See page 36 http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/aw/dti1107/index.php
C3 MOD info
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 Anthony58 |
C3 MOD info |
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Posts: 2191 ( 5-Nov-2007 02:14:00) |
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Rob |
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Posts: 494 ( 5-Nov-2007 08:34:27) |
Also some CVF news on 24-25 of this online magazine.
Link. http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/aw/dti1007/index.php |
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Kendo no sensei |
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Posts: 567 ( 5-Nov-2007 09:49:24) |
EDIT: Anthony, thanks for the info.
Last Edited By: Kendo no sensei
5-Nov-2007 15:13:42.
Edited 1 times.
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perfectgeneral |
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Posts: 220 ( 5-Nov-2007 20:34:35) |
I can understand that we might need shallow draft for mine clearing, but I think that the MoD will be hard pressed to squeeze patrol/survey/minehunt/SFO into
2000 tons. The marshes approaching Basra required helicopter drawn mine sleds. I can see these and AUVs doing the job better than trying to get the ship into
every nook and cranny. These OPVs need to have a flight deck large enough to support a helicopter that can pull a mine(sweeping/hunting) sled. I would also
expect Merlin support to be more useful for special forces deployment than that for Future Lynx (a likely interdiction aircraft). I think something more the
size of the Dutch OPV is likely ('3,750 ton').
edit for tons/tonnes
http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/Want10Destroyers/
http://petitions.pm.gov.uk/4Subs88Months/
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MSR |
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Posts: 2505 ( 5-Nov-2007 21:00:28) |
I suspect this 2,000 tonnes figure is another Treasury fop. Just as the RN has been doing for generations, it pitches a small tonnage because that's easier
to do than to educate the bean counters that it's not the size of the hull that matters, but what you put in it.
C3 should be 4,000 tonnes and have big empty holes in it for storing mission-specific equipment in a variety of hangars-come-garages located both within the aft superstructure (helicopters and UAVs and any other equipment for above deck activities) and within the hull with large access ports in the sides and a boat ramp in the stern for the deployment and recovery of UAVs and small craft and any other remote equipment, or simply for embarking or working with new equipment whilst at sea (for example, using a mexeflote alongside as a working platform). This ship would not go in harms way. It would send small remote craft into harms way. This is the only technologically feasible way in which we can achieve a vessel that can do all this in one hull.
The aim of diplomacy is to achieve results, not win arguments
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Anthony58 |
USN LCS programme ending at 2 ships? | ||
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Posts: 2194 ( 5-Nov-2007 22:50:41) |
C3 cannot go this way, I know LCS is a different concept (but is relatively lightly armed).
Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship (LCS 4) Contract (Source: US Department of Defense; issued Nov. 2, 2007) Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead announced today that the Department of the Navy is terminating construction of the fourth littoral combat ship (LCS 4) for convenience under the termination clause of the contract because the Navy and General Dynamics could not reach agreement on the terms of a modified contract. The Navy had not yet authorized construction on LCS 4, following a series of cost overruns on LCS 2. The Navy intended to begin construction of LCS 4 if the Navy and General Dynamics could agree on the terms for a fixed-price incentive agreement. The Navy worked closely with General Dynamics to try to restructure the agreement for LCS 4 to more equitably balance cost and risk, but could not come to terms and conditions that were acceptable to both parties. The Navy remains committed to the LCS program. "LCS continues to be a critical warfighting requirement for our Navy to maintain dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around the world," said Winter. "While this is a difficult decision, we recognize that active oversight and strict cost controls in the early years are necessary to ensuring we can deliver these ships to the fleet over the long term." "I am absolutely committed to the Littoral Combat Ship," said Roughead. "We need this ship. It is very important that our acquisition efforts produce the right littoral combat ship capability to the fleet at the right cost." (ends) (EDITOR'S NOTE: Having canceled Lockheed Martin's contract to build the competing LCS 3 ship in March, the US Navy now is stuck with only the two lead ships of each competing design, both of which are facing performance issues and major cost over-runs. With lukewarm Congressional backing, and many critics, the future of the entire LCS program, which was originally planned to include over 50 ships, is now very much up in the air.) http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?session=dae.30713087.1194293971.O-LC1X8AAAEAABJviJMAAAAU&modele=jdc_34 |
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MSR |
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Posts: 2507 ( 6-Nov-2007 01:06:47) |
The fatal flaw of LCS is a very familiar one. The brass hats, politicians and industrial lobbyists wanted to build a fleet of executive saloons and wanted them
to be as cheap and expendable as a supermini.
I would say capability creep killed it, but that doesn't even begin to do justice to the lack of common sense, oversight, resistance to domestic political expediency and incompetent project management that this debacle of a procurement exercise represents. Makes the MoD look like professionals. But what should we have expected? A dyed-in-the-wool, World War III, Big Ship navy tries to build a small, numerous, affordable patrol and light combat vessel that by definition is not capable of sustained industrial warfare against a 1st tier opponent... and fails. My over-riding impression has been that the USN may currently lack the right kind of personnel working in procurement who are able to shift their mindsets into the right mode of thinking - dare I say it, into a more European mode of thinking!
The aim of diplomacy is to achieve results, not win arguments
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Jim WH |
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Posts: 731 ( 6-Nov-2007 02:29:03) |
I don't think LCS is anything like dead yet. The mission modules, for example, are progressing quite nicely according to plan (on budget, on time, on
capability targets). The difficulty is that indeed capability creep entered into the construction of the sea frames, which has driven up their cost during
build. Therefore I expect that on completion of the two ordered LCS, the USN will put them through their paces, see if they need the extra bits and bobs it had
added during construction and have a good long think about the marginal utility of the more costly bits of the sea frames. I'd expect that a production
order will then follow based on the evaluation (my money would be on the GD-Austral team), although possibly for a smaller fleet than the originally envisaged
50+ LCS fleet.
If worst comes to worst and the sea frames cannot be procured at a cost that the USN can accept, then they can always package the mission modules into a far less ambitious sea frame, say roughly 2,000 tons and 20-25 knots transit speed (sound familiar?). Which would be a blow to the USN (they wanted that speed badly) but would mean that they could procure enough ships to have them prepositioned around the world. |
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Colin Mc |
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Posts: 554 ( 6-Nov-2007 09:31:04) |
What is the situation with the C-Project? First the emphasis was on C3, then it was a rush to get a design together for a C2 Main Gate next year - another
source said it was for C1. Any snippets? I am suffering from snippet starvation!
I hope all this robotic MCM stuff delivers; the RN has made MCM a speciality - be a shame to squader it. Me - I can't make up my mind. C2 looks like a grown up C3 to me, only fewer in number and for MCM not as handy. On another thread there is discussion about Absolom and the lack of NATO naval standards. Presumably, C2 will approach them and C3 like Absolom, won't. When you read what the standards are you wonder why fully featured warships in the Falklands succumbed to a few old fashioned iron bombs - though having said that Plymouth was heroic. Anybody got any views?
Last Edited By: Colin Mc
6-Nov-2007 09:33:41.
Edited 1 times.
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pymes75 |
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Posts: 1042 ( 6-Nov-2007 12:55:59) |
"I hope all this robotic MCM stuff delivers; the RN has made MCM a speciality - be a shame to squader it."
Me too. I can't help but think that increasing the 'stand off MCM' capability has got to be where the future lies. Stationing larger, better armed (Point Defence) mother ship from which UUVs/UAVs/Helos and engineers in LCAC(L)s (remember Al Faw in 2003?) are launched has to be a better way of going about clearing littoral areas. 'Stand Off'/OTH MCM would improve security of the force as well as helping to avoid giving away the location of any planned horizontal assault in the build up to an amphibious landing. |
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Jim WH |
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Posts: 733 ( 6-Nov-2007 13:39:42) |
The future of UUV is certainly very promising for MCM, but it is really important to note that this will simply be an evolutionary growth from the techniques
and systems that have been used of routinely for in excess of 30 years. We do all realise that the first successful implementation of unmanned platforms in a
military setting was minehunting don't we? The principal systems aboard the Sandown class are the sonar system and the unmanned disposal system (the PAP),
and of course it was all trialled on the Ton class quite a while before that too...
The big thing in the next couple of decade will be autonomous UUV (as opposed the remote controlled PAP) and getting longer range out of them. Both of these developments will be well served by developments in the commercial and military settings (e.g. far more powerful COTS derived computers running modified versions of the algorithms that fly UAV), by big investment by the USN (they want to have 'organic' MCM UUV deployable from their destroyer fleet inside of the next couple of years IIRC), and may well benefit from some left field technology rearing its head on the sidelines (e.g. discrete broadband underwater communications techniques, developed by accident in WA a few years ago, and currently being investigated by the USN, RN and RAN with reference to applications like MCM). But the point is that it is essentially a predictable evolutionary process, which is the reason that C3 (as it is proposed at the moment) should be an effective MCM vessel. |
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Colin Mc |
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Posts: 555 ( 7-Nov-2007 12:29:45) |
Anybody got a view on what the difference in MCM capability will be between C3 and C2. Will it just be a standard fit out for both classes or will C3 have the
edge? Or will it be the other way round - C2 being able to survive in more hazardous operations, because of its better defences, will have a more complete
range of kit?
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Jim WH |
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Posts: 737 ( 7-Nov-2007 13:07:56) |
I don't know that there is anything in the public domain on the subject, but I suppose there are a few consideration to answering that question:
-Will C3 be carrying it's own on-board sensors for mine detection, or will it be strictly off-board? -Will C2 even carry MCM UUV? [Be stupid not to, IMHO] -If both C2 and C3 carry MCM UUV, will C2 be able to carry more or less of them than C3? -Will C3 be equipped with a sweep (probably a bad idea these days)? -Will C3 be built specifically for low signature WRT to sea mines? Will C2 be built to the same standards? -Will the RN be investing in helicopter based mine-sweeping? And if so, would C2 be able to field it? Basically, there is no way of knowing based on the information currently available. And it is worth remembering that for the moment S2C2 was simply an in house study, not an official program, so it's probably a touch early to be considering exhaustive specifications. |
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CVA02 |
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Posts: 307 ( 8-Nov-2007 00:04:11) |
MSR wrote: The insurmountable problem with the LCS program is the "European mode of thinking" behind the design and procurement process. Both contractors submitted to political pressure to buy in far too much European content, which has exacerbated the cost issues of a very poorly framed and executed program. European and Australian contractors very effectively lobbied members of U.S. Congress and the result is program that served the immediate interests of the European and Australian contractors in question, but failed in every other conceivable aspect. |
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Jim WH |
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Posts: 740 ( 8-Nov-2007 00:10:53) |
Australia involvement is limited to two discrete components of the system:
-The sea frame of the GD submission, based on a design by an Australian firm (Austral), but built in the US. -The Nulka active decoy. Both of those components won on merit, not on Australian lobbying. The fact of the matter is that if you are after an advanced hull form it is hard to go past Austral, as they're one of the very few firms to actually build large wave piercing catamarans and large trimarans commercially. |
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