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Admiral Beez |
Would a swept-wing Hawker Sea Hawk be competitive in Korea? |
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Posts: 4220 ( 9-Nov-2007 22:02:16) |
Had the RN fielded swept wing Sea Hawks in Korea, would they have been competitive with the MiG-15? They shared the same basic engine. The straight-wing Sea
Hawk's weight was 13,220 lb (loaded) vs. the MiG-15 at 10,935 lb (loaded) so the Brit may still be uncompetitive. Thoughts?
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PMN1 |
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Posts: 3127 ( 9-Nov-2007 22:10:55) |
Here is a scenario from 'Project Cancelled'
Scenario 1952 How does the scene look with a P.1081 type given top priority by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm? The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming. Naval jet experience has been gained with three squadrons of Sea Vampires and the straight wing, tail wheel undercarriage Sea Attacker has been abandoned. An RAF Squadron is operating alongside F-86's in the Korean War and the naval squadron is preparing to embark on HMS Eagle for service in Korean waters. The P.1081 proves itself a match for the Mig15 in dog fighting over the Yalu River and with rockets and bombs does useful work in the ground attack role. The Fleet Air Arm cross-operates with US Navy carriers and for a period flies from the land base alongside the RAF. The results are far-reaching. There is a massive inflow into the Air Ministry of up-to-date data and many young pilots are rotated through the Koran squadron to gain combat experience. Eight RAF squadrons in Britain and Germany are equipped with P.1081s and the type forms the spearhead of Fighter Command until the full advent of the Hunter in 1955-56. The vital decision is to re-equip the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons with P.1081s and, for export, Government finance is made available for the P.1081 to be re-engined with the up-rated Rolls Royce Tay engine with afterburner. Impressed with the P.1081's performance, the first nation to order the type is Australia. Thereafter a total of 250 are sold abroad. The P1081's successor, the Hunter, is chosen as the basis for long-term development. After the introduction of the Avon Hunter into RAF service, a prototype of the P.1083 variant, with 50-degree sweep and fully variable afterburning, is flown in the autumn of 1953. It is ordered into production. The P.1083 Hunter enters service in late 1956, and the RAF has its first genuine supersonic aircraft at the same time that the US Air Force introduces the Convair F-102 delta. The P.1083 proves capable of 800mph at sea level and around 780mph at 36,000ft. Export sales boom and a further development is ordered, with a twp per cent thinner wing and equipped with either air-to-air missiles or ground attack weapons. Production of single or two-seat Hunters continues into the 1970's, mainly for export.
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Admiral Beez |
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Posts: 4221 (10-Nov-2007 01:56:49) |
Are there technical reasons we couldn't have the swept wing Hawk from the start, instead of, not after, the straight wing model? The first swept wing
MiG-15 flew in 1947. I see no reason the swept wing Hawk could not be active in Korea the same time as the MiG or F-86.
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3213 (10-Nov-2007 02:38:43) |
Answer, its 1945 and the money just ran out.
Keynes is sent to get a deal from the US and comes back instead with a loan, 25% of which is wiped out in less than week by the terms of the loan (purchase of imports in dollars I think). Government stops development of swept wing aircraft during this periode, leading the quote from the RAF "all we want for Christmass is our wings swept back" a year or two later. If government had given it a priority instead of stopping it dead, then yes its quite possible to see Swept Wing SeaHawks ready for Korea. |
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NewGolconda |
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Posts: 2845 (10-Nov-2007 08:14:43) Commonwealth Moderator |
It's important not to forget the financial limitations. Great Britain ran out of financial reserves early in 1941 then pawned itself to the US to continue
the war. Churchill then insured the complete destitution of Great Britain by mobilising her economy such that Britain had the greatest portion of her GDP
serving the war machine, by a significant margin - in order to maximise the British war effort and in his eyes to retain Britain's strategic role as a
great power.
Post war Great Britain was exhausted - at one stage the home fleet was a light cruiser and some destroyers. Food rationing was carried well past the war. How do you justify research into cutting edge fighters when you have just won the war and your people are still on ration cards? There was absolutely no room to move financially until the early 1950's - at which point the British government committed to a major re armament campaign. Britain's defence spending was still unsustainable, with the early sixties budget in the +10% of GDP range - roughly double the Reagan cold war peak in the United States. It wasn't until the Thatcher reforms of the 1980's that the last of the wartime economic damage was undone. Shortcut back eighty years - Disraeli was well aware that Britain's early lead in industrialisation was about to be overtaken in Europe, and there was very little Great Britain could do about it, other than to reap the dividends that a century of trading had given them on the worlds markets. Britain maintained a first class navy 1887-1914 through her 18th/19th century industrial legacy, low cost labour and by accepting a tiny army in European terms. Maintaining a first class navy and a first class air force, even without an effective army strained the economy to its limits 1919-1939 - and the priority given to the RAF in the re armament programme can explain much of the RN's shortcomings 1939-1942. Britain never had the capacity to maintain in peacetime a first class (size and quality) air force, navy and army. Yet this is exactly what they tried to do in the cold war. Britain's 20th century fate was sealed by the cost of the war 1941-45 war, but this was not helped by the decision to maintain a British army of the Rhine, something no British government had ever contemplated, even at the peak of their strength. At some point in the 19th century British statesmen had forgotten that long term strategic conflicts were won by economic strength. The policy that had delivered global power and empire was abandoned, and that legacy of economic strength was consumed, consciously or unconsciously, in the effort required to defeat Germany twice. When you consider the British Korean War order of battle - don't wonder where all the leading edge technology on the cusp of development in 1945 went. Instead marvel that they had a semblance of a modern military at all! That they did could be put down the willingness of the British government and people to live under a rationing environment (as only one of a number of strict controls) for years in peacetime. |
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3220 (11-Nov-2007 20:29:13) |
My information does'nt tally with that, its 1941 they got warnings about the finances, '42 they began to run out of cash '43 we where dependant on
US support.
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NewGolconda |
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Posts: 2855 (11-Nov-2007 22:56:34) Commonwealth Moderator |
We could probably compare sources, or perhaps even definitions. But I know Pedden contains warnings about the depletion of foriegn reserves in 1938!
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Zen9 |
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Posts: 3224 (12-Nov-2007 01:45:20) |
I think it must have been rather more complicated than that, since various holdings where sold off during the war and on a trading market a notable ex-criminal
made millions for the UK during the war in illegal activities.
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NewGolconda |
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Posts: 2857 (12-Nov-2007 02:02:30) Commonwealth Moderator |
1941 was the year that cash and carry was suspended and lend lease introduced, which is for me the date that the British Empire was broke. The sale of British
assets in the US certainly raised money, but the money was raised at fire sale prices.
Churchill actually removed treasury from the war cabinet serveral times. Certainly the various financial arangements were complex. Arguing which year they went broke is not going to change the dire financial and economic position immediately post war, which is supported by multiple independent sources of data. |
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robertf2 |
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Posts: 299 (12-Nov-2007 03:44:24) |
Zen9 wrote: This book has a narrative of the internal workings of the British government during late 1940 and early 1941 up until the start of lend-lease. All things are open to interpretation but if the facts given are to be believed the British Government was scrabbling for dollars from late 1940 onwards. To avoided defaulting on payment of contracts without US assistance would have required massive reductions of foreign purchases not just war material, but raw materials. This would have effectively thrown the brakes on the British war effort. A conscious decision seems to have been made to continue placing new orders even though the British would not have been able to pay for these from their own means in the spirit of "may as well be hung for a sheep as well as a lamb". So not technically "broke" in the sense of being unable to pay bills when due, but dependent on the US none-the-less. Without Lend-lease the defaulting would have started in 1941, expropriation and fire-sale of assets regardless. In fact the US government took a lot of convincing the the British was in fact in dire straights and not squirreling away assets out of sight to the extent of requiring a full accounting of all British assets.. |
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robertf2 |
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Posts: 300 (12-Nov-2007 21:03:08) |
I checked the relevant chapter in Ponting's book when I got home from work and Britain and found this passage that I had forgotten in the section
describing British efforts to meet payments between the publication of the Lend Lease Bill in January 1941 and it becoming law on 11 March. (Rooseveldt refused
to make any payments until the bill was passed)..
Eventually it was a loan of L60 million of gold on 4 February [1941] from the Belgian government in London that avoided disaster. Without these loans [there was a previous Czech loan in December] Britain would have defaulted on its payments in the United States, because by the beginning of 1941 it had less than L3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default. |
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Admiral Beez |
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Posts: 4225 (13-Nov-2007 03:09:31) |
NewGolconda wrote: Well said. IMO, Britain should have never become involved in the First World War, and should have let the European powers bash each other, while simply selling equipment for profit. Had Britain avoided involvement in WW1, her economic collapse post-WW2 would have been reduced. |
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PMN1 |
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Posts: 3143 (13-Nov-2007 11:29:02) |
Admiral Beez wrote: I cant see Britain managing to stay out of conflict with Germany for too long. |
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Red Admiral |
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Posts: 1737 (13-Nov-2007 15:52:40) |
IMO, Britain should have never become involved in the First World War, and should have let the European powers bash each other, while simply selling equipment for profit.But France and Russia would have been defeated, leaving Germany and Austro-Hungary in control of most of the continent. This is not in accordance with the long term strategic policy of the UK (e.g. Napoleonic wars) In answer to the basic question, yes, something like the P.1052 would be competitive. Maybe fitted with 2x 30mm Adens instead of the 20mm? |
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Admiral Beez |
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Posts: 4226 (13-Nov-2007 16:32:04) |
Red Admiral wrote:Was continental domination Germany's goal in 1914? I would have thought that Germany's plans for 1914 would mirror its last war with France in the 1870s under Bismarck, wherein Germany bashes the hell out of the French, forces them to the Treaty table to make concessions and then withdraws (mostly) back to Germany. Germany victory in the absence of British combat troops is not guaranteed. I would have thought the higher strategic policy of the UK would be not to bankrupt the Empire in the defence of the French and Russians. |
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wabpilot |
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Posts: 1967 (14-Nov-2007 20:54:34) |
Admiral Beez wrote:Beez, I tend to agree with you that a German victory in 1914 would have looked a lot like her victory in 1870. However, I do think that British troops were essential to the French holding on in 1914. No British troops, and the Germans would have won the war in 1914. |
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bager1968 |
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Posts: 2637 (14-Nov-2007 22:02:28) |
Yes, on both points.
Without the BEF, the Germans roll up the left wing of the French forces and encircle Paris before the reinforcing troops arrive from the south to take their famous "Taxicabs of Paris" ride. I have read things to the effect that this was NOT 1870, and France would have continued the fight... but how effectively is very questionable. In mid-late 1914 the German war aims in the west were clear and simple... 1. keep the French forces out of Germany, and absorb Luxemburg. 2. at the peace conference, they would try to get eastern Belgium & a small part of France east of Verdun down to (and including) Nancy. 3. the rest of Belgium (now to be called "Flanders-Wallonia") would be a "Tributary State", and be under German political & economic supervision. 4. Holland would be brought into "the German Customs Union", and be under German economic control. Germany also had these demands for the western powers: 1. the Belgian Congo would be turned over to Germany 2. France would give up the African colonies of Dahomey and French Equatorial Africa. 3. in early 1914, Britain and Germany had agreed that, if the Portugese colonies in Africa were to be removed from Lisbon's control, Germany would get Angola and Mozambique, so Germany wanted these also. They would have quickly signed a bi-lateral armistice that ended the fighting in the west, if they got the afore-mentioned territories. They might have even settled for Luxemburg and French neutrality, if the African demands were at least partially met. It was only later, as the war dragged on, that Germany demanded larger annexations in both Europe and Africa, and full economic control of all parts of Europe, Scandanavia, and into the Middle East. |
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NewGolconda |
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Posts: 2865 (14-Nov-2007 22:22:30) Commonwealth Moderator |
To Russia, with love.
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Nick Sumner |
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Posts: 466 (16-Nov-2007 17:19:26) |
Admiral Beez wrote: Germany in 1914 was a fundamentally different country from Germany in 1870 with a different outlook and different goals. Bismarck's sure diplomatic hand was no longer guiding German policy and Wilhelm I was a very different leader than Wilhelm II
Your Text Signature ...
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JNiemczyk |
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Posts: 5736 (17-Nov-2007 19:19:46) |
Beez, to take this further O/T, IMVHO going to war in 1914 fit in perfectly with Britain and England's security strategy for the past few hundred years,
which basically boils down to two things:
1: No one single power must be allowed to dominate the Continent, be it France, Spain, or Germany. 2: No hostile power should be allowed to dominate the Low Countries and establish bases there. Not going to war in 1914 would risk both of those things happening and would probably have left us isolated in Europe with no allies and a powerful Germany. Sometimes going to war is the least worst option. And yes, I think that the P.1081 would have been competitive in Korea. |
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