WW2 bombing strategies

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PMN1	WW2 bombing strategies	Lead	[-]
Posts: 3573 ( 3-Jul-2008 15:35:35) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Target: Hitler's Oil by Ronald C Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit Bomber Command, from September 1939 onwards and the USAAF, after the latter had entered the European air war in April 1942, could choose form several alternative strategies. On the one hand, they could carry out 'precision' bombing. This meant the concentration of attacks on carefully selected individual targets, such as aircraft factories or oil refineries, which were believed to be of special importance to the enemy. On the other hand, they could avoid the difficulties of precision bombing by carrying out what became known as 'area' bombing. This was the bombing of whole districts within cities or towns, mostly industrial, without any attempt to single out particular targets. Behind this more or less 'blanket' approach lay the belief that at least some vital economic targets would be hit; also, that the casualties suffered by civilians, plus the loss of their living accommodation, would lower the morale of the population. There was, in reality, a third possible policy in the earlier years of the war. It was to hold down the scale of strategic bombing to a justifiable level until the difficulties impeding it had been overcome. This would have been the level which appeared justified after comparing the results obtained and costs incurred during recent operations. The material and manpower resources saved by this policy could have been used in a more profitable way, perhaps by diverting them to tactical bombing. But this third alternative seems never to have been seriously considered. How easy/hard would it have been to determine the point at which resources should be increased and what would be the chances of getting those resources diverted to the bomber fleets given the resources are likely to have been allocated elsewhere?
binder001.forumonwar		#1	[-]
Registered Member Posts: 3 ( 3-Jul-2008 17:26:10) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	One problem is that since WW1 a large number of airpower advocates had been pushing and battering with the idea that the BOMBER was the new way to win a war. It would replace battleships and make land armies subordinate to its needs. There were careers to be built or redeemed and the future of independent air forces were based on the belief in the bomber as a decisive weapon. Who wanted to use a measured response when all the "bomber boys" were hollering to have more planes and to unleashed to prove that they could win the war. They would never have stood for any resources to be allocated for anything but bombers, bombers and more bombers. So in answer to "how easy/hard"? - almost impossible. Gary
emc		#2	[-]
Posts: 3906 ( 3-Jul-2008 18:40:12) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Considering how hard it was to get the RAF to divert a few squadrons of obsolescent bombers to maritime patrol duties -- an error which arguably contributed to the parlous economic state of the UK post ww2 -- binder is probably right in it being impossible. Given the technology available in the early parts of ww2, it was certainly impractical for high-altitude bombers to achieve the level of precision needed to destroy many industrial targets, as heavy machinery is quite resistant to blast damage. Stated differently, the only practical way for a high-altitude bomber force to significantly reduce factory output was to reduce the workers' productivity, by death, injury (of course injured workers needed to be cared for, meaning their caregivers wouldn't be available for military production), and demoralization (if nothing else, round-the-clock bombing keeps everybody from getting a good night's sleep). Leaving aside the advocacy of people like "Bomber" Harris (and his peers in the USAAF), it was probably necessary for the Western Allies to directly strike the Axis, both for domestic politics and for the survival of the alliance (at least as perceived in 1942). (added in edit) As an aside, apparently USAAF strategic bombing crews had casualty rates greater than that experienced by Japanese kamikaze squadrons, mostly because the kamikaze squadrons were frequently unable to sortie.
Dave Bender	Necessary for the Western Allies to directly strike the Axis	#3	[-]
Posts: 6708 ( 3-Jul-2008 21:16:24) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	1. Cancel RAF Bomber Command. 2. Shift the massive resources formerly consumed by RAF Bomber Command into producing decent armored and mechanized infantry divisions. 3. Shift the shipping resources formerly used by RAF Bomber command (bringing fuel, bombs, etc. from the U.S.) to amphibious transports. 4. After June 1941 the RAF had a huge superiority of fighter aircraft in western Europe. 5. After the "Channel Dash" (February 1942) the RN had naval supremacy in both the Atlantic and the Med. Now Britain can use mechanized ground forces, Spitfire wings, amphibious transports and naval superiority to do what Churchill always wanted to do. Start seizing the Medittranean region one piece at at time. Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Crete are obvious targets as they are large islands. Air and naval superiority ensures that the invading British Army will have a good supply line. The defending German and Italian units will be without a supply line. That fight can end only one way. Italy will change sides early. After Britain totally dominates the Med Spain can be pressured to quit selling tungsten to Germany. Turkey can be pressured to quit selling chrome to Germany. If the British have any sense they will use their geographic dominance to ensure that only anti-communist guerilla forces in the Balkans receive military support. Yugoslavia will not go communist at the end of WWII and Greece will not have a civil war. Or we could fire bomb German civilians in direct violation of the Hague Convention.
Red Admiral		#4	[-]
Posts: 1895 ( 3-Jul-2008 21:47:48) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Or we could fire bomb German civilians in direct violation of the Hague Convention. Good job the Hague convention doesn't mention Jews or Eastern Europeans... Bomber Command coudl have done a lot better job by better analysis of the after action reports early on by Dyson et al to see what was working. Theres a thesis around titled The Economic Cost of Airpower which goes into the subject quite deeply.
emc		#5	[-]
Posts: 3908 ( 3-Jul-2008 22:40:15) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Dave Bender wrote: 1. Cancel RAF Bomber Command. 2. Shift the massive resources formerly consumed by RAF Bomber Command into producing decent armored and mechanized infantry divisions. 3. Shift the shipping resources formerly used by RAF Bomber command (bringing fuel, bombs, etc. from the U.S.) to amphibious transports. 4. After June 1941 the RAF had a huge superiority of fighter aircraft in western Europe. 5. After the "Channel Dash" (February 1942) the RN had naval supremacy in both the Atlantic and the Med. Now Britain can use mechanized ground forces, Spitfire wings, amphibious transports and naval superiority to do what Churchill always wanted to do. Start seizing the Medittranean region one piece at at time. Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Crete are obvious targets as they are large islands. Air and naval superiority ensures that the invading British Army will have a good supply line. The defending German and Italian units will be without a supply line. That fight can end only one way. Italy will change sides early. After Britain totally dominates the Med Spain can be pressured to quit selling tungsten to Germany. Turkey can be pressured to quit selling chrome to Germany. If the British have any sense they will use their geographic dominance to ensure that only anti-communist guerilla forces in the Balkans receive military support. Yugoslavia will not go communist at the end of WWII and Greece will not have a civil war. Or we could fire bomb German civilians in direct violation of the Hague Convention. 1: Not a chance, as there were, inarguably, legitimate military targets like, say, Tirpitz, or u-boat pens. 2: See 1. 3: See 1. 4, 5: no comment The US especially, was adamantly against "peripheral" operations, like Greece, Yugoslavia, etc. Or we could fire bomb German civilians in direct violation of the Hague Convention. I do realize that "they did it, too" isn't a legitimate basis for a defense, but the u-boat campaign was also in violation of international law (yes, the USN did the same thing in the Pacific), as was the German bombardment of British, French, Polish, and Dutch cities. For that matter, so was the very existence of the Luftwaffe and the German Navy's submarines. When you say things like that you sound like an apologist for nazi war crimes.
NewGolconda		#6	[-]
Posts: 3457 ( 4-Jul-2008 01:49:49) Commonwealth Moderator Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	"2. Shift the massive resources formerly consumed by RAF Bomber Command into producing decent armored and mechanized infantry divisions." Some of the resources assigned to aircraft production can be turned instead toward manfucture of light vehicles and trucks. Of course, the british army was already highly motersied in its logistical train. Tanks compete with naval resources, armour production, medium guns - though of course they also need engines and transmitions that clash with parts of the aircraft programe. One intangible is the massive drain airforce recruiting and training programmes had on the army man power pool. People who might otherwise have been the infantry squad leaders etc in WWI were, in WWII ground crew, aircrew or tied up in the simply massive training machinery required for a large scale bomber offensive. In the end though, why should Britain try and compete as a ground power with the Germans? Why not more naval resources, so that Britain can apply its limited land power at places of its chosing against isolated enemies, at least until the US is mobalised.
NewGolconda		#7	[-]
Posts: 3458 ( 4-Jul-2008 01:51:02) Commonwealth Moderator Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	"Or we could fire bomb German civilians in direct violation of the Hague Convention." Does being better at something make it more or less moral?
Dave Bender	Why not more naval resources	#8	[-]
Posts: 6712 ( 4-Jul-2008 04:06:46) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	What did the WWII RN lack beside ASW assets and troop transports? WWII Britain used thousands of armored vehicles manufactured in the U.S. I suspect a lot of ammunition and other equipment also. Universal Carrier (i.e. Bren Gun Carrier) Grant tank. Sherman tank. M3 Stuart light tank. M10 Wolverine tank destroyer M22 Locust airborne tank. M24 Chaffee light tank. M7 Priest 105mm SP artillery. Without massive American assistance the WWII British Army would scarcely exist after the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk. Rather then purchasing factories for the contruction of heavy bombers and support equipment the British should be purchasing factories for the construction of army equipment. The BEF will be reconstituted quicker and ultimately the British Army will have more combat divisions. The British Army should be capable of defeating Italy all by itself.
NewGolconda		#9	[-]
Posts: 3459 ( 4-Jul-2008 05:45:28) Commonwealth Moderator Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Without massive American assistance the WWII British Army would scarcely exist after the BEF was destroyed at Dunkirk. Lend lease was of massive significance to the British war effort, and to pre US enterting the war politics, as well as many other fields. However its breadth and scope goes way beyond this list of military vehicles. With out the army compoanant of lend lease vehicles Britain would have fielded fewer divisions in 1942, but how many divisions did she need at that point? Rather then purchasing factories for the contruction of heavy bombers and support equipment the British should be purchasing factories for the construction of army equipment. The heavy bomber industrial effort was a massive industrial commitment, and one that went well beyond the main aircraft manufacturers. Its gestation was long before lend lease, indeed even the three heavy bomber industrial groups pre date this. Re directing some of this effort in hindsight might help the British war effort, but I think I would have chosen high performance naval aircraft, tactical aircraft and high performance fighters for overseas theatres before I chose additional army equipment. I might even re consider the scale of british mobalisation, conserving some resources for the peacetime economy and reconstruction. Remember not all resources are transferable, and not all resources relate directly to choices on monetary investment, at least on the wartime time scales. No amount of money, for example, spent in 1938 could improve british armour plate production in 1939. No amount of money can increase pools of highly skilled labour, at least not in a 12 or 24 month time frame. The BEF will be reconstituted quicker and ultimately the British Army will have more combat divisions. The British Army should be capable of defeating Italy all by itself. Why? What strategic goal does this serve? Why is this a better choiuce than some other potential alternative choices? Where would this stack up against holding malaya?
robertf2		#10	[-]
Posts: 328 ( 4-Jul-2008 06:42:17) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	PMN1 wrote: Target: Hitler's Oil by Ronald C Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit <snip> There was, in reality, a third possible policy in the earlier years of the war. It was to hold down the scale of strategic bombing to a justifiable level until the difficulties impeding it had been overcome. How easy/hard would it have been to determine the point at which resources should be increased and what would be the chances of getting those resources diverted to the bomber fleets given the resources are likely to have been allocated elsewhere? Very difficult for the RAF as they had not done their homework, as they should have, during the interwar years to sufficiently assess their own operational efficiency. Additionally this idea assumes a level of real time knowledge of operational effectiveness that was probably not available until late in the war, if then, -the oil offensive was effective in large part because Ultra intercepts gave insight into the critical effect that disrupted oil production had on the German leadership and also allowed effective and economical targeting by giving an idea of the damage and also when repairs had been completed so that targets could be re-bombed. In similar vein I have read plausible opinion that the RAF Ruhr offensive was eventually effective but from lack of knowledge of the other side of the hill Harris threw away his opportunity to really effect the course of the war by switching target to Berlin (shades of Goering switching objectives during the Battle of Britain).

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