Annex 2: Losses of German Capital Ships at Jutland
Moltke
Moltke was the fourth ship in the 1st Scouting Group line. She was being fired on by both Tiger and New Zealand during the run to the south and received an underwater hit on her starboard side, in the forward part of the hull from Tiger at 1602 at approximately the same time that Indefatigable blew up. The result of this hit is unknown but was probably limited to structural damage and flooding. From 1608 the 1st Scouting Group also came under fire from the British Fifth Battle Squadron and Moltke was hit at 1616 by either Barham or Valiant below her starboard number 5 casemate and exploded. (Note 1) Von Der Tann, the next ship in line, had to swerve violently to avoid the smoke cloud. Eyewitness reports from members of Von Der Tann's crew described an enormous deflagration amidships. A recent survey of the wreck has confirmed that she suffered a magazine explosion. Only seven members of her crew were saved.
Seydlitz
The first hit scored on Seydlitz was at 1555 by a 1400lb 13.5 inch shell from the Queen Mary that struck her starboard side above the battery deck forward of the foremast. It caused substantial damage but did not reduce the ships fighting efficiency. Two minutes later she was hit by Queen Mary again, the shell striking the 9 inch armour of her aft super firing barbette. It penetrated and caused the destruction of the turret but did not otherwise disable the ship. (Note 2)
She was hit by another 13.5 inch shell (again probably from the Queen Mary) at 1605 underwater in the region of the Starboard wing barbette. The shell is believed to have exploded just outside the torpedo bulkhead and splinters penetrated the magazine and adjacent engine room but the resultant flooding rapidly extinguished any fires thereby saving the ship. (Note 3)
A fourth 13.5 inch shell struck the 210mm armour at 1617 just aft of her starboard rearmost 150mm casemate. It caused heavy damage, disabling the gun, wrecking a large area of the ship and forcing the temporary evacuation of the starboard turbine compartment.
At 1650 she was hit by a 15 inch shell on the starboard side of the focsle deck above her torpedo flat which exploded well inside the ship and caused major structural damage (Note 4). Strained by the hit on a weak part of her hull structure and the high-speed at which she was travelling, several bulkheads collapsed and the fore-part of the ship took on large amounts of water By 1655 she had slowed noticeably and when struck by a torpedo from the destroyer Petard at 1657 below and slightly aft of the spot where the shell had hit, she pulled out of line and slowed to four knots. The hull, already strained, was now riven by the explosion of the British torpedo and the subsequent explosion of several of her own torpedoes. Splinters penetrated as far back as her forward boiler rooms which began to flood.
At 1501, though heavily damaged, listing to starboard and down by the bows the ship was saveable but unfortunately two British destroyers, Obdurate and Morris were approaching at 31 knots from the west on a bearing of ENE less than 10,000 yards on Seydlitz' starboard beam and seeing her in distress accelerated to 34 knots to attack. They were within firing range in two minutes and fired six of their eight 21 inch torpedoes at the stricken battle cruiser at a range of 8000 yards before turning away.
Their approach and the launching of their torpedoes was masked by the smoke from the German 9th Destroyer Flotilla and the light cruiser Regensberg which were then steaming past Seydlitz to the west (i.e. between her and the British destroyers) steering NNE, though both the German destroyers and the cruiser engaged the British ships scoring several hits their intervention came too late to prevent the British launching torpedoes.
The breeze, which was from WSW (Note 5) carried the funnel smoke of the German light forces towards the battle cruiser making observation difficult for her lookouts while her masts were clearly visible to the attacking British destroyers above the smoke. The torpedo tracks were not observed by the Seydlitz until 1508 when they were less than 1500 yards away. Seydlitz started to turn towards the torpedoes in an attempt to 'comb the tracks' but the slowly moving ship did not answer the helm rapidly and four of the six torpedoes found their mark striking at 1710. One exploded adjacent to the site of the 1605 hit while two more struck very close together abreast of the aft boiler rooms. The torpedo bulkhead was opened in two places.
Seydlitz was stopped completely by 1712 and there was no saving her at this point. There was no buoyancy in the forward part of the ship, her forward magazine, one of her turbine rooms and three of her boiler rooms were rapidly flooding. Captain von Egidy gave the order to abandon ship at 1714, she sank by the bows while also rolling to starboard and at 1726 her stern was clear of the water, it finally disappeared at 1731. 467 members of her crew were rescued.
Derfflinger
Derfflinger was leading the 1st Scouting Group line when she suffered a magazine explosion at 1713. The shell was of 15 inch calibre and fired by either Barham or Valiant at a range of 18,000 yards and an angle of obliquity of approximately 33°. The shell is believed to have struck on the starboard side below the waterline in the region of the forward magazines. (Note 6)
Several historians have noted that had it not been for an incident at approximately 1602, Hipper's flagship Lutzow would have been leading the line. This was a near collision between the flagship and one of the escorting destroyers of the 9th Flotilla. The 1st Scouting Group was executing a manoeuvre whereby they were turning from line abreast to line astern formation while changing course from ESE to SSE. While this movement was a well practised one it is possible that the helmsmen of Lutzow, Derfflinger and the destroyer S52 were distracted by the explosion of the Queen Mary which had just occurred and the destroyer came too close to the Lutzow causing a violent course correction by the flagship and a sudden loss of speed. It seems that the crew of the Derfflinger (also possibly distracted by the action) failed to notice the Lutzow's turn and sailed past her to port, though Von der Tann (now the third ship in the German line) both slowed down and manoeuvred to follow the Lutzow leaving Derfflinger slightly ahead of the rest of the squadron.
Hipper then ordered Derfflinger to take up position in the lead of the 1st Scouting Group , possibly because this would bring the ship's back into formation more quickly and with less confusion than if Derfflinger had attempted to take up her old place in the line. (Note 7) Hipper preferred to lead his force from the front, Scheer's flagship always took up a position in the middle of the German battle line.
Konig
During the third phase of the action between 1815 and 1835 Konig suffered many hits from the British battleships but it is believed that the shell that sank her came from Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke which was credited with her destruction. Recent analysis of the wreckage has confirmed that she suffered a magazine explosion. (Note 8 ) The ship was lost with all hands.
Helgoland
In contrast to Konig, Helgoland was only hit once at 1915 by a 15 inch AP shell from Valiant at 17,000 yards at an angle of roughly 45°. The shell struck above the torpedo flat on 6 inch vertical armour but passed right through this to burst inside the ship causing sympathetic explosions of Helgoland's own torpedoes. (Note 9) Although the bulkhead forward of the magazine was holed by splinters it held, forward of this bulkhead the ship was open to the sea and many compartments flooded rapidly.
Captain von Kameke ordered the ship to slow to a crawl and the rest of the HSF soon left her behind but her forward pumps were inoperable due to shock damage from the explosions in her torpedo flat and like all German ships of this era her watertight subdivision was compromised by cable runs, voice pipes and other systems and she began to settle. By 2009 her focsle was underwater and the sea was now entering the ship through casemate embrasures. The situation became even worse at 2024 when one of her remaining pumps failed and she foundered at 2207.
Lutzow
The flagship of 1st Scouting Group received a tremendous battering throughout the action and by 1840 her condition was extremely serious. She had endured a total of nineteen heavy calibre hits, eight 12 inch, seven 13.5 inch and four 15 inch. The ship's upperworks were wrecked, almost 8,000 tons of water were inside the hull, 25% of her boilers were out of action as were most of her guns, she was down by the bows and listing to port.
Yet when at 1913 Scheer ordered Hipper to charge the British line in a desperate bid to draw the Grand Fleet's fire away from the fleeing van of the High Seas Fleet the ship turned towards the hurricane of fire without a moments hesitation. It is possible that in the confusion Scheer was unaware that the 1st Scouting Group consisted now of only a single battle cruiser (Von der Tann was heavily damaged and making her way south at this point). Writing after the battle he said of Hipper 'His devotion to duty was exemplary, his courage beyond praise'.
For all that Lutzow did not last long and the tactical sense, situational awareness and downright good luck that had helped Hipper thumb his nose at the Grand Fleet at Flamborough Head, Dogger Bank and up to this point at Jutland were finally of no avail. Between 1914 and 1918 it is estimated that the ship was hit by four 15 inch, five 13.5 inch and nine 12 inch (Note 10) before the British shifted their fire from the stopped, smoking wreck and on to the German battleships. The exact sequence of events on board Lutzow is unknown but at 1920 she capsized and sank shortly after. 121 members of her crew were rescued, Admiral Hipper was not among them.
Von der Tann
The first hit on Von der Tann came at 1609 from Barham . It struck a joint in the belt armour 3 feet above the legend waterline and some 28 feet from the stern, penetrated the armour deck and burst, jamming one of the rudders and bending the number 3 propeller shaft which continued to turn damaging the shaft gland and flooding the number 3 engine room.
She was hit by Tiger at 1620 and 1623. The first hit pierced the 200mm armour of A barbette and burst destroying much of the rotating mechanism, killing or injuring most of the crew and causing the turret to jam. The second pierced the main deck and exploded inside X barbette causing the turret to burn out.
Between 1706 and 1755 she received five hits from 15 inch shells that destroyed P turret and wrecked the forward part of the ship causing extensive flooding (Note 11). Combined with the now serious flooding aft from the 1609 hit it was estimated by the ships damage control officer that some 7,000 tons of water were inside the hull causing her to settle lower and reducing her speed to 5 knots so that she fell well behind the rest of the German fleet.
Progressive flooding along cable runs and through voice pipes as well as that due to action damage meant that by 2021 her focsle was awash and her screws were out of the water. The crew struggled for hours to contain the flooding and attempts were made to take her in tow but she foundered at approximately 0015 on 1st June.
Damage (Note 12)
The battleship Grosser Karfurst sustained extremely heavy damage but survived the action. She suffered twelve heavy hits, six by 15 inch shell, five by 13.5 inch and one 12 inch. Both her forward turrets and her X turret were burned out, her forward superstructure was severely damaged as was her number 2 turbine room. A 13.5 inch shell from the Lion had burst inside the battery armour underneath the bridge causing heavy casualties and badly injuring Captain Goette. Heroic efforts by her crew saved her and when she finally reached the mouth of the Jade in late afternoon on 1st June she could only mange 5 knots and her forward freeboard was down to 4 feet.
Westfalen, leading the High Seas Fleet in its headlong dash for home after Scheer's second battle turnaway came under fire from Beatty's battle cruisers during the fifth phase of the action at ranges between 13,000 and 19,000 yards. She was hit four times between 2024 and 2030, one of the hits at 2028 was a 13.5 inch from Princess Royal that caused heavy but localised damage to and in the vicinity of her number 2 boiler room. The other three hits - two 12 inch from New Zealand and another 13.5 inch from Princess Royal struck aft of X turret, the 13.5 inch penetrating the armour, bending one of her shafts and wrecking her steering gear. Prompt action by the chief engineer in stopping the bent shaft meant that her damage was not as serious as the similar damage suffered by the Von der Tann nevertheless it took some 13 hours to repair as it involved sending divers into the flooded stern of the ship and she did not limp home until almost midnight on 1st June.
Kronprinz suffered a single 15 inch hit from Royal Oak at 1927. It struck the front of Y turret's roof and penetrated, bursting on the right hand breech mechanism. The turret was destroyed.
Markgraf received three 15 inch hits, one 13.5 inch hit and one 12 inch hit. The first two 15 inch hits struck parts of the foremast but the third at 1710 penetrated a joint between two pieces of 8 inch armour 71 feet forward of the stern. It glanced off the armour deck and exploded causing flooding and extensive local damage. She was hit again at 1835 by the 13.5 inch shell which penetrated the 170mm armour of her port number 6 casemate, as well as the 60mm deck and burst in her port aft boiler room destroying it.
The last hit on Markgraf was a 12 inch CPC shell from Agincourt of the old Lyddite filled type that broke up on her side armour causing little damage. Agincourt also hit the battleship Kaiser twice, at 1923 and again at 1926. Both hits were ineffective, the first bursting outside the ship, the second failing to explode. She was one of the ships of the Grand Fleet that had not been re-equipped with the new pattern 'Greenboy' shell. It is interesting to speculate at this point what the outcome of Jutland might have been had all the British ships been equipped with the defective pattern of shell so recently replaced in most of them.
Notes
The results given here are the product of analysis of two resources. N. J. M. Campbell's Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting and Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume III ; As well as Stephen Lorenz, Robert McCoy and Nathan Okun's NAaB (Naval Armour and Ballistics) program which was used to calculate the probable results of hits obtained on the German ships if British shells had worked properly.
Note 1
In OTL she was hit by a 15 inch shell on the 8 inch part of her belt armour at 18,000 yards. The angle of obliquity was roughly 35°. The shell burst on the belt. If the shell had been working properly it would have achieved complete penetration of the belt with sufficient remaining energy to pierce both the 2 inch part of the sloped deck armour and the 2 inch torpedo bulkhead. The naval armour and ballistics program suggests complete penetration all the way to the magazines but it should be noted that due to the German habit of storing shells with their nose caps out ward (i.e. towards the exterior of the ship) then even partial penetration by splinters had the potential to cause a magazine explosion.
Note 2
In OTL the shell burst in penetrating.
Note 3
In OTL the shell burst in the water outside the ship.
Note 4
In OTL the shell did not penetrate very far into the ship before exploding and much of the damage that it did was above the waterline. The torpedo hit at 1657 is also as historic.
Note 5
The approach of the British destroyers and the wind direction are both as OTL. The 1st SG were steaming south too rapidly to offer the prospect of a target without a stern chase and the difficulty of fighting past 9th Destroyer Flotilla. Here, the crippled Seydlitz is too tempting a target to pass up!
Note 6
In OTL this was a hit on the Lutzow. (As Derfflinger and Lutzow were sister ships it seems reasonable to assume that if they were to change places shell hits aimed at either one would land in the same place.) The shell struck the thin lower edge of the armour belt beneath the waterline abeam of the forward main magazines and exploded without penetrating causing the ship to be violently shaken. The naval armour and ballistics program suggests a good probability of partial penetration of the magazines if the shell had worked properly. Again deficiencies in German shell storage could easily have doomed the ship.
Note 7
The described manoeuvre at the time of the sinking of the Queen Mary is historic, the near collision incident is not, though the potential for difficulty certainly existed.
Note 8
In OTL a 13.5 inch shell from Iron Duke, fired at a range of 12,000 yards and striking at approximately 18° from the normal, struck the lower edge of the armour belt 5 1/2 feet beneath the waterline between the bottom of the armour belt (which was only seven inches thick at this point) and the shelf that supported it. The hit was in line with 'B' barbette and burst on the wing longitudinal bulkhead after travelling only 6 1/2 feet inside the ship. It blew holes in several bulkheads and destroyed the ship's number 14 magazine igniting about 15 charges and arming the fuse on one of the 150 mm shells of her secondary armament. Some shell and torpedo bulkhead fragments even penetrated her main armament magazines. The crew of the Konig were incredibly lucky. In TTL a properly working shell penetrates much further into the ship causing a magazine explosion and her loss.
Note 9
In OTL the shell broke up on 6 inch armour and failed to explode.
Note 10
These hits were divided between the four surviving German battle cruisers in OTL
Note 11
In OTL these were hits on the Seydlitz. I have calculated where the hits would land assuming the stem of the ship was the aiming point.
Note 12
The non OTL late fourth and fifth phase hits (1921 - 2030) on Westfalen, Kronprinz and Grosser Karfurst are derived from the OTL hits on Lutzow, Von der Tann , Derfflinger, Konig and Seydlitz which in TTL are sunk before the shells aimed at them OTL are fired. The three battleships are the most obvious targets for the British at this point. Grosser Karfurst will be the Seydlitz of this timeline, staggering home despite enormous damage.
Table of Losses of ships at The Battle of Jutland
Battleships
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Konig
Helgoland
Battle Cruisers
Royal Navy
Indefatigable
Queen Mary
Invincible
Kaiserlich Marine
Moltke
Seydlitz
Derrflinger
Lutzow
Von der Tann
Pre-Dreadnought Battleships
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Pommern
Armoured Cruisers
Royal Navy
Black Prince
Defence
Warrior
Kaiserlich Marine
None
Light Cruisers
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Elbing
Frauenlob
Rostock
Weisbaden
Destroyers
Royal Navy
Ardent
Fortune
Nestor
Nomad
Shark
Sparrowhawk
Tipperary
Turbulent
Kaiserlich Marine
S35
V4
V27
V29
V48
Moltke
Moltke was the fourth ship in the 1st Scouting Group line. She was being fired on by both Tiger and New Zealand during the run to the south and received an underwater hit on her starboard side, in the forward part of the hull from Tiger at 1602 at approximately the same time that Indefatigable blew up. The result of this hit is unknown but was probably limited to structural damage and flooding. From 1608 the 1st Scouting Group also came under fire from the British Fifth Battle Squadron and Moltke was hit at 1616 by either Barham or Valiant below her starboard number 5 casemate and exploded. (Note 1) Von Der Tann, the next ship in line, had to swerve violently to avoid the smoke cloud. Eyewitness reports from members of Von Der Tann's crew described an enormous deflagration amidships. A recent survey of the wreck has confirmed that she suffered a magazine explosion. Only seven members of her crew were saved.
Seydlitz
The first hit scored on Seydlitz was at 1555 by a 1400lb 13.5 inch shell from the Queen Mary that struck her starboard side above the battery deck forward of the foremast. It caused substantial damage but did not reduce the ships fighting efficiency. Two minutes later she was hit by Queen Mary again, the shell striking the 9 inch armour of her aft super firing barbette. It penetrated and caused the destruction of the turret but did not otherwise disable the ship. (Note 2)
She was hit by another 13.5 inch shell (again probably from the Queen Mary) at 1605 underwater in the region of the Starboard wing barbette. The shell is believed to have exploded just outside the torpedo bulkhead and splinters penetrated the magazine and adjacent engine room but the resultant flooding rapidly extinguished any fires thereby saving the ship. (Note 3)
A fourth 13.5 inch shell struck the 210mm armour at 1617 just aft of her starboard rearmost 150mm casemate. It caused heavy damage, disabling the gun, wrecking a large area of the ship and forcing the temporary evacuation of the starboard turbine compartment.
At 1650 she was hit by a 15 inch shell on the starboard side of the focsle deck above her torpedo flat which exploded well inside the ship and caused major structural damage (Note 4). Strained by the hit on a weak part of her hull structure and the high-speed at which she was travelling, several bulkheads collapsed and the fore-part of the ship took on large amounts of water By 1655 she had slowed noticeably and when struck by a torpedo from the destroyer Petard at 1657 below and slightly aft of the spot where the shell had hit, she pulled out of line and slowed to four knots. The hull, already strained, was now riven by the explosion of the British torpedo and the subsequent explosion of several of her own torpedoes. Splinters penetrated as far back as her forward boiler rooms which began to flood.
At 1501, though heavily damaged, listing to starboard and down by the bows the ship was saveable but unfortunately two British destroyers, Obdurate and Morris were approaching at 31 knots from the west on a bearing of ENE less than 10,000 yards on Seydlitz' starboard beam and seeing her in distress accelerated to 34 knots to attack. They were within firing range in two minutes and fired six of their eight 21 inch torpedoes at the stricken battle cruiser at a range of 8000 yards before turning away.
Their approach and the launching of their torpedoes was masked by the smoke from the German 9th Destroyer Flotilla and the light cruiser Regensberg which were then steaming past Seydlitz to the west (i.e. between her and the British destroyers) steering NNE, though both the German destroyers and the cruiser engaged the British ships scoring several hits their intervention came too late to prevent the British launching torpedoes.
The breeze, which was from WSW (Note 5) carried the funnel smoke of the German light forces towards the battle cruiser making observation difficult for her lookouts while her masts were clearly visible to the attacking British destroyers above the smoke. The torpedo tracks were not observed by the Seydlitz until 1508 when they were less than 1500 yards away. Seydlitz started to turn towards the torpedoes in an attempt to 'comb the tracks' but the slowly moving ship did not answer the helm rapidly and four of the six torpedoes found their mark striking at 1710. One exploded adjacent to the site of the 1605 hit while two more struck very close together abreast of the aft boiler rooms. The torpedo bulkhead was opened in two places.
Seydlitz was stopped completely by 1712 and there was no saving her at this point. There was no buoyancy in the forward part of the ship, her forward magazine, one of her turbine rooms and three of her boiler rooms were rapidly flooding. Captain von Egidy gave the order to abandon ship at 1714, she sank by the bows while also rolling to starboard and at 1726 her stern was clear of the water, it finally disappeared at 1731. 467 members of her crew were rescued.
Derfflinger
Derfflinger was leading the 1st Scouting Group line when she suffered a magazine explosion at 1713. The shell was of 15 inch calibre and fired by either Barham or Valiant at a range of 18,000 yards and an angle of obliquity of approximately 33°. The shell is believed to have struck on the starboard side below the waterline in the region of the forward magazines. (Note 6)
Several historians have noted that had it not been for an incident at approximately 1602, Hipper's flagship Lutzow would have been leading the line. This was a near collision between the flagship and one of the escorting destroyers of the 9th Flotilla. The 1st Scouting Group was executing a manoeuvre whereby they were turning from line abreast to line astern formation while changing course from ESE to SSE. While this movement was a well practised one it is possible that the helmsmen of Lutzow, Derfflinger and the destroyer S52 were distracted by the explosion of the Queen Mary which had just occurred and the destroyer came too close to the Lutzow causing a violent course correction by the flagship and a sudden loss of speed. It seems that the crew of the Derfflinger (also possibly distracted by the action) failed to notice the Lutzow's turn and sailed past her to port, though Von der Tann (now the third ship in the German line) both slowed down and manoeuvred to follow the Lutzow leaving Derfflinger slightly ahead of the rest of the squadron.
Hipper then ordered Derfflinger to take up position in the lead of the 1st Scouting Group , possibly because this would bring the ship's back into formation more quickly and with less confusion than if Derfflinger had attempted to take up her old place in the line. (Note 7) Hipper preferred to lead his force from the front, Scheer's flagship always took up a position in the middle of the German battle line.
Konig
During the third phase of the action between 1815 and 1835 Konig suffered many hits from the British battleships but it is believed that the shell that sank her came from Jellicoe's flagship Iron Duke which was credited with her destruction. Recent analysis of the wreckage has confirmed that she suffered a magazine explosion. (Note 8 ) The ship was lost with all hands.
Helgoland
In contrast to Konig, Helgoland was only hit once at 1915 by a 15 inch AP shell from Valiant at 17,000 yards at an angle of roughly 45°. The shell struck above the torpedo flat on 6 inch vertical armour but passed right through this to burst inside the ship causing sympathetic explosions of Helgoland's own torpedoes. (Note 9) Although the bulkhead forward of the magazine was holed by splinters it held, forward of this bulkhead the ship was open to the sea and many compartments flooded rapidly.
Captain von Kameke ordered the ship to slow to a crawl and the rest of the HSF soon left her behind but her forward pumps were inoperable due to shock damage from the explosions in her torpedo flat and like all German ships of this era her watertight subdivision was compromised by cable runs, voice pipes and other systems and she began to settle. By 2009 her focsle was underwater and the sea was now entering the ship through casemate embrasures. The situation became even worse at 2024 when one of her remaining pumps failed and she foundered at 2207.
Lutzow
The flagship of 1st Scouting Group received a tremendous battering throughout the action and by 1840 her condition was extremely serious. She had endured a total of nineteen heavy calibre hits, eight 12 inch, seven 13.5 inch and four 15 inch. The ship's upperworks were wrecked, almost 8,000 tons of water were inside the hull, 25% of her boilers were out of action as were most of her guns, she was down by the bows and listing to port.
Yet when at 1913 Scheer ordered Hipper to charge the British line in a desperate bid to draw the Grand Fleet's fire away from the fleeing van of the High Seas Fleet the ship turned towards the hurricane of fire without a moments hesitation. It is possible that in the confusion Scheer was unaware that the 1st Scouting Group consisted now of only a single battle cruiser (Von der Tann was heavily damaged and making her way south at this point). Writing after the battle he said of Hipper 'His devotion to duty was exemplary, his courage beyond praise'.
For all that Lutzow did not last long and the tactical sense, situational awareness and downright good luck that had helped Hipper thumb his nose at the Grand Fleet at Flamborough Head, Dogger Bank and up to this point at Jutland were finally of no avail. Between 1914 and 1918 it is estimated that the ship was hit by four 15 inch, five 13.5 inch and nine 12 inch (Note 10) before the British shifted their fire from the stopped, smoking wreck and on to the German battleships. The exact sequence of events on board Lutzow is unknown but at 1920 she capsized and sank shortly after. 121 members of her crew were rescued, Admiral Hipper was not among them.
Von der Tann
The first hit on Von der Tann came at 1609 from Barham . It struck a joint in the belt armour 3 feet above the legend waterline and some 28 feet from the stern, penetrated the armour deck and burst, jamming one of the rudders and bending the number 3 propeller shaft which continued to turn damaging the shaft gland and flooding the number 3 engine room.
She was hit by Tiger at 1620 and 1623. The first hit pierced the 200mm armour of A barbette and burst destroying much of the rotating mechanism, killing or injuring most of the crew and causing the turret to jam. The second pierced the main deck and exploded inside X barbette causing the turret to burn out.
Between 1706 and 1755 she received five hits from 15 inch shells that destroyed P turret and wrecked the forward part of the ship causing extensive flooding (Note 11). Combined with the now serious flooding aft from the 1609 hit it was estimated by the ships damage control officer that some 7,000 tons of water were inside the hull causing her to settle lower and reducing her speed to 5 knots so that she fell well behind the rest of the German fleet.
Progressive flooding along cable runs and through voice pipes as well as that due to action damage meant that by 2021 her focsle was awash and her screws were out of the water. The crew struggled for hours to contain the flooding and attempts were made to take her in tow but she foundered at approximately 0015 on 1st June.
Damage (Note 12)
The battleship Grosser Karfurst sustained extremely heavy damage but survived the action. She suffered twelve heavy hits, six by 15 inch shell, five by 13.5 inch and one 12 inch. Both her forward turrets and her X turret were burned out, her forward superstructure was severely damaged as was her number 2 turbine room. A 13.5 inch shell from the Lion had burst inside the battery armour underneath the bridge causing heavy casualties and badly injuring Captain Goette. Heroic efforts by her crew saved her and when she finally reached the mouth of the Jade in late afternoon on 1st June she could only mange 5 knots and her forward freeboard was down to 4 feet.
Westfalen, leading the High Seas Fleet in its headlong dash for home after Scheer's second battle turnaway came under fire from Beatty's battle cruisers during the fifth phase of the action at ranges between 13,000 and 19,000 yards. She was hit four times between 2024 and 2030, one of the hits at 2028 was a 13.5 inch from Princess Royal that caused heavy but localised damage to and in the vicinity of her number 2 boiler room. The other three hits - two 12 inch from New Zealand and another 13.5 inch from Princess Royal struck aft of X turret, the 13.5 inch penetrating the armour, bending one of her shafts and wrecking her steering gear. Prompt action by the chief engineer in stopping the bent shaft meant that her damage was not as serious as the similar damage suffered by the Von der Tann nevertheless it took some 13 hours to repair as it involved sending divers into the flooded stern of the ship and she did not limp home until almost midnight on 1st June.
Kronprinz suffered a single 15 inch hit from Royal Oak at 1927. It struck the front of Y turret's roof and penetrated, bursting on the right hand breech mechanism. The turret was destroyed.
Markgraf received three 15 inch hits, one 13.5 inch hit and one 12 inch hit. The first two 15 inch hits struck parts of the foremast but the third at 1710 penetrated a joint between two pieces of 8 inch armour 71 feet forward of the stern. It glanced off the armour deck and exploded causing flooding and extensive local damage. She was hit again at 1835 by the 13.5 inch shell which penetrated the 170mm armour of her port number 6 casemate, as well as the 60mm deck and burst in her port aft boiler room destroying it.
The last hit on Markgraf was a 12 inch CPC shell from Agincourt of the old Lyddite filled type that broke up on her side armour causing little damage. Agincourt also hit the battleship Kaiser twice, at 1923 and again at 1926. Both hits were ineffective, the first bursting outside the ship, the second failing to explode. She was one of the ships of the Grand Fleet that had not been re-equipped with the new pattern 'Greenboy' shell. It is interesting to speculate at this point what the outcome of Jutland might have been had all the British ships been equipped with the defective pattern of shell so recently replaced in most of them.
Notes
The results given here are the product of analysis of two resources. N. J. M. Campbell's Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting and Arthur Marder's From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume III ; As well as Stephen Lorenz, Robert McCoy and Nathan Okun's NAaB (Naval Armour and Ballistics) program which was used to calculate the probable results of hits obtained on the German ships if British shells had worked properly.
Note 1
In OTL she was hit by a 15 inch shell on the 8 inch part of her belt armour at 18,000 yards. The angle of obliquity was roughly 35°. The shell burst on the belt. If the shell had been working properly it would have achieved complete penetration of the belt with sufficient remaining energy to pierce both the 2 inch part of the sloped deck armour and the 2 inch torpedo bulkhead. The naval armour and ballistics program suggests complete penetration all the way to the magazines but it should be noted that due to the German habit of storing shells with their nose caps out ward (i.e. towards the exterior of the ship) then even partial penetration by splinters had the potential to cause a magazine explosion.
Note 2
In OTL the shell burst in penetrating.
Note 3
In OTL the shell burst in the water outside the ship.
Note 4
In OTL the shell did not penetrate very far into the ship before exploding and much of the damage that it did was above the waterline. The torpedo hit at 1657 is also as historic.
Note 5
The approach of the British destroyers and the wind direction are both as OTL. The 1st SG were steaming south too rapidly to offer the prospect of a target without a stern chase and the difficulty of fighting past 9th Destroyer Flotilla. Here, the crippled Seydlitz is too tempting a target to pass up!
Note 6
In OTL this was a hit on the Lutzow. (As Derfflinger and Lutzow were sister ships it seems reasonable to assume that if they were to change places shell hits aimed at either one would land in the same place.) The shell struck the thin lower edge of the armour belt beneath the waterline abeam of the forward main magazines and exploded without penetrating causing the ship to be violently shaken. The naval armour and ballistics program suggests a good probability of partial penetration of the magazines if the shell had worked properly. Again deficiencies in German shell storage could easily have doomed the ship.
Note 7
The described manoeuvre at the time of the sinking of the Queen Mary is historic, the near collision incident is not, though the potential for difficulty certainly existed.
Note 8
In OTL a 13.5 inch shell from Iron Duke, fired at a range of 12,000 yards and striking at approximately 18° from the normal, struck the lower edge of the armour belt 5 1/2 feet beneath the waterline between the bottom of the armour belt (which was only seven inches thick at this point) and the shelf that supported it. The hit was in line with 'B' barbette and burst on the wing longitudinal bulkhead after travelling only 6 1/2 feet inside the ship. It blew holes in several bulkheads and destroyed the ship's number 14 magazine igniting about 15 charges and arming the fuse on one of the 150 mm shells of her secondary armament. Some shell and torpedo bulkhead fragments even penetrated her main armament magazines. The crew of the Konig were incredibly lucky. In TTL a properly working shell penetrates much further into the ship causing a magazine explosion and her loss.
Note 9
In OTL the shell broke up on 6 inch armour and failed to explode.
Note 10
These hits were divided between the four surviving German battle cruisers in OTL
Note 11
In OTL these were hits on the Seydlitz. I have calculated where the hits would land assuming the stem of the ship was the aiming point.
Note 12
The non OTL late fourth and fifth phase hits (1921 - 2030) on Westfalen, Kronprinz and Grosser Karfurst are derived from the OTL hits on Lutzow, Von der Tann , Derfflinger, Konig and Seydlitz which in TTL are sunk before the shells aimed at them OTL are fired. The three battleships are the most obvious targets for the British at this point. Grosser Karfurst will be the Seydlitz of this timeline, staggering home despite enormous damage.
Table of Losses of ships at The Battle of Jutland
Battleships
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Konig
Helgoland
Battle Cruisers
Royal Navy
Indefatigable
Queen Mary
Invincible
Kaiserlich Marine
Moltke
Seydlitz
Derrflinger
Lutzow
Von der Tann
Pre-Dreadnought Battleships
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Pommern
Armoured Cruisers
Royal Navy
Black Prince
Defence
Warrior
Kaiserlich Marine
None
Light Cruisers
Royal Navy
None
Kaiserlich Marine
Elbing
Frauenlob
Rostock
Weisbaden
Destroyers
Royal Navy
Ardent
Fortune
Nestor
Nomad
Shark
Sparrowhawk
Tipperary
Turbulent
Kaiserlich Marine
S35
V4
V27
V29
V48
