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Hardrada55 |
Hiyo at Santa Cruz? |
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Posts: 43 (27-Jun-2009 16:37:38) |
Would the presence of Hiyo at the Battle of Santa Cruz have been enough to result in the destruction of the Enterprise? I think there would have been another
16 A6M and 17 D3A available for the battle.
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jlyons97 |
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Posts: 2231 (28-Jun-2009 16:40:01) |
Possible the Big E could have been done in. But with D3A 500 lb bombs?
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E F Draaijers |
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Registered Member
Posts: 852 (28-Jun-2009 19:18:54) |
Quite a lot depends on the coordination of the attacks, neamly the coordination with torpedo attack planes. If Hiyo had operated with the group of Junyo and
coordinated the attack with the main carrier force of Shokaku and Zuikaku, the overwhelming number of aircraft could have been decisive, but if she attacked on
her own, with a small airstrike, the USN could have evaded it more easily. Since Hiyo most likely did not yet have a torpedobomber force, she could likely not
have pressed home her attack, due to the lesser power of the divebomberforce.
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RBH Jr |
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Posts: 703 (29-Jun-2009 21:21:23) |
uite a lot depends on the coordination of the attacks, neamly the coordination with torpedo attack planes. If Hiyo had operated with the group of Junyo and coordinated the attack with the main carrier force of Shokaku and Zuikaku, the overwhelming number of aircraft could have been decisive, but if she attacked on her own, with a small airstrike, the USN could have evaded it more easily. Since Hiyo most likely did not yet have a torpedobomber force, she could likely not have pressed home her attack, due to the lesser power of the divebomberforce.
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Hardrada55 |
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Posts: 44 (30-Jun-2009 16:01:01) |
From the book "Guadalcanal" by Frank and "Carrier Strike" (by another author whose name presently escapes me), it appears to me that the
air group both Hiyo and Junyo put to sea with in October 1942 consisted of 21 A6M, 18 D3A and 9 B5N2s each. Both books reference a bomber strike on
Guadalcanal around October 17 consisting of both of Hiyo and Junyo's B5N2 units. According to the book, "Carrier Strike", in this bomber strike
Junyo lost 8 of 9 B5N2s and Hiyo lost 2 of 9 B5N2s. This strike was accompanied by an equal number of A6Ms and no mention is made of any losses by these
escorts. Around the 21st, Hiyo suffers her engine room fire which reduces her to 16 knots and leads to her being ordered to return to Truk. According to the
above referenced sources, Hiyo passes to Junyo's air group 3 A6Ms, 1 D3A and 5 B5N2s. She sends to Rabaul or Buna, I can't remember which, 16 A6Ms and
17 D3As.
It looks as if Junyo only has one of her B5N2s left after the early strike on Guadalcanal and that this plane is reinforced with 5 B5N2s from Hiyo. It looks like there should only be 6 B5N2s available for any strike at Santa Cruz, but 7 B5N2s are referenced in the first strike Junyo makes. I don't know whether these ships were carrying a couple of spare aircraft or one or two were flown in during this time or what. It appears that Hiyo may have retired from the area carrying a couple of A6Ms and 2 B5N2s, which might be a prudent thing to do. Anyway, if Hiyo had not suffered her disaster, how much would it have mattered in the Battle of Santa Cruz? |
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E F Draaijers |
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Registered Member
Posts: 858 (30-Jun-2009 17:13:02) |
Even if the number of planes was as mentioned, it did not matter still, if the IJN failed to coordinate airstrikes more precisely, from multiple directions,
including all carrier groups in the erea. This would naturally mean breaking radiosilence, but the sheer number of strikeplanes from at least three CV's
and one CVL, would have been sufficient to cheque mate USS Enterprise, at that time the only servicable CV on Allied side in the Pacific. Multi angle attack
from both divebombers and torpedoplanes were almost impossible to avoid. Besides that, the Yorktown class CV was known to be very vulnerable to torpedodamage,
as happened earlier with USS Yorktown and USS Hornet. With the still exelent IJN airborne torpedoes, the sheer number of strikeplanes left available for the
attack on USS Enterprise, should have been exploited more cleverly, if Japan wanted to win at least. (also some planes attacking from landbases could be added
to the force, although making coordination more complicated too. At Rabaul there were several dozens of very long ranged G4M's available for such
missions.)
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RBH Jr |
Thanks Hardrada55 | ||
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Posts: 704 (30-Jun-2009 21:55:54) |
Thanks Hardrada55 for the details of Hiyo & Junyo's airgroups.
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bennett0 |
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Posts: 516 ( 1-Jul-2009 20:09:22) |
EF,
I beg to differ about the vulnerability of the Yorktown class to torpedo damage According to the USN Summary of War Damage it took 3 bombs, 2 aircraft torpedoes and 2 submarine torpedoes to sink Yorktown (CV-5). In addition, the torpedo that sank Hamman (DD-412) exploded close aboard and Hamman's depth charges exploded close by. It's likely they caused more underwater damage. Also, there is still a question whether Yorktown was abandoned prematurely. Certainly the lack of tugs was a major contributing factor in her loss. It is possible that if damage control parties had been working on her overnight the submarine torpedoes the next day might not have sunk her. She certainly remained afloat until the next morning. According to Robert Cressman in That Gallant Ship, most people were surprised she lasted as long as she did given the "recognized inadequacy of the torpedo protection system". It took 5 bombs, 2 airplane crashes and 3 aircraft torpedoes to cripple Hornet (CV- . Then Anderson (DD-411) fired 8 more
for 1 erratic run, 1 premature detonation and 6 hits but she still stayed afloat . She was then subjected to an unknown (to me) number of 5" hits. It finally took 4 Japanese surface torpedoes to sink her, which by themselves
were enough to sink any ship afloat except possibly a new battleship .
This does not exactly sound like excessive "vulnerability to torpedo damage" to me . In fact IMHO they stood up very well to both torpedo and bomb damage,
especially since USN damage control was very much a "work in progress" when they were lost. In fact, it was lessons learned from these (and other)
losses that helped raise US damage control to the level it enjoyed by 1944-45. As a result of the limited size (due to the Washington and London treaties)
their TDS was not as good as it should have been and their engineering plant was vulnerable to being disabled. Given these limitations the USN was quite
satisfied with the design and felt the new Essex class (with another 10,000 tons to play with) had corrected the
problems. Since no Essex was ever subjected to the same amount of damage (especially from torpedoes) that's
impossible to say .
Bennett
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E F Draaijers |
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Registered Member
Posts: 865 ( 2-Jul-2009 11:03:48) |
The vulnerability is not bound to the sinking of a ship, but the incapacitating. The USS Yorktown and USS Hornett both were crippled by one, or two torpedoes,
hittinmg them in the midships section, putting out the boilers and engines. The other succeding hits were only adding to the damage already done. The major
point of the growth of the successors of theEssex Class was essentially to make them more durable to this sort of damage, which they indeed were, being more
segmented and containing more watertight compartments internally, which the Yorktowns lacked, being designed in a time of economic depression and therefore
more "cheaply" constructed. (Basically USS Wasp was the most well known exponent of this, being a scaled down Yorktown in almost every detail, except
size and protection, which she entirely lacked. Yorktown had at least a small amount of armor worked in her design.) The Yorktowns were most vulnerable to
shockdamage, caused by underwaterhits, such as with torpedoes, which resulted in damage to boilers and engines.
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seasick |
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Posts: 5778 ( 3-Jul-2009 07:02:31) |
Junyo and Hiyo had civilian grade steam turbines, and military boilers. A [sarcasam]hefty[/sarcasm] 22 knots. Hornet was almost saved and was scuttled only to
prevent capture. Even if it had been there it wouldn't have helped. She also wouldn't have been avalible for the the Solomos weeks later, giving the
USMC at Henderson Field air superiority.
The IJN had enough air to air losses as it was. Hiyo in home waters or with its anchor down at Truk was just as well. WASP CV-7 was a Rumsfeldian design. |
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bennett0 |
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Posts: 518 ( 8-Jul-2009 03:44:44) |
EF,
I fully agree the Yorktown class (as well as all US cruisers before Cleveland and Baltimore were quite vulnerable to loss of power due to torpedo damage. Hornet and the St Louis class cruisers did have some rearrangement of machinery spaces in an attempt to fix this, but it wasn't successful (as shown by damage to Helena at Pearl Harbor ). However, as I said earlier Yorktown
and Hornet were actually lost because once their machinery was disabled, no tugs were available to tow them out of the
area. This allowed the sub to get to Yorktown and forced the USN to try to scuttle Hornet because IJN surface forces were approaching . However, even given the disabling of machinery by torpedo hits, in both cases these ships absorbed much more underwater damage than they were
designed to resist before sinking . Not too bad under the
circumstances.
Bennett
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jlyons97 |
Nonsense...yet again, and I grow weary.... | ||
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Posts: 2239 ( 8-Jul-2009 04:09:10) |
E F Draaijers wrote:I suppose I should be used to correcting your more egregious errors by now, but it must, as NG says, be done. Yorktown and the rest of the class were not impacted by the Depression, an era about which I suspect you are clueless. The issue with these ships re survivability as compared to the Essex's was the arrangement of the propulsion plant, in which the boilers were all forward of the engine rooms. Wasp was not a scaled-down Yorktown. In fact it, if you had bothered to look, had a unit propulsion system and although much smaller than the Yorktowns survived two torpedoes with her propulsion plant intact. All three carriers were not sunk as a result of aircraft torpedoes. There had to be other agents to do this. Please avoid more public embarrassment and do some research such that I do not have to waste electrons by correcting your errors. |
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E F Draaijers |
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Registered Member
Posts: 878 ( 8-Jul-2009 09:02:43) |
jlyons97 wrote: Perhaps reading is not your best qualification, as I already mentioned that sinking is not the only way to put a ship out of action. USS Yorktown was hit by two airborne torepdoes at Midway and lost power to the engines, resulting in her crew to abandon ship, instead of trying immediately to fix the damaged boilers and restore power. Engines were still in fine conditions. BOILERS were not. You will have nothing with engines, if these have no power to operate on. It took two more torpedoes to sink the ship, in this case fired by submarine. USS Hornet was also disabled simmilarly to boilerdamage at Santa Cruz, as her boilers were blown death by the shock, resulting from two airborne torpedohits. This is the main reason of disablement, not the enginedamage, as that is something different. If USS Enterprise had been hit by a torpedo or so, which luckily never happened, she would likely have suffered simmilar secondary damage and also the most likely consequenses. USS Hornet could not raise power in time again and was abbandoned, as the Japanese surfacefleet was aproaching. The burning hulk of USS Hornet was finished off by a Type 93 torepedo from a Japanese Destroyer. USS Wasp was completely left ablaze by three torpedohits from an IJN submarine, which also hit USS O'Brien an USS South Carolina with the same salvo. The direct result of these hits was a large inflow of water and secondary fires, which toughed off the ready to use ammunition for ther aircraft, resulting in fires running out of controll quickly and eventually to her loss, although her end was sped up by a scuttlingattemt of her escorting destroyers. (Which fired torpedoes at her, with no appearent result, due to the poor reliability of the USN torpedoes that period.) |
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SeaTurtle Prince |
North Carolina | ||
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Posts: 372 ( 8-Jul-2009 22:28:19) |
was hit by the torpedo. South Carolina had been long ago scrapped.
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bennett0 |
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Posts: 520 ( 8-Jul-2009 22:58:17) |
EF,
I have to agree with the other posters that it would help if you checked some of your facts before posting, because you sure do have them messed up .
You are correct that both Yorktown and Hornet lost power because of damage to the firerooms and boilers, not the engines . However, as I already
mentioned, both ships also took several bomb hits or aircraft crashes. These seriously damaged the uptakes and knocked out boilers. Besides the bomb damage,
all Yorktown's torpedo hits were in the way of her firerooms, on both sides of the ship . I also mentioned earlier that many people feel (with benefit of 20/20
hindsight) Yorktown was abandoned prematurely and might have been saved by better damage control . Hornet had an airplane crash into her
stack which seriously damaged her uptakes and shut down (actually blew out the fires in) her boilers. She was also hit by two torpedoes on the starboard side
abreast the forward engine room (not the firerooms), as well as one further
aft.
Wasp was a totally different design because of treaty limits and has no place in this discussion of the Yorktown class. But since you brought it up, she was not lost because of machinery damage . The torpedo hits ruptured both her avgas lines (which were in use) and her fire
mains. Because her crew was unable to effectively fight the fires, she had to be abandoned.
In addition to all the other benefits of having an extra 10,000 tons to play with during design , the Essex class had their machinery
arranged on the unit principal, with each engine and its boilers in a separate compartment. This was MUCH more resistant to damage .
Finally, you don't even get your ship names right . USS South Carolina (BB-26), the first all-big gun battleship to be designed, was launched in
1906 and scrapped in 1924. This would make it difficult for her to have been torpedoed in the South Pacific in 1942 . The battleship hit (in what has to be the most effective torpedo salvo ever
fired ) was North Carolina (BB-55) the first US treaty battleship and, AFIK, the only modern US battleship ever torpedoed.
In the future, it would be greatly appreciated, by me and others, if you would take the trouble to check on at least the more basic facts before posting . It would save you a lot of irritated posts and do a lot for
your credibility.
Thank you, Bennett
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RBH Jr |
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Posts: 705 ( 8-Jul-2009 23:38:14) |
To get back to the original question;
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E F Draaijers |
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Registered Member
Posts: 881 ( 9-Jul-2009 12:33:43) |
I have to agree with the comments on my mistaken nameswitch for the USS North Carolina. Just an error, as you indeed mentioined the first of the Carolina´s was
USS South Carolina of 1907, not the ship in the WW2, which was to be mentioned.
To return to the topic again, I suppose the influence of IJN Hiyo at Santa Cruz would not have made much impact, as her airgroup was not that large and powerfull to make much impact on the USN forces there, besides creating more damage, while lacking a crippling punch to turn the tables. Most likely she even lacked a torpedoattack squadron, but in the event she had one, it likely was too small to be of much additional impact. (total airgroup was estimated to be just some 40 aircraft at that time in history, while her capacity was 53 at best.) More powerfull attacks could have been flown in by the Rabaul airfield based long ranged bombers of the G3M and G4M (Nell´s and Betty´s'), both capable of torpedoattacks and available in large numbers at that time. With a landbased fighterescort from the equally long ranged A6M-2´s from additional airfields in the Solomons, a powerfull strike could have been launched at the USN CVBG, likley to even kill a carrier, if it could be hit. Japanese divebombers lacked the punch to take a carrier completely out of action, being capable of just carrying a single 551 lbs AP bomb, which was too small to create catastrophic damage on a prepared USN warship. (Only a surpriseattack could do the job, when divebombing, with planes on the carrier surprised in the hangar, fully loaded and armed, like USS Princeton at Leyte and USS Franklin of Okinawa.) |
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RBH Jr |
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Posts: 706 ( 9-Jul-2009 17:06:16) |
To return to the topic again, I suppose the influence of IJN Hiyo at Santa Cruz would not have made much impact, as her airgroup was not that large and powerfull to make much impact on the USN forces there, besides creating more damage, while lacking a crippling punch to turn the tables. Such a simplistic summation demonstrates either a lack or effort on your part or a lack of knowledge of the
battle's details.
06:45, a U.S. scout aircraft sighted the carriers of Nagumo's main body.
06:58, a Japanese scout aircraft reported the location of Hornet's task force
07:40 Japanese first to get their strike launched, with 64 aircraft, including 21 "Val" dive bombers, 20 "Kate" torpedo bombers, 21 Zero fighters, and two "Kate" command and control aircraft on the way towards Hornet.
07:40, two U.S. SBD Dauntless scout aircraft, responding to the earlier sighting of the Japanese carriers, arrived and dove on Zuihō. With the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) busy chasing other U.S. scout aircraft away, the two U.S. aircraft were able to approach and drop both of their bombs on Zuihō, causing heavy damage and preventing the carrier's flight deck from being able to land aircraft.
08:00 Hornet launches 1st strike of 8 F +15 DB + 6 TB.
08:10 Enterprise launches strike of 8 F +3 DB + 7 TB
08:10, Shōkaku launched a second wave of strike aircraft, consisting of 8 F + 19 DB
08:20 Hornet launches her 2nd strike of 7 F + 9 DB + 8 TB
08:40 Zuikaku launched 16 TB
08:40 The opposing aircraft strike formations passed within sight of each other. 9 F from Zuihō surprised and attacked the Enterprise group, attacking the climbing aircraft from out of the sun. In the resulting engagement, four Zeros, three Wildcats, and two TBFs were shot down, with another two TBFs and a Wildcat forced by heavy damage to return to Enterprise.
08:50, the lead U.S. attack formation from Hornet spotted four ships from Abe's Vanguard force. Pressing on, the U.S. aircraft sighted the Japanese carriers and prepared to attack. Twenty Zeros from the Japanese carrier CAP attacked the SBD formation and shot down four of them.
08:52, the Japanese strike force commander sighted the Hornet task force (the Enterprise task force was hidden by a rain squall) and deployed his aircraft for attack. 08:55, the U.S. carriers detected the approaching Japanese aircraft on radar, about 35 nmi (65 km) away, and began to vector the 37 Wildcat fighters of their CAP to engage the incoming Japanese aircraft. However, communication problems, mistakes by the U.S. fighter control directors, and primitive control procedures prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Japanese aircraft before they began their attacks on Hornet.[39] Although the U.S. CAP was able to shoot down several Vals, most of the Japanese aircraft commenced their attacks relatively unmolested by U.S. fighters.
09:05-09:14, Junyō arrives within 280 nmi (520 km) of the U.S. carriers and launched a strike of 12 F + 17 DB. 09:09, the anti-aircraft guns of Hornet and her escorting warships opened fire as the 20 untouched Japanese Kates and remaining 16 Vals commenced their attacks on the carrier. 09:12 a Val placed its 250-kilogram, semi-armor-piercing bomb dead center on Hornet's flight deck, across from the island, which penetrated three decks before exploding, killing 60 men. Moments later, a 242-kilogram "land" bomb struck the flight deck, detonating on impact and creating an 11-foot (3.3 m) hole as well as killing 30 men. A minute or so later, a third bomb hit Hornet near where the first bomb hit, penetrating three decks before exploding, causing severe damage but no direct loss of life. 09:14 a diving Val was hit and damaged by anti-aircraft fire directly over Hornet. The damaged Val crashed into Hornet's stack, spreading burning aviation fuel over the signal deck. 09:13 - 09:17 Despite suffering heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire, the Kates planted two torpedoes in Hornet, knocking out her engines. As Hornet glided to a stop, a damaged Val approached and purposely crashed into the carrier's side, starting a fire near the ship's main supply of aviation fuel. At 09:20, the surviving Japanese aircraft departed, leaving Hornet dead in the water and burning. Twenty-five Japanese and six U.S. aircraft were destroyed in this first attack on Hornet. 09:27 The remaining 11 SBDs commenced their attack dives on Shōkaku, hitting her with 3- 6 bombs, ruining her flight deck and causing serious damage to the interior of the ship. The final SBD of the 11 lost track of the Shōkaku and instead dropped its bomb near the Japanese destroyer Teruzuki, causing minor damage. The six TBFs in the first strike force, having become separated from their strike group, missed finding the Japanese carriers and eventually turned back towards Hornet. On the way back, they attacked the Japanese heavy cruiser Tone, missing with all of their torpedoes.
09:30 second wave of Japanese aircraft spotted inbound on Enterprise radar 10:00 With Enterprise flight deck full she ceased landing operations in preparation for inbound Japanese strike. 10:00 With the assistance of firehoses from three escorting destroyers, the fires on Hornet were under control by. Wounded personnel were evacuated from the carrier, and an attempt was made by the cruiser USS Northampton to tow Hornet away from the battle area. However, the effort to rig the towline took some time, and more attack waves of Japanese aircraft were inbound. 10:08 the second Japanese aircraft strike wave, believing Hornet to be sinking, directed their attacks on the Enterprise task force. Again, the U.S. CAP had trouble intercepting the Japanese aircraft before they attacked Enterprise, shooting down only two of the 19 Vals as they began their dives on the carrier. Attacking through the intense anti-aircraft fire put-up by Enterprise and her escorting warships, the Vals hit the carrier with two 250-kilogram bombs and near-missed with another, causing heavy damage to the carrier and jamming her forward elevator in the "up" position. Twelve of the 19 Vals were lost in this attack. 10:30 the 16 Zuikaku Kates arrived and split up to attack Enterprise. One group of Kates was attacked by two CAP Wildcats which shot down three of them and damaged a fourth. On fire, the fourth damaged Kate purposely crashed into the destroyer USS Smith, setting the ship on fire and killing 57 of her crew. The destroyer steered into the spraying wake of the battleship USS South Dakota to help put out the fires and then resumed her station, firing her remaining anti-aircraft guns at the still attacking Kates. The remaining Kates attacked Enterprise, South Dakota, and cruiser USS Portland, but all of their torpedoes missed or were duds, causing no damage. The engagement was over at 10:53 with nine of the 16 attacking Kates shot down., at 11:15 After suppressing most of the onboard fires Enterprise reopened her flight deck to begin landing returning aircraft from the morning U.S. strikes on the Japanese warship forces. However, only a few aircraft landed before the next wave of Japanese strike aircraft arrived and began their attacks on Enterprise, forcing a suspension of landing operations. 11:21 Junyō's strike attacks Enterprise task force. Scores one near miss on Enterprise, causing more damage, and one hit each on South Dakota and cruiser USS San Juan, causing moderate damage to both ships. Eleven of the 17 DB were destroyed in this attack.
11:35 Kinkaid decides to withdraw Enterprise and her screening ships from the battle, since Hornet was out of action. Enterprise was heavily damaged. He directed Hornet's task force to follow as soon as they were able.
11:39-13:22, Enterprise recovered 57 of the 73 airborne U.S. aircraft as she headed away from the battle. The remaining U.S. aircraft ditched in the ocean, and their aircrews were rescued by escorting warships.
13:06 Junyō launched second strike of 7 TB + 8 F; Zuikaku launched her third strike of 7 TB + 2 DB + 5 F (TOTALS = 13 F + 2 DB + 14 TB).
15:35 Junyō launched the last Japanese strike force of the day, 6 F + 4 TB
15:20 Junyō's second strike arrived and attacked the almost stationary Hornet. 15:23 One torpedo struck Hornet, destroying the repairs to the power system, causing heavy flooding and a 14-degree list. With no power to pump out the water, Hornet was given up for lost, and the crew abandoned ship. The third strike from Zuikaku attacked Hornet during this time, hitting the sinking ship with one more bomb.
16:27 All of the Hornet's crewmen off ship.
17:20 The last Japanese strike of the day dropped one more bomb on the sinking Hornet. |
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E F Draaijers |
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Posts: 884 ( 9-Jul-2009 17:13:39) |
What is your point? this summary is not on dispute here.
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RBH Jr |
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Posts: 707 ( 9-Jul-2009 17:25:24) |
My point is that you assertions that Hiyo's airwing would not make any diference in the battle (because it was too small) is not only overly simplistic but
it demonstrates a lack of knowledge about the battle itself. I thought I would try to help you with that, obviously my effort was taken the wrong way.
I am not saying that adding Hiyo makes the Japanese unbeatable, but given the details of the battle it is obvious that it was a close run thing and that any addition to the IJN airwing could well tip the battle further in their favor. |
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Hardrada55 |
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Posts: 45 ( 9-Jul-2009 22:19:07) |
My take on this is that after the air strike on Guadalcanal around October 17 and before Hiyo dropped out because of the engine room fire around October 21st ,
I surmise that her air group consisted of:
21 A6M 18 D3A 7 B5N2 46 total Junyo's air group at the same time consisted of about: 18 A6M 17 D3A 2 B5N2 37 total There may have been a couple more A6Ms on Junyo. This doesn't completely square with the numbers of air group casualties we know about from the different books written but does pretty much square with information we know about from the number of aircraft participating in each air strike and the numbers of aircraft transferred by Hiyo to Junyo (3 A6M 1 D3A and 5 B5N2) and by Hiyo to Buna (16 A6M and 17 D3A). If Hiyo had been present at Santa Cruz, it possibly would have added as many as 18 A6Ms, 17 D3As and 2 B5N2s to the number of aircraft available for the battle. 37 total aircraft. Would another 37 aircraft of the types described made a difference? Enterprise received two 250kg bomb hits and two near misses during the battle. If Hiyo had been with Junyo and launched her aircraft (say 12 A6M 12 D3a and 7 B5N2s) along with Junyo's historical first strike (12 A6M and 17 D3A) at 9:05-9:14, the extra planes (60 total aircraft) might have made a cripple out of Enterprise too. Enterprise's deck is crowded with recovered aircraft when the first Junyo strike arrives. |
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