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Nuclear weapons and World War Three.

Introduction.

The Third World War, like the Second, was effectively ended by the detonation of nuclear weapons. However these weapons, thermonuclear rather than atomic, were far more powerful than anything that 'Enola Gay' or 'Bockscar' could have delivered to their Japanese targets.

The world is indeed fortunate that the destruction and death caused by the weapons employed were limited, though we are still living with the effects today, thankfully though 'The War Game', 'Threads' and 'The Day After' were to remain as televisual fiction rather than a prediction of what was to come. Perhaps the great reductions in nuclear arms that took place in the Nineteen Nineties saved humanity, who knows, but certainly the took away the temptation by both sides to use battlefield nuclear weapons when their ground forces were in dire straights.

From details of American and Soviet war plans from the Nineteen Eighties both sides intended to use battlefield weapons early on in any potential conflict.

The threat of nuclear warfare hung heavy over the world for over half a century, having a great impact on both military and civil defence planning, probably to the detriment to planning for a conventional conflict. After all if the conventional phase of a Third World War was to be short, or non-existent, what was the point in building up supplies of ammunition, fuel, spare parts, or even having particularly strong armed forces at all?

This, of course, became a self-fulfilling prophesy and a vicious circle. If one relied on nuclear weapons for defence, then why bother with strong conventional forces, and if conventional forces were weak then one would have to rely on nuclear weapons.

Some observers in the West could not help noticing that despite their massive number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems the USSR still maintained a strong conventional military. Beginning in the late Nineteen Seventies and early Eighties, and marked by the publication of such books as 'The Third World War' and 'The Untold Story', calls for NATO to strengthen its conventional forces grew ever stronger. Their watchword was to be: 'If you want nuclear peace, prepare for non-nuclear war: but be ready to pay the price'.

The pressure did have an effect, though exactly how much is impossible to know, and a large conventional build-up did take place during the Nineteen Eighties, forming the foundations for the continued improvements to conventional defences that took place in the Nineteen Nineties and the early years of the Twenty-first century.

START III.

Probably the only positive development to come out of the Nineteen Eighties was the continuation of strategic arms reduction negotiations. It was pretty clear that whatever they said in public President Regan and General Secretary Gorbachev and their successors Bush and Yakolev had a great fear of nuclear war, both sides believing that it would mean an end to civilisation. It was in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union to continue to reduce their nuclear arsenals.

The START I and START II treaties had begun the process of seriously reducing both sides' strategic arsenals. As both America and the Soviet Union already had enough weapons to destroy the each other and the world several times over, the cuts of the treaties mentioned above were not too painful, though the removal of weapons systems like the LGM-118A 'Peacekeeper' and R-36/SS-18 'Satan' heavy ICBMs were regretted by their respective users. (1)

Within a few years of START II being signed the world had completely changed. Gorbachev was dead, replaced by Andrei Yakolev, who was in turn replaced by Arkady Renko when Yakolev was diagnosed with an inoperable tumour in 1998.

NATO had already decided to concentrate on conventional weapons, which will be discussed below, and the resources soaked up by strategic weapons could be better used elsewhere. Similarly the USSR was struggling to catch up with the technological edge of Western conventional weapons and chose to concentrate resources in this direction.

This was the rather promising background to the negotiation of the START III treaty. The actual progress of negotiations and the precise wording of the treaty are beyond the scope of this work, but the end result of the negotiations was a treaty that called for an immediate cut of 50% in both sides holdings of strategic nuclear arms, and a phase reduction over ten years to a level which would be 25% of the number of warheads available in the year that the treaty was signed.

Both sides would also be limited to an identical number of warheads, and elimination of heavy ICBMs was confirmed by the treaty.

In practise the treaty meant that all LGM-30G missiles would be reconfigured from three re-entry vehicles (RV) to one, using warheads from retired Peacekeeper missiles. (2) Similarly navy D-5 'Trident II' missiles would be limited to two RVs, like their Royal Navy counterparts, and the C-4 'Trident I' would be immediately removed from service. The Ohio class boats designed to carry the C-4 missile would be eventually converted to SSGN configuration.

Strategic Air Command's bomber force, on the other hand, was to remain undiminished in strength, but around half of it, including the entire B-1B 'Lancer' force, was to be devoted solely to conventional missions, the crews of those Bomb Wings not being certified for the carriage of 'special weapons'.

The Soviet Union was to carry out similar steps, eliminating its remaining rail garrisoned ballistic missiles, retiring its oldest SLBMs and modifying all of the Tu-22M and much of the Tu-95 bomber fleets so that they would no longer be able to carry nuclear weapons.

While START III certainly did much to reduce the number of available nuclear warheads, by 2005 there were still more than enough for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to destroy both themselves and the rest of the world, with weapons to spare. The threat of strategic nuclear escalation was a threat that still hung over the heads of the leaders and ordinary population of both sides.

The Tactical Weapons Treaty.

While treaties like SALT and the various START treaties had dealt with strategic weapons and the Intermediate Nuclear Force, or INF treaty had seen the elimination of such weapons as the GLCM, Pershing II, SS-20 and SS-23, there still remained thousands of tactical, or 'battlefield' nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, or free-fall bombs carried by aircraft in the class of the F-15E, Tornado and Su-24 'Fencer'.

To many observers these weapons had the potential to touch off an uncontrollable escalation to strategic weapons. Certainly it was very unlikely that once battlefield nuclear weapons had been employed that the exchange could be kept limited.

In the West Precision Guided Weapons were continuing to increase in accuracy and reliability. Gone were the days when a deep command bunker could only be taken out by a low-yield nuclear weapon, now large conventional bombs such as the GBU-28 'Deep Throat' and the GBU-37 could destroy these targets.

NATO planners began to realise that 'battlefield' weapons were becoming increasingly irrelevant; they could do the same job with good old fashioned high explosives without the political and literal fall-out of nuclear weapons. NATO commanders also realised that they could fight and possibly defeat the Red hordes with non-nuclear weapons, such as the MLRS, Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and the various PGMs available to both the ground and air forces.

The circumstances in which the employment of 'battlefield' weapons would be entertained became even more remote. Yet these warheads remained in their storage bunkers, close to the Inner German Border, vulnerable to being overrun and captured at an early stage of an invasion.

NATO now became rather keen on eliminating these weapons, but would not do so while the Warsaw Pact still had them.

Coincidentally in the East too there was disillusionment with battlefield nuclear weapons. The Soviets had never believed in graduated escalation, had they attacked anytime between the late Fifties and early Nineties they would have used the full spectrum of weapons available to them, conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological, at once in a massive attack.

However beginning in the early Eighties there were some in the military and the party who began to question the wisdom of employing Weapons of Mass Destruction where conventional weapons would be sufficient. There would not be much point in conquering (or 'liberating' in Soviet idiom) Western Europe if it was a radioactive charnel house.

Yes, NATO might have a technological advantage in conventional weapons, but the Soviet Union still had a crushing numerical advantage. For example while a NATO tank might be able to destroy five Soviet tanks before itself was destroyed, the Soviets would always be able to pit six, or even ten tanks against their NATO counterparts. The same was true of the situation in the air.

These men argued that the Soviet Union and her allies could win with conventional weapons only, and should tailor their war fighting strategy accordingly. Eliminating tactical weapons would also make it harder, in their view, for NATO to counter the numerical superiority of the Soviet Union.

Luckily for their point of view they found a supporter in General Secretary Yakolev, who had an intense fear of radioactivity, having lived near Chernobyl when the disaster had occurred. During the final negotiations on START III he raised the matter of banning all 'battlefield', or tactical nuclear weapons with President Clinton. (3)

Clinton, a member of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, who had nonetheless supported measures to improve conventional forces, jumped on this offer. Clinton had been something of a student radical in the Sixties, having studies at Oxford to avoid the draft, and was extremely keen on the idea of eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons.

While the American President was happy enough to eliminate 'battlefield' nuclear weapons, the rest of NATO would also have to be convinced, as many American weapons were earmarked for use by NATO forces in time of war, and both the United Kingdom and France had their own tactical weapons stockpiles.

The British were, in fact, quite keen to eliminate tactical weapons. It would mean that they could cancel development of a successor to the WE.177B and C, and divert the money into the development of a conventional stand-off weapon that would eventually emerge as the Storm Shadow. Redundant nuclear materials could be recycled into warheads for Trident missiles then coming into service with the Royal Navy.

The French, with their doctrine of an independent nuclear force, were a little harder to convince. But they fell into line, not wishing to be blamed for the failure of a nuclear weapons reduction treaty, and on the bright side they too no longer needed to work on a nuclear armed replacement for the ASMP.

The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty was signed in Helsinki on 13^th November 1996; a few hours after START III had been signed, a record from proposal to signature in the history of arms treaties.

With the withdrawal of weapons such as Pershing and Lance the American and British Armies began to re-equip regiments with the M270 MLRS, thus strengthening their conventional artillery strength. Both armies also began to withdraw the M110 Self Propelled Howitzer, both intended mainly as a nuclear delivery system, also replacing it with the MLRS.

One regiment of M110s survived in the British Army long enough to see service in the Third World War. Some 'Peace' campaigners saw the retention of these howitzers as proof that Britain was flouting the treaty. However the regiment was only issued with HE, sub-munition and smoke rounds, it was also very unlikely that nuclear warheads would have been entrusted to a Territorial Regiment.

Several other NATO, including Spain, Greece and Turkey, and the Japanese, continued to use the M110A2, rather blowing a hole in that argument.

The Soviets too withdrew a number of weapon systems designed to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. However they successfully negotiated the retention of the SS-21 'Scarab A/B', or OTR-21 Tochka and Tochka-U Short Ranged Ballistic Missile, which could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, pointing out that some versions of the MLRS launched ATACMS missile had a greater range, and that they should not be put at a disadvantage by the existence of this conventional weapon system.

The Soviets thus scrapped all of the warheads designed for the 'Scarab' missile, and modified the weapons so that they could only be fitted with H.E, sub-munition, or chemical warheads. (4)

Weapons not covered by the treaty.

While the treaty did ban all so-called 'battlefield' weapons it did not ban nuclear weapons that could be used in a tactical context, such as cruise missile warheads, or free-fall bombs used by aircraft such as the B-2A, or the Tu-160. Moreover, at a pinch an ICBM or SLBM could be fired at a tactical target, even though they were hardly suitable for the role, and it would be like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

Perhaps surprisingly, though, the treaty did not cover the naval equivalent of the 'battlefield nuke', the Nuclear Depth Bomb. While both sides did remove such weapons from their ships to storage ashore, it would not be too hard to get them to where they were needed, and of course they would be easily available to Maritime Patrol Aircraft, or shore based helicopters.

Weapons such as the British WE.177A, the boosted fission version of this weapon with a variable yield of 0.5-10 kT, and the version of the American Sea Lance fitted with a 200 kT W-89 warhead were not outlawed.

Interestingly the WE.177A, for example, could be carried by the Sea Harrier and the Tornado GR.4, and although they were intended to be used by Nimrods and Merlin helicopters they could have been issued to the aforementioned aircraft. Indeed there is some evidence that in the final week of the war the RAF was preparing to move WE.177As held at RAF St .Mawgan and RAF Kinloss to RAF Marham, where they would have been available for the Tornados based there, but this can not be confirmed.

Similarly the Soviets still maintained stockpiled of Nuclear Depth Bombs that could have been modified for use aboard tactical aircraft.

Why Nuclear Depth Bombs were excluded from both START III and TNWT is something of a mystery. None of the negotiators who took part in the formulation of both treaties have spoken publicly on the matter, and no evidence has come to light that they were deliberately left out.

The historian investigating this matter must be left with only one conclusion, it was an accidental omission which was never rectified, presumably when both sides realised they were too embarrassed to talk of it publicly. Perhaps it was then intended to rectify this matter with a later treaty; however world events meant that this never took place.

The other major weapons not covered by the TNWT were, not surprisingly, Chemical and Biological weapons.

Chemical weapons should have been covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention, however this never came into force for various reasons, which are beyond the scope of a study such as this, though only the United States and the USSR continued to manufacture and stockpile large amounts of chemical weapons, they did hold stocks of chemical weapons for their allies. (5)

Biological weapons were covered by a treaty that banned their development, except in small amounts for defensive research capability. However while the West adhered to the letter of this treaty, the Soviet Union blatantly flouted it; either that or their idea of 'small amounts' was vastly different from the rest of the world; while publicly claiming that they were abiding by it, a legacy we are still living with today.

In many ways biological weapons are far more dangerous than either nuclear, or chemical. They are easier to deliver, and most worryingly because they are living organisms they have the potential to mutate uncontrollably into new strains, and has the potential to infect the population of who initially released it.

While nuclear warfare would probably destroy society and civilisation as we know it, biological warfare has the potential to make humanity extinct.

Conclusion.

Before the START III and TNWT treaties were signed it was quite likely that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have gone nuclear at a very early stage of any conflict. With the number of nuclear warheads available to both sides this was likely to be disastrous for the world.

After both treaties were signed it was far more likely that while any conflict would be very destructive and result in thousands, if not millions of deaths, civilisation would emerge from it intact. The events of 2005 and the fact that this study is being written in 2007, two years after the end of the Third World War bear this view out.

However despite the massive reductions of both nuclear weapons treaties the threat of nuclear destruction still hangs over the world. There are still thousands of nuclear warheads sitting atop ballistic missiles, or ready to be loaded into the weapons bays of bombers.

More worryingly in the multi-polar world that has emerged from the aftermath of the war nuclear proliferation is a real danger, it is very likely that nuclear weapons may soon end up in the hands of unstable regimes, or even terrorists. In years to come we may look on the Cold War years before 2005 with affectionate nostalgia as a period of relative peace and stability.

***

Notes.

1. Both the 'Peacekeeper' and 'Satan' missiles were due to be retired by 2007, something confirmed by START III. However the outbreak of hostilities meant that the programmes initiated to remove these missiles were temporarily halted and not completed until 2008.

2. The LGM-30G would begin to be replaced by the single warhead MGM-135A 'Minuteman IV', or Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM), from late 2004.

3. It is believed that the tumour which killed Andrei Yakolev in 2000 may have been caused by radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl disaster.

4. Details of the SS-21 and all other ballistic missiles mentioned in this work can be found here.

5. For example British artillery gunners in Kuwait were issued with American 155mm Sarin filled shells. The Americans also maintained stocks on behalf of West Germany.