Double posted, from the air forces. What do people think of this exchange?
Correspondence, extracted from SPITFIRE - the history.
July 1942 - Admiralty request access to Spitfire, Hurricane and Seafire aircraft in numbers - too and fro with the RAF and a discussion of Russian needs (roughly 200 British fighters a month to Russia in 1942). Later the same month the Admiralty asked for a reduced, immediate supply of 229 nonfolding wing and 143 folding wing Seafires.
Air Ministry offered to supply 114 Mk VB and 50 Mk I and II without hooks.
The Admiralty's reply "The Firefly is still a sick bird and already very late, and the Firebrand seems to have been stillborn. It is still an unknown quantity, the final design is far from being clear and we still have doubts about the Sabre engine. The situation regarding American fighters is rather obscure and deliveries are behind schedule. The Martlet is not really fast and is unable to deal with the Junkers Ju88. We must have more Spitfires, but preferably Seafires. The Fulmar is obsolescent for modern air warfare and the 60 Hurricanes would be purely stop gaps adapted for sea service. Although the Hurricane II has been hooked and operated by Indomitable, the wings do not fold and many of those offered took part in the Battle of Britain. The exFrench Martlet Is are a wasting asset as there are insufficient spares to maintain one squadron afloat. The ex-Greek contract Martlets are not equipped for employment on British carriers and will be used for shore duties in the Middle East. I would, therefore, suggest that authority be obtained for a further allocation of Spitfire VCs for the Royal Navy. I consider the position as regards Fleet fighters at the present moment is so grave that authority should be sought at the highest level to allocate another 750 Seafires".
Air Marshall Freeman replies -"The question of priority for naval aircraft was considered at the meeting of the Defence Committee (Supply) on 9 December last, when it was ruled that the highest priority should be accorded to the production of aircraft necessary for the aircraft carrier. In the course of the discussion you said -`That it was essential that the aircraft to equip and maintain the aircraft carriers must have priority over everything else. The Minister of Aircraft Production tells me that he has interpreted this as applying not only to naval fighters, but to all types of aircraft required for aircraft carriers. He has, in consequence, given instructions to factories that all aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm must have the highest possible priority. You will see, therefore that what the First Sea Lord asks for has already been accorded to him.
In your letter on FAA fighters there are certain matters raised which injustice to MAP and its technical staff must be commented on. That the FAA were not in possession of the best carrier-borne fighters in the world at the beginning of this war is the sole responsibility of the Admiralty who, for a number of years, refused to consider speed as an important characteristic of FAA fighters. Speed was deliberately sacrificed for long range and two seats. Those responsible at the Air Ministry for development urged the Admiralty to put a higher value on speed, but to no avail. It was not until Captain Slattery arrived at the Admiralty that this policy was recognized and reversed. Captain Slattery took up his appointment in 1939, and an airplane designed in 1939 is not likely to come off the production line until four years later.
If the word 'modern' is meant to mean `up-to-date' then the Fulmar was never modern - it was a hotch potch of the P4 34 and was, therefore, five years old when it was redesigned as a FAA fighter. The Admiralty did not consider the Hurricane or Spitfire suitable as a fighter as they still wanted a two-seater. During the last few years the RAF have been fleeced of fighters in order to make up for the previous short sighted policy of the Admiralty. Further, the Hurricanes and Spitfires handed over have to be modified, occupying the time of design staff and of jig and tool makers and upsetting the production line. Not only have the RAF lost the actual aircraft handed over but there has been an adverse effect on the production line itself. It is for AMSO to say whether we can spare another 750 Spitfires and 250 Hurricane IICs, but we must also know how these are to be matched with carrier production. When it is realized how seldom the FAA fighters fly off from carriers to attack enemy aircraft, 750 far from being comparatively small, is in fact incomparably large."
