanning and handling marks with B&W plates. Water marking along block-edge. Moderate bumping, rubbing and scuffing to spine ends and to corners with moderate rubbing, scuffing and wear along edges and over surfaces. Transfer of dust jacket along spine. Clipped jacket with loss. Chipping and tears to spine ends and along edges with noticeable rubbing and wear over surfaces. book. Bookseller Inventory # 1474274387NAT
Mar 10 17 6:18 AM
Mar 10 17 6:22 AM
Mar 10 17 6:37 AM
Mar 10 17 7:31 AM
ADP wrote:"That gives roughly 2 to 3 ecorts per merchant."
Check your math......
Mar 10 17 8:12 AM
OG46 gives 16 as optimal nr of escorts for large convoys of 30 to 50 ships. That gives roughly 2 to 3 ecorts per merchant. In reality transatlantic convoys of that sze were moving with 6 to 8 (sometimes 10) escorts,
Mar 10 17 8:23 AM
Mar 10 17 8:43 AM
Mar 10 17 9:06 AM
Dupplin Muir wrote:It's amazing how some people keep parroting the nonsense King came up with during the war - that ships are safer sailing independently until some magic figure for escorts is reached whereupon they become safer in convoy. In reality the progression goes (from high-risk to low-risk):
- Ships sailing independently
- Ships in unescorted convoys
- Ships in lightly-escorted convoys
- Ships in heavily-escorted convoys
It seems to me that certain posters are wholly reluctant to admit that the disaster that was Paukenschlag was due to incompetence, and want to pretend that it was down to factors beyond human control, so that no-one (especially the British) could have done any better under the circumstances.
1. Assume that in the absence of any escorts the U-boat can make a virtually unopposed approach and sink 1.2 ships. (Earlier it was estimated that a salvo would sink 1 to 1.5 ships.) When escorts are present, their effect is considered to be one of reducing the fraction of cases in which the submarine reaches firing position undetected, but the number of ships sunk if it does so is not changed. FIGURE 6. Effect of number of escorts on convoy losses. 2. The effect of each additional escort is to reduce the ships sunk by about 0.075 ship, that is, to reduce the U-boat's chance of penetrating the screen by about 6 per cent. Apparently, 16 escorts would give complete protection. During the period under study most attacks were made at night and the sort of perimeter which the escorts had to defend is shown in Figure 7. If 16 escorts are distributed around this perimeter, it can be seen that each one effectively screened about 2 miles of it or, in other words, had an effective detection range of about 1 mile on the U-boats under those conditions (surfaced night attacks predominating; most ships fitted with radar, but not all centimeter type; North Atlantic wolf pack operations). FIGURE 7. Zone to be defended by escorts. It is rather surprising that there is no evidence of an upward concavity in the curve of Figure 6. It does not seem likely that even 16 or more escorts could completely prevent submarines from sinking any ships, but it does seem likely that the number of ships sunk would be made very small, perhaps 0.1 or 0.2, for large numbers of escorts. On the other hand, it may be that the presence of a large number of escorts is sufficient to discourage U-boats from aggressively pressing home attacks. Perhaps they would consider it too dangerous to attack a convoy with 15 or more escorts ever to try to do so, even though they might actually have some chance of success. The data available are sufficient only to suggest this question, not to answer it. They do, however, show conclusively that strength of escort played a very important role in determining ship losses.14The figures of Table 6 are given on a per attack
basis, however, and do not take into account the frequency of attacks. Since surface escorts are often used for offensive sweeps designed to shake off trailing U-boats and prevent attack, such figures may not be a complete measure of the escort's value. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine from operational data the ability of the escorts to prevent attack. One complicating feature is the tendency to provide more escorts when and where the danger is greatest, which increases the relative number of attacks made on convoys when many escorts were present. Actually the data of Figure 6 may be considered a conservative indication of the value of surface escorts.
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